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Abstract
Scientific explanation is an important goal of scientific practise. Philosophers
have proposed a striking diversity of seemingly incompatible accounts of explanation,
from deductive-nomological to statistical relevance, unification, pragmatic, causal-
mechanical, mechanistic, causal intervention, asymptotic, and model-based accounts.
In this dissertation I apply two novel methods to reexamine our evidence about sci-
entific explanation in practise and thereby address the fragmentation of philosophical
accounts.
I start by collecting a data set of 781 articles from one year of the journal Science.
Using automated text mining techniques I measure the frequency and distribution
of several groups of philosophically interesting words, such as “explain”, “cause”,
“evidence”, “theory”, “law”, “mechanism”, and “model”. I show that “explain”
words are much more common in scientific writing than in other genres, occurring
in roughly half of all articles, and that their use is very often qualified or negated.
These results about the use of words complement traditional conceptual analysis.
Next I use random samples from the data set to develop a large number of small
case studies across a wide range of scientific disciplines. I use a sample of “explain”
sentences to develop and defend a new general philosophical account of scientific
explanation, and then test my account against a larger set of randomly sampled
sentences and abstracts. Five coarse categories can classify the explanans and ex-
plananda of my cases: data, entities, kinds, models, and theories. The pair of the
categories of the explanans and explanandum indicates the “form” of an explana-
tion. The explain-relation supports counterfactual reasoning about the dependence
of qualities of the explanandum on qualities of the explanans. But for each form
there is a different “core relation” between explanans and explanandum that sup-
ports the explain-relation. Causation, modelling, and argument are the core relations
for different forms of scientific explanation between different categories of explanans
and explananda. This flexibility allows me to resolve some of the fragmentation in
the philosophical literature. I provide empirical evidence to show that my general
philosophical account successfully describes a wide range of scientific practise across
a large number of scientific disciplines.
Keywords: philosophy of science, scientific explanation, natural kinds, scientific
models, scientific theories, text mining, case study method, philosophical methodol-
ogy
iii
To Bob, for helping me find my own path.
To Judy, for helping me follow it.
To Lily and Andrew, whom we met along the way.
iv
Acknowledgements
My doctoral research was made possible by a Canada Graduate Scholarships Doc-
toral Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
I gratefully acknowledge funding from Prof. Robert Batterman, the Joseph L. Rotman
Institute of Philosophy, the London Health Sciences Centre Department of Medical
Imaging, and the Canadian Institutes for Health Research Team in Image-Guided
Prostate Cancer Management. I would like to thank the University of Pittsburgh for
hosting me for two semesters, in 2009 and 2011, with the support of a CGS Michael
Smith Foreign Study Supplement from SSHRC. I would also like to thank the Tilburg
Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science for a very pleasant and productive visiting
fellowship in 2011.
To the teachers, staff, colleagues, friends, and family who have supported me in
so many ways, I continue to offer my most sincere thanks.
v
Contents
Certificate of Examination ii
Abstract iii
Dedication iv
Acknowledgements v
1 Explanation 1
1.1 Explanation in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Philosophy of Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.2 Philosophical Accounts of Scientific Explanation . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 Too Many Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Evidence Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5 A General Philosophical Account of Scientific Explanation . . . . . . 14
1.6 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.7 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Words 21
2.1 Text Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 Importance of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Generality of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.4 Explanation as a Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Evidence for Philosophical Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
vi
3 Analysis 40
3.1 The Case Study Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Selecting Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Sample A – Cases of “Explain” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.3.1 Case A12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.2 Case A14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.3 Case A4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.4 Case A10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3.5 Phrases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.3.6 Preliminary Glosses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.7 Normal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3.8 Patterns of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.9 Categories and Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.10 The Structure of an Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.3.11 Revised Glosses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3.12 Preliminary Evidence for the Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 A General Philosophical Account of Scientific Explanation . . . . . . 60
3.4.1 Connections to Other Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Sample B – Beyond “Explain” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5.1 Case B1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.5.2 Evidence and Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.3 The Importance of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6 Sample C – Aiming to Explain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6.1 Case C4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.6.2 Explanation as a Goal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.7 Evidence for This Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.7.1 The Generality of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.7.2 Forms of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.7.3 Evidence for Other Accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4 Data 78
4.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 Data in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4 Forms of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
vii
4.4.1 Secondary: Data-Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5 Entities 86
5.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.3 Entities in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5.4 Forms of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.4.1 Primary: Entity-Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.4.2 Secondary: Entity-Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6 Kinds 97
6.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.3 Kinds in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.4 Forms of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.4.1 Primary: Kind-Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.4.2 Secondary: Kind-Kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
7 Models 106
7.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
7.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
7.3 Models in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
7.4 Forms of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7.4.1 Primary: Model-Kind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7.4.2 Secondary: Model-Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8 Theories 118
8.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
8.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
8.3 Theories in Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
8.4 Forms of Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
8.4.1 Primary: Theory-Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
8.4.2 Secondary: Theory-Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
9 Conclusions 127
A Appendix A: Case Studies 130
A.1 Index of Cases by Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
viii
A.2 Sample A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
A.3 Sample B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A.4 Sample C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
B Appendix B: Code Listings 235
B.1 Articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
B.2 Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
B.3 Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
B.4 Frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
B.5 Genres . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
B.6 N-Grams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
B.7 Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
B.8 Samples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
B.9 Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
B.10 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
Bibliography 262
Curriculum Vitae 273
ix
List of Tables
2.1 For each word group we make four measurements: the number of arti-
cles containing at least one word in that group; the percentage of such
articles among the 781 in the data set; the number of tokens matched
from that group; and the number of tokens from that group averaged
over all of the articles in the data set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.2 The number of tokens per million words for each word group in each
of the three corpora. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 The four lists show the ten most common “n-grams” – two-word, three-
word, four-word, and five-word phrases – that include either “explain”
or “be explained”. For each phrase the number of occurrences is listed
as well as its percentage among the 471 total occurrences of “explain”
and “be explained” in the data set. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 The two lists show the most common phrases from the list generated
by a systematic combination of a modal [“may”, “can”, “could”] with
a base [“explain”, “be explained”, “show”] and negations. For each
phrase the number of occurrences is listed, as well as its percentage
among the total occurrences of the base phrase(s) in the data set. . . 30
3.1 Normalized structure of the explanation in case A4. . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 The number of cases in sample A for each of the 25 forms of expla-
nation, where each form is the pair of an explanans type (row) and
an explanandum type (column), and the five categories of data, entity,
kind, model, and theory classify both explanans and explanandum. . 59
x
3.3 Summary of results by sample and in total, showing: 1. the number
of cases sampled; 2. the number of cases for which at least one expla-
nation on my account was found; 3. the number of cases for which at
least one evidential claim on my account was found; 4. the number
of cases for which at least one explanation or evidential claim on my
account was found; 5. the percentage of cases containing at least one
explanation on my account; 6. the percentage of cases containing at
least one evidential claim on my account; 7. the percentage of cases
containing at least one explanation or evidential claim on my account;
8. the number of explanations on my account found across all cases; 9.
the number of evidential claims on my account found across all cases;
10. the sum of the number of explanations and evidential claims on
my account found across all cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4 Breakdown of results by article keyword, showing: 1. the number
of articles with that keyword; 2. the percentage of articles with that
keyword among all the articles; 3. the number of articles from which at
least one case was sampled; 4. the percentage of the articles with that
keyword from which at least one case was sampled; 5. the number
of cases sampled from articles with that keyword; 6. the number of
cases sampled from articles with that keyword that include at least
one explanation on my account; 7. the number of cases sampled from
articles with that keyword that include at least one evidence claim on
my account; 8. the number of cases sampled from articles with that
keyword that include at least one explanation or evidence claim on my
account; 9. the percentage (if any) of cases sampled from articles with
that keyword that include at least one explanation or evidence claim
on my account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5 The number of explanations and evidence claims on my account among
the sampled cases, broken down by form of explanation. The results
are given by sample and in total (major rows), and by type (major
columns): explanations alone, combined (explanations and evidence
claims), and evidence claims alone. Within each minor table the row
provides the category of the explanans and the column provides the
category of the explanandum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
xi
List of Figures
1.1 A plot of the number of articles in the data set by keyword. . . . . . 12
1.2 The five categories, four primary relations, and examples of five sec-
ondary relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 General structure of a theory-data explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Plot of the percentage of articles that contain one or more tokens from
each word group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2 Plot of the number of tokens from each word group. . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3 Plot of the number of tokens from each word group for the three corpora. 29
2.4 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “explain” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indi-
cating the overall percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token of
“because”, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall
percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “show” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating
the overall percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.7 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “law” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating
the overall percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.8 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “theory” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indi-
cating the overall percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.9 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “cause” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicat-
ing the overall percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
xii
2.10 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “mechanism” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line
indicating the overall percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.11 Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “model” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indi-
cating the overall percentage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.12 Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of words in the
“explain” group occur in articles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.13 Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of words in the
“understand” group occur in articles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.14 Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of “because” occur
in articles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.15 Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of words in the
“cause” group occur in articles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.1 The five categories, four primary relations, and examples of five sec-
ondary relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2 General structure of a theory-data explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Visualization of table 3.2 in which darker colours indicate larger values. 59
3.4 Visualization of table 3.5 in which darker colours indicate larger values. 75
xiii
Chapter 1
Explanation
1.1 Explanation in Science
One of the goals of science is explanation. Scientists explain to other scientists how a
particular gene regulates a phenotype, how patterns in the luminance of a particular
star indicate the presence of planets, how the sizes of the populations of two particular
linked species vary with environmental changes. Scientists explain to their students
how genes are transcribed and code for proteins, how planets orbit and occlude stars,
how the sizes of populations of organisms change and correlate. And scientists explain
to the public and to policy makers how genes affect health and disease, the place of our
planet and sun among the stars, and the effects of ecology on our lives and livelihoods.
Explanation is a practise that cuts across scientific disciplines and extends far
beyond the sciences. We offer explanations to each other and to ourselves in our
daily lives and in our various specialized fields. But the importance of science and the
differences between scientific practises and other practises have led many to consider
scientific explanation as a topic of study in its own right. By understanding scientific
explanation we may shed light on other forms of explanation, or on the distinction
between science and non-science. These goals are important, but the primary goal
here is to understand what scientific explanation is. This is valuable to the extent
that it leads to better scientific explanations and thus to better science.
But scientific explanation is not well understood. Scientists themselves seem to
find the concept slippery. Textbook discussions of scientific method often tangle to-
gether hypothesis, prediction, and explanation without elucidating the latter.1 Great
1For instance see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method. Hypothesis
and prediction are distinct from explanation. Some hypotheses are merely predictions, and one
can have both a prediction that does not explain and an explanation that does not predict.
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scientists, famous for giving excellent explanations, are often unreflective or at best
unclear about what makes a good explanation.2 Psychologists have looked into what
makes a proposed explanation satisfying – the “ah-ha!” moment – but there are too
many examples where such a feeling is misleading (Trout 2007). Artificial intelligence
researchers have built systems that can discover explanations of a sort, but only in a
narrow range of highly restricted cases (J. R. Josephson and S. G. Josephson 1996).
And all too often popular articles on scientific topics demonstrate confusion about
what scientists have explained and have not explained. While scientific explanation
is important, its nature and role are not as clear as they should be.
In this dissertation I take a philosophical approach toward scientific explanation.
Philosophers have written extensively on the topic for 60 years, building on a tradition
with ancient roots (Woodward 2011). Like most philosophers, I set aside questions of
the psychology of explanation and the discovery of explanations, and ask instead what
a scientific explanation is. I approach explanation as a topic in the general philosophy
of science, cutting across scientific disciplines. And I combine traditional analysis and
case studies with some new methods designed to keep the focus on scientific practise
while covering a representative sample of cases. The result is a general account of
scientific explanation that applies to a broad range of scientific practise, and that
incorporates a number of insights from the philosophy of science literature. In this
chapter I lay out my project and present an overview of my account.
1.2 Philosophy of Science
1.2.1 Background
Philosophy of science has roots in ancient philosophy. Pre-Socratic philosophers of-
fered cosmological explanations of the nature of the world, its origins, its elements,
and the order beneath its apparent diversity (Hankinson 2001). In this way they were
precursors to modern scientists of many stripes. Aristotle not only took steps for-
ward in science and scientific method but also in the philosophy of science and the
understanding of explanation. His four causes are perhaps best understood as four
forms of explanation, where his efficient causes are the best fit with the modern use of
“cause”. Aristotle also elucidated natural kinds and developed a logic for reasoning
2Richard Feynman’s autobiographical Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman is reflective but cer-
tainly not clear (Feynman, Leighton, and Hutchings 1985), and I would say the same for his interview
on the BBC TV series “Fun to Imagine” (1983) available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=wMFPe-DwULM or transcribed at http://lesswrong.com/r/discussion/lw/99c/.
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about them, both of which have an important role in explanation.
Between Aristotle and the 20th century, science and the philosophy of science
both matured. Some philosophical topics discussed over this long period that remain
important include causation, laws of nature, deduction and induction, and questions
of realism and empiricism, among others. But explanation itself was not a central
topic for philosophers concerned with science.
In the 20th century both science and philosophy of science became increasingly
specialized. Philosophy of science as its own field of philosophy developed out of the
Vienna Circle and strands of American pragmatism in the first half of the century
(Woodward 2011; Reisch 2005; Richardson 2002). Carl Hempel made explanation an
important topic in the emerging field (Woodward 2011; Hempel and Oppenheim 1948;
Hempel 1965b). His empiricist commitments made him skeptical of appeals to causa-
tion, and his deductive-nomological (D-N) account of scientific explanation relies in-
stead on deduction from natural laws and initial conditions. D-N was very influential
on subsequent accounts of explanation, of which there are many, including: inductive-
statistical (Hempel 1965a); statistical relevance (Salmon 1971); unification (Friedman
1974; Kitcher 1989); pragmatic (van Fraassen 1980); causal mechanical (Salmon 1984;
Dowe 2000); mechanistic (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000; Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen 2005); causal intervention (Woodward 2003); asymptotic (Batterman 2002);
model-based (Bokulich 2009); and more.
Philosophy of science as a field has often followed larger trends in science and
the public perception of science. Until the 1970s, philosophy of science was almost
exclusively focused on the science of physics. Physics was taken as the paradigm for
other sciences by philosophers, by physicists, and often by scientists in other fields.
And so philosophers of science working on explanation focused on explanation in
physics, with its universal, exceptionless laws, various relations between them, their
instantiation in differential equations, and so on. The so-called “special sciences”
(sciences other than physics) were often taken to be reducible to physics (Oppenheim
and Putnam 1958; Nagel 1961). But even within the science of physics, the focus was
largely on two main areas: quantum mechanics and particle physics on the one hand,
and gravitation and space-time on the other. Other important areas of physics, such
as thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, fluid dynamics, and solid state physics,
were excluded along with the special sciences. The result was a narrow view of science
and scientific explanation, still heavily influenced by the Newtonian revolution. While
appropriate for philosophical questions in fundamental physics, it was a poor fit for
other scientific disciplines.
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This narrow focus began to change with the increasing scope and power of the sci-
ence of biology. The discovery of DNA was one triumph in a cascade of advances. A
new generation of philosophers of biology began to examine thorny conceptual issues
in genetics and evolution. On the subject of explanation they found that the existing
accounts fell far short. Laws of biology may exist but they are few and far between,
and do not play the central role given to them in physics. Rather than mathemat-
ical equations, biological explanations are often narrative or focus on systems that
are stable by degrees. Biologists and physicists use “mechanism” to mean quite dif-
ferent things. And it is difficult to resist assigning purposes to biological organs
and organisms because their behaviour appears so purposeful. Biologists appeal to
causes, functions, models, and mechanisms in their explanations, and so philosophers
of biology have appealed to these concepts to elucidate biological explanation.
The philosophy of physics and the philosophy of biology are the most prominent
among a growing number of philosophies of specific sciences. Philosophy of cognitive
science and philosophy of neuroscience are increasingly important and independent.
In much of cognitive science the nature of the mind is explained in terms of functional
modules. Those functional explanations build on the concept of biological function,
but also on a computational sense of function. Mechanistic accounts of explanation
for neuroscience build on biological mechanisms, but also on analogies to electronic
circuits. So here too we see different approaches of explanation growing out of the
specialized concerns of emerging philosophies of specific sciences.
As a final example, philosophies of the various social sciences have their own
concerns that have implications for explanation. The social sciences must deal with
individuals acting with intentions, who are communicating or concealing those inten-
tions. Their explanations are sometimes singular and historical, sometimes general
and probabilistic. Philosophers of science working in anthropology, archaeology, eco-
nomics, and other fields must grapple with these differences. I only mention that
there is growing interest in philosophy of chemistry, climatology, medicine, and more,
as demonstrated by the proceedings of recent conferences.
The diversity of philosophies of specific sciences has been, and continues to be,
productive and valuable for philosophy and for science. Many important questions can
only be answered by means of such deep and specialized analysis. But the diversity
has also led to fragmentation. In many of these areas there have been claims that
existing philosophical accounts of scientific explanation are insufficient. As the long
list of philosophical accounts of explanation given above suggests, the literature on
scientific explanation is fragmented.
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No doubt there is great diversity among the sciences. And no doubt it was a na¨ıve
vision that earlier philosophers of science had of physics as the model science to which
all others would conform. But the failure of that vision need not lead us to accept
its antithesis: that there is no common core to scientific explanation. I argue that
there is a shared structure among the various forms of explanation. But before I put
forward my argument we had best briefly survey some of the accounts of scientific
explanation that philosophers have offered.
1.2.2 Philosophical Accounts of Scientific Explanation
Most histories of philosophical engagement with scientific explanation, including Wood-
ward 2011, begin with Carl Hempel’s D-N account. Here I do the same, and give short
synopses of several other prominent accounts in rough chronological order.
Deductive-Nomological A D-N explanation is a sound argument in first-order
predicate logic that essentially includes at least one natural law as a premise,
and for which the explanandum (the statement of the thing being explained) is
the conclusion (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948). If the natural laws are removed
the deduction must fail. The other premises will often include boundary con-
ditions and initial conditions. D-N explanations are usually taken to explain
particular events, making predictions about the state of a system. However
Hempel also intended D-N to apply to the deduction of special laws from more
general ones.
D-N has been a very influential account. However it faces a large number of
challenges and standard counterexamples (Salmon 1989, §2.3). Many subsequent
accounts were designed specifically to addresses problems with D-N.
Statistical Relevance Wesley Salmon developed the statistical-relevance account
to address failures of D-N to capture information about relevant causes (Salmon
1971). He appeals to a notion of statistical relevance, requiring that for C to
be relevant to B it must the case that P (B|A ∧ C) 6= P (B|A). This condition
has intuitive appeal. However it requires the right partition of the space of
possibilities, and it turns out to be very difficult to state necessary and sufficient
criteria for the partition. Technical problems forced Salmon to abandon the
statistical relevance account, but similar work has continued and found success
in the form of structural equation models (Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines 2000).
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Unification This approach to explanation takes theoretical unification to be a con-
dition for successful explanation. Michael Friedman presented an account based
on this intuitive notion (Friedman 1974), and Philip Kitcher criticized (Kitcher
1976) and extended it (Kitcher 1989). On Kitcher’s version we have an explana-
tory store of schemata for explaining the phenomena we observe, and the goal
is to expand the scope of our explanations while reducing the size of the store.
We do this by discovering increasingly powerful but stringent schemata. The
intuitive appeal of this account is undermined by some of its consequences, such
as its inability to distinguish between explanatory unifications and cases where
the same formalism happens to apply in multiple cases, and its inability to allow
for a shallow explanation to count as explanatory when a deeper explanation is
available.
Pragmatic Bas van Fraassen argues that an explanation is simply an answer to a
why-question (van Fraassen 1977). What answer should be accepted is a mat-
ter of pragmatics. Every question presupposes a contrast class of acceptable
answers, and to answer the question is to pick out a member of that class.
Alternatively, one can reject the question and its presuppositions. Depending
on the context, almost anything one can think of could be an answer to some
question, and so there is little more to say about the nature of a well-formed
explanation. A consequence of van Fraassen’s view is that there is no distinct
category of scientific explanation – science does not explain, but merely pro-
vides facts and principles that are employed in our answers to why-questions
(van Fraassen 1977, p. 149).
Causal-Mechanical After rejecting statistical relevance Salmon turned to an ac-
count of singular causal explanation. His concern was an analysis of causation
compatible with our knowledge of physics, such that a “mark” can be transmit-
ted by the causal interaction. Philip Dowe developed a related account (Dowe
2000). Both are suspicious of appeals to counterfactual conditions to spell out
causation. Christopher Hitchcock has raised the criticism that causally relevant
aspects of mark-transmission often pull apart from the explanatorily relevant
aspects that Salmon was trying to distinguish (Hitchcock 1996). While perhaps
successful as an account of explanation for photons in the void, it is difficult to
see how the account can apply to the tangled causal webs studied in the special
sciences.
Mechanisms Very much concerned with causal explanation in the special sciences
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are several accounts of “mechanisms”. I will focus on Machamer, Darden,
and Craver’s (MDC) account (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). An MDC
mechanism is a system of entities and activities organized to be productive of
changes from start conditions to termination conditions. To explain an event
is to describe the mechanisms that generated it. Their use of “mechanism”,
as in much of contemporary scientific practise, goes far beyond mechanisms
as machines and the science of mechanics (Craver and Darden 2005). Along
with mechanisms they describe mechanism schemata and mechanism sketches
to fill epistemic roles in their account. The MDC mechanism approach has been
applied to a wide range of special science cases.
Causal Intervention James Woodward has developed a general account of causal
explanation based in part on the structural equations literature (Woodward
2003). Woodward tries to capture very general features of causal explanation
explicitly in terms of counterfactual dependencies. An explanation should an-
swer “what if things had been different” questions about the explanans and the
explanandum. The truth of the explanation depends upon truths about what
would have been different if we had intervened at some point in the relevant
causal chain. As with mechanisms, this approach is well suited to explanation
in the special sciences.
Asymptotic Robert Batterman’s account of asymptotic explanations handles an
important set of cases in statistical mechanics and solid state physics where
all other accounts fall short (Batterman 2002). Physicists’ explanations in these
examples revolve around the behaviour of a system in the limit as some quantity
approaches infinity. In some cases the infinite quantity is the number of particles
in the system, while in other cases it is the inverse of a wavelength. In each
case the idealization contradicts our knowledge that the system is finite in the
relevant respect, but the idealization cannot be relaxed or eliminated without
abandoning the explanation. The idealization, which we know to be false, is
essential to our best scientific explanation of the phenomenon.
Model Reflections on the pervasiveness of idealized models in science have led to
other accounts of explanation, of which I take Alisa Bokulich’s as one example
(Bokulich 2009). Bokulich argues that a model explains its target when it ex-
hibits a pattern of counterfactual dependencies about the target and meets an
additional “justificatory step” that specifies its domain of application.
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1.2.3 Too Many Explanations
The first thing to note about these philosophical accounts of explanation is their
variety. Explanations are variously logical arguments, collections of statistical infor-
mation, argument schemata, answers to why-questions, descriptions of mechanisms,
descriptions of causal relations, mathematical arguments, or models. If we look at
these accounts as each proposing an explain-relation, then the relata of the various
explain-relations are quite different: laws of nature, predictions, theories, statements
of probabilities, particular events, models, questions, sets of possible answers, etc.
Most of these accounts apply (or apply best) to a subset of the sciences. The
D-N, statistical relevance, unification, and causal mechanical accounts apply best to
fundamental physics. All of them rely on laws of nature, but it is far from clear that
laws of nature play the same central role in biology that they do in physics (Smart
1959; Beatty 1995). The singular causal chains of the causal mechanical account
are a poor fit for the complicated causal tangles present in a cell or organism. On
the other hand, the mechanistic and causal intervention accounts apply very well in
certain special sciences, but can be a poor fit for quantum mechanics or space-time
theories. Their reliance on causation prevents them from capturing mathematical
explanation, where acausal numbers and mathematical functions play an essential
role. The asymptotic explanation account works very well for a set of cases where all
the previous accounts fail. It provides wide-ranging lessons about idealization, but it
is not general in scope.
On the other hand, Bokulich’s model account is general and can probably be
applied to cases in any science, if not to every case of scientific explanation. The
pragmatic account of explanation is very general – it is designed to account for all
forms of explanation.
It is also worth considering how these accounts are motivated and the evidence
given to support them. In the original paper, the D-N account is presented using toy
examples from physics. The statistical relevance account responds to D-N and some
of the toy examples that were proposed as counterexamples. In his survey of scientific
explanation Woodward notes how peculiar it is that philosophers discussing scientific
explanation should so often appeal to homely examples of non-scientific explanations
(Woodward 2011, §1, §2.4). The latter four accounts, however, are supported by case
studies. The original MDC paper provides two cases: the discovery of DNA and
a standard model of neurotransmission. It has been applied to a variety of cases
in other publications. Woodward’s book includes a range of cases, and Batterman
develops several cases in great depth. Bokulich’s paper discusses Bohr’s model of the
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atom and cites a number of model explanations in the literature. I think that this
shift in the evidence given as support is representative of a larger shift away from toy
examples and toward detailed cases in the philosophy of science.
None of these accounts is universally accepted. The case studies provide evidence
that scientists do in fact offer mechanistic explanations, causal intervention expla-
nations, asymptotic explanations, and model explanations. Even this diversity is
striking. Is scientific explanation really so heterogeneous, covering so many different
relata? And if so, is it then fragmented by discipline or topic? Is there a general
account of scientific explanation to be had amid this diversity?
To settle these questions I think we must reconsider our evidence about the prac-
tise of scientific explanation. How do scientists, in various disciplines, explain?
1.3 Evidence Base
While there are many sources of evidence about scientific practise, some are easier to
make use of than others. I have chosen to consider scientific articles recently published
in the journal Science. Several factors played a role in this decision.
First, the publication of an article is one of the main goals of most scientific
research. This gives scientific articles a special status. Publication in Science is
especially prestigious – these articles are held up as ideals toward which scientists
should strive. This introduces a normative factor into my discussions of scientific
explanation. If I can correctly describe the use of scientific explanation in these
articles then I will have described some norms for scientific practise. In this way my
project has both a descriptive and a normative aspect.
On a practical basis, published articles are easy to access and easy to collect in
large numbers. It is a virtue of an evidence base that all sides in the debate have
ready access to the data. It is also easy to draw a range of inferences about scientific
practise from sets of published articles, given the right methods.
I also believe that, for the overwhelming majority of hypothesis-driven scientific
articles, their central claim is some sort of explanation or the rejection of some ex-
planation. If I am correct then scientific articles are an excellent source of evidence
about scientific explanation. One of the goals of my analysis is to test whether this
is in fact the case.
In choosing to apply novel methods to a large set of published articles from Science
my goal has been to expand the range of evidence available in the philosophical debate
over scientific explanation. But I recognize that this evidence base is still limited in
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many ways.
Scientific publications present only a fraction of scientific knowledge and practise.
Years of painstaking work in the lab and in the field are neatly glossed in a few
thousand words. Traditionally, philosophers of science have focused on the public
face of science and ignored the myriad private details of scientific practise. But
sociologists and historians have applied their own methods to the inner workings of
science, and philosophers are increasingly engaged with such research.
I believe that the methods I develop in this dissertation could be successfully
adapted and applied to, for instance, transcripts from laboratories and other ethno-
graphic records. Without denying that there are many differences between public and
private practise, I also believe that my general philosophical account of scientific ex-
planation applies just as well to informal conversation as it does to the printed page.
It would be fascinating to test these beliefs against an evidence base that reflects the
private practise of science.
However, such a study would itself be limited without a supporting analysis of
public practise. In order to sufficiently address my three questions about importance,
generality, and goals, my methods also require a very large and diverse evidence base.
Ethnographic research is laborious, and ethnographic records are relatively rare, but
publications are plentiful and easy to collect in large numbers. In short, I think that
an analysis of publications is the right place to start, and I hope that in the future
this work will be extended to encompass a wider range of evidence.
The choice of publications from the journal Science also requires some justification.
Science is an outstanding journal in several senses. Not only it is prestigious, it is
especially competitive, and its mission is to publish highly influential papers. Such
papers can also be high-risk, and more prone to retraction than those published in
other journals. Science articles are especially short, compared to other journals, which
may have a significant effect on the use of language. In short, by choosing Science as
the source of my evidence I may be introducing bias into my analysis.
My methods can easily be adapted to publications in other scientific journals. The
same methods could be applied to the top journals in various scientific disciplines (e.g.
Cell, or more specifically Annual Review of Immunology), and the results compared
to Science. However, an analysis of one or a few specialized journals would not allow
me to sufficiently address my three main questions about importance, generality, and
goals. The evidence base I have chosen is the right starting point, but by no means
the end of the road.
Finally, by choosing publications from one recent year of Science I am open to
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other possible biases. Doubtless there are trends in the use of language by scientists,
some of which may be significant to this analysis. My analysis will also be blind to
changes in the nature of scientific explanation over time. A temporal analysis might
be able to show trends in philosophy or philosophy of science reflected in science. I
have thought it best to start with a snapshot contemporary science before trying to
describe changes over time. I leave these interesting questions to future work.
My evidence base for this dissertation consists of 781 scientific articles from the
journal Science. It includes all 72 of the long-form “research articles” and all 709 of the
shorter-form “reports” published in regular issues between September 24, 2010 and
September 23, 2011. I consider the abstracts and bodies of these articles, excluding
their bibliographies and supplementary materials, for a total of approximately 1.6
million words and 11 million characters.
The set of articles covers a wide range of scientific disciplines, as shown in the fol-
lowing list. The number of articles marked with that keyword is given in parentheses.
Figure 1.1 shows a plot of the number of articles by keyword. I have organized the
keywords in order to draw out potential similarities between physical sciences, life
sciences, and social sciences. I freely admit the shortcomings of this ordering but I
believe it is slightly more informative than an alphabetical listing.
• (3) Computers, Mathe-
matics
• (60) Physics
• (26) Physics, Applied
• (65) Chemistry
• (36) Materials Science
• (1) Engineering
• (27) Astronomy
• (29) Planetary Science
• (33) Geochemistry, Geo-
physics
• (19) Atmospheric Sci-
ence
• (12) Oceanography
• (52) Biochemistry
• (35) Molecular Biology
• (25) Microbiology
• (50) Cell Biology
• (21) Genetics
• (26) Development
• (34) Evolution
• (27) Ecology
• (23) Botany
• (18) Paleontology
• (3) Anatomy, Morphol-
ogy, Biomechanics
• (8) Physiology
• (6) Virology
• (19) Immunology
• (26) Medicine, Diseases
• (2) Epidemiology
• (54) Neuroscience
• (15) Psychology
• (3) Sociology
• (2) Economics
• (14) Anthropology
• (7) Education
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Figure 1.1: A plot of the number of articles in the data set by keyword.
1.4 Analysis
To address this broad and rich set of data I take two distinct approaches. The first
is to use automated text mining techniques to search for words of interest such as
“explain” and “cause”. Second, and more important, I take random samples from
the data set and use them to develop a large number of small case studies across
a wide range of scientific disciplines. From these cases I develop and test a general
philosophical account of scientific explanation.
The first approach is a novel one in philosophy. Using computer programs I search
through the millions of words in the data set for patterns in their usage. I measure
the frequency and distribution of these words, look for the most common phrases that
they occur in, and consider the positions at which they occur in the articles. The
evidence I collect is no substitute for a conceptual analysis of the words of interest,
but it provides some valuable new information.
My second approach is more traditional than the first. The case study is a method
that philosophers of science rely upon. But by using random samples to collect a large
number of cases I am able to support much stronger claims than a traditional case
studies can. With a large number of cases I can show that the account I develop
applies across a wide range of sciences. And by ensuring that my selection of cases
is unbiased, I can show that my account of explanation applies to a large portion of
the claims that scientists make in their papers.
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There are three questions driving my analysis using these two different approaches.
The first is whether scientific explanation is important for science. The second is
whether scientific explanation is general, occurring across a wide range of scientific
disciplines. The third is whether explanation is a goal of science. My ultimate
conclusions are all affirmative: that explanation is important, that it is general with
a general account to describe it, and that it is a goal toward which scientists strive.
The general account I propose addresses the problem of fragmentation, and its broad
applicability reaffirms the importance of scientific explanation for the philosophy of
science.
To address these three questions I begin with the usage of “explain” words in Sci-
ence. I use text mining to show that “explain” is a common word but not ubiquitous.
It has strong connotations and so scientists tend to qualify their use of the word. I
take a random sample of sentences that include “explain” and use them as the basis
of case studies. I use these clear cases of scientific explanation to develop my account.
To address the question of the importance of scientific explanation I compare
the use of “explain” words to other words of interest to philosophers such as “cause”,
“evidence”, “theory”, “model”, and “law”. “Explain” is about as common as “cause”
and “evidence”, more common than “theory” and “law”, and less common than
“model”. But scientists explain without using the word “explain”. Using a large
random sample from the set of all the sentences in the 781 Science articles, I show that
the account of scientific explanation I propose applies to at least a quarter of all the
sentences. I also show that, if we include claims of inference to the best explanation,
we can account for another quarter of the sentences. In sum, approximately half of
all the sentences in the Science data set make some sort of explanatory or abductive
claim on my general account of scientific explanation. A large portion of the Science
data set cannot be understood without an account of scientific explanation.
To address the question whether explanation is a goal, I consider where “explain”
words occur in scientific articles. They occur more frequently in the introduction and
toward the end of the articles, suggesting that these words are used for setting and
assessing the goals of the articles. But stronger evidence comes from a random sample
of the abstracts from the Science data set. I consider the main claims being made
in these abstracts and show that all of them have either explanatory or inference-to-
the-best-explanation form on my account of scientific explanation.
Finally, to address the generality of scientific explanation, I show that “explain”
words are used in all of the disciplines represented in the Science data set, and that
my general account of scientific explanation applies to at least one case sampled from
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each of those disciplines, with a small number of exceptions that are most likely due
to inadequate sample sizes.
1.5 A General Philosophical Account of Scientific
Explanation
The two approaches I take to the data set are intended to provide empirical support
for the general philosophical account of scientific explanation I develop here. But
even without the support of text mining evidence and a broad range of cases, my
account is intended to stand alone as a plausible philosophical account.
An explanation consists of an explain-relation, an explanans, and an explanandum.
There is an ambiguity in the usage of “explanation”, allowing the word to refer to a
statement of the explanation, but I try to distinguish between the explanation itself
and the statement of the explanation. Unlike Hempel, I do not restrict the explanans
and explanandum to propositions, and I believe that my broader use of the terms is
not unusual among philosophers of science.
The explain-relation holds between a quality of the explanans and a quality of
the explanandum. In other words, it is always something about the explanans that
explains something about the explanandum. While the explanandum quality always
depends on the explanans quality, the basis for that dependence can take many forms.
In every case the explain-relation between the qualities must be supported by a second
relation that holds between the explanans and the explanandum themselves. I call
this the “core relation” for the explanation. In some cases the core relation is singular
causation: the explanandum quality depends on the explanans quality because the
explanans causes the explanandum. In other cases the core relation is modelling: the
explanandum quality depends on the explanans quality because the explanans is a
model of the explanandum. While the explain-relation is essentially the same across
a wide variety of scientific explanations, the core relation can differ widely.
In order to understand the differences between core relations we must consider
the sorts of things that can be the explanans and the explanandum. I propose five
coarse categories that allow us to classify the explanantia and explananda of a wide
range of scientific explanations. The categories are: data, entities, kinds, models, and
theories. Data are statements of measurements and observations of entities. Entities
are concrete particular things in the world. Kinds are abstract universals that entities
instantiate. Models are abstract descriptions that articulate the relationships among
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kinds and their qualities. Theories are the principles and systems of inference that are
used to build models. Each category is widely recognized by philosophers, although
the details of my usage sometimes differ from what is standard. In each case there are
philosophical problems and disagreements over the nature and role of that category
of thing in scientific explanations. I cannot address and resolve all of these issues, but
I do locate my position for each category within the wider philosophical literature.
I call the pair of the category of the explanans and the category of the explanan-
dum the “form” of the explanation. Given the five categories there are 25 possible
forms of explanation. Differences in the form of explanation indicate differences in
the core relation. Among these 25 forms there are four that I call “primary forms”,
because they are especially important for understanding explanation: theory-model,
model-kind, kind-entity, and entity-data. Each of the four primary forms involves a
shift from a more general explanans to a more specific explanandum. The four core
relations for the four primary forms are justification, modelling, instantiation, and
measurement, respectively. In a model-kind explanation it is something about the
model (the explanans) that explains something about the kind (the explanandum),
and the core relation that supports the explanation is modelling. The explanation will
hold if and only if as the model is a model of the kind. This includes both the actual
circumstances and the counterfactual ones that the core relation supports. Figure 1.2
shows the five categories, the four primary forms of explanation, and examples of the
five “secondary forms” of explanation for which the explanans and explanandum fall
into the same category. I call the other 16 “tertiary forms” of explanation because I
consider them to be composites of the primary and secondary forms. Accordingly I
focus my attention on the four primary and five secondary forms.
What makes these 25 forms count as forms of explanation? In what sense do the
various core relations support a single explain-relation? The fragmentation of the
philosophical literature on scientific explanation has meant a diversity of proposed
conditions on what makes for an explanation. Despite the fragmentation, there are
two proposed necessary conditions that philosophers have been widely accepted. The
first is that explanations answer why-questions. The second is that explanations
answer “what if things had been different” questions. These are, of course, closely
related: I believe that the second condition is a more accurate expression of the key
insight in the first condition.
James Woodward develops the second condition a part of the motivation for his
appeal to causal counterfactuals. For my part, I see no reason to limit the coun-
terfactuals to causal ones. All of the forms of explanation I propose involve a core
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relation that supports counterfactual reasoning, and thus allow us to answer “what if
things had been different” questions. Those answers, given in counterfactual terms,
are answers to the scientific why-questions that philosophers have been interested in.
This condition that all of the 25 forms of explanation meet is a broad one. There
may well be other necessary conditions, or even sufficient conditions, to be found.
Although broad, the condition is not toothless. It allows us to distinguish explanations
from statements of fact, from descriptions, and from predictions. Each of the core
relations articulates some more specific sort of of counterfactual relation, but all of
them have at least this much in common.
The most complex form of explanation on my account is theory-data explanation
because it spans the five categories from most general to most specific. Figure 1.3
shows the general structure for such a case. At the top are the explanans quality and
the explanandum quality. At the bottom is the “base” of the explanation, which is
shared between the explanans and explanandum. In the middle are the “cores” of
the explanans and explanandum.
While this model was developed to capture the structure of explanatory claims, it
also captures the structure of inferences to the best explanation. In these “evidential”
cases the direction is reversed, and it is something about the more specific “explanan-
dum” that gives evidence for something about the more general “explanans”. Figure
1.3 shows the “explain” and “evidence for” arrows pointing in opposite directions.
For each of the randomly sampled sentences or abstracts I develop a small case
study and try to apply this structure. Often part of the structure is not apparent on
the surface of the quotation, and so I take it to be implicit. Appendix A includes my
analysis of all of the sampled cases. I distinguish clearly between the implicit and
explicit items in each case analysis.
This general account addresses the problem of fragmentation in the philosophical
literature that I raised above. Philosophers of science have often focused on one or a
few of the many forms of explanation that scientists use. In giving detailed accounts
of those forms for those sorts of explanantia and explananda they overlook the many
other forms. There is room for a diversity of specific philosophical accounts because
the practises of scientific explanation are in fact quite diverse.
Looking at figure 1.2 we can see that there is room for several of the existing
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation. Mechanistic, causal intervention,
and model explanation fit near the middle, among the categories of models, kinds,
and entities. Unification and asymptotic explanation fit on the left, among theories
and models. Causal mechanical explanation concerns singular causal relations among
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Theories Models Kinds Entities Data
justifies models instantiated by measured by
unifies submodel of subkind of causes correlates with
Figure 1.2: The five categories, four primary relations, and examples of five secondary
relations.
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entities. D-N explanations are an interesting case, since they can span the full range
from theory to data. My general account of the various forms of scientific explanation
allows us to pull apart what D-N explanations run together.
This account may appear overly complex on first glance. Instead of one explain-
relation we have both an explain-relation and a core relation to support it. Instead of
one form of explanation there are 25 possibilities, each with a different core relation.
But both of these complexities reflect the reality of scientific practise. Scientists
use the word “explain” to express dependence relations between qualities in many
different situations, but to understand the dependence in a particular case we must
look to the relation that holds between the bearers of the qualities. While some
of the forms of explanation are much more common than others, all 25 are used at
least once in my sampled cases. By distinguishing the core relation from the explain-
relation, and recognizing the variety among core relations, we gain a flexible and truly
general account that can capture a wide range of cases of explanation across many
sciences. The flexibility and generality are required in order to address the problem
of fragmentation. On balance, the added complexity is a small price to pay.
1.6 Limitations
Scientific explanation is an important topic. I consider it to be central to the phi-
losophy of science. Explanation touches on many other important topics, including
causation, measurement, natural laws, natural kinds, modelling, idealization, confir-
mation, and theory change. By better understanding scientific explanation we gain
insights into these other important areas.
But this comes at a cost. In order to fully understand scientific explanation we
must be able to give accounts of causation, measurement, natural laws, natural kinds,
modelling, idealization, confirmation, theory changes, etc. A complete account of this
topic requires at least partial accounts of these others. And like scientific explanation
itself, each of these other topics has its share of philosophical problems.
Faced with such a challenge, one response is specialization. By narrowing the
scope to one branch of science we may be able to find questions that can be answered
in full. This is often a good response, but it cannot be the only one. The general
philosophical account of scientific explanation that I offer, and the novel methods that
I use to support it, address important questions and provide useful answers, even if
some of those answers are not complete.
Because I cannot hope to address all the philosophical topics that my account of
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explanation touches upon, I have tried to limit the scope of this work to the question:
what is a scientific explanation? When I discuss data, entities, kinds, models, and
theories, I try give an adequate characterization of each and to locate my position in
the larger philosophical literature.
There are two questions in particular that are very close to my focus but re-
main outside the scope of this dissertation. The first is what makes a good scientific
explanation? The second is what is the nature and role of inferences to the best expla-
nation? Regarding the first, in analyzing the explanations in my sample cases I have
not tried to evaluate whether they are good or bad ones. The main normative claim I
make here is that these explanations are held up as exemplars by being published in
Science, and I have given an account of their structure. Regarding the second, many
of the cases I have sampled appear to be inferences to the best explanation. They
have the same structure as explanations except that the direction of the inference
is reversed. For some of the cases, if I merely substituted “suggests” with “might
be explained by” the reader would not notice any tampering, because switching the
direction of the inference makes no other difference to the structure. In my analysis I
mark these cases as distinct, but I analyze them in the same way as the other expla-
nations. A full analysis of inference to the best explanation on my general account is
an important goal that I must leave to future work.
Despite the many connections between scientific explanation and other important
philosophical topics, in this dissertation I aim to answer the question what is a scien-
tific explanation? in such a way that I can resolve some of the fragmentation in the
philosophical literature and show that scientific explanation is an important general
goal of science.
1.7 Overview
This dissertation consists of nine chapters and two appendices. Following this intro-
duction is the chapter on my text mining methods. I address the three questions
about the nature and role of scientific explanation by means of various measurements
of the frequency and distribution of words of interest in the Science data set. The
results of this chapter provide insights into the use of “explain” words in science, and
help to focus the analysis that follows.
The third chapter is the longest and most important. I discuss my methods for
randomly sampling the Science data set to create a large set of small case studies.
Sample A consists of 25 sentences containing at least one of the words “explain”,
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“explains”, or “explained”. I use these cases to develop and discuss my general
philosophical account of scientific explanation. Then I test the account against sample
B, with 100 random sentences, and sample C, with 25 random abstracts. I close the
chapter with a discussion of the evidence I have gathered from these samples and how
it addresses the three questions about scientific explanation.
The following five chapters are each short. I present the five categories in turn:
data, entities, kinds, models, and theories. The structure of each chapter is the same.
I begin with some examples drawn from samples A, B, and C. I then provide a general
philosophical discussion and characterization of the category. I describe each of the
examples in this light. And I close with a discussion of the forms of explanation for
which the explanans is in that category.
The body of the dissertation ends with a short conclusion. Following that are the
two appendices. Appendix A is very long, including the full analysis of all 150 cases
in samples A, B, and C. In appendix B I provide listings of the programs that I have
used to collect my data set, perform the text mining, and sample and analyze my
cases. The appendices are included for completeness, so that the reader can check
the details of my analysis that interest them.
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Chapter 2
Words
My goal is a philosophical answer to the question what is a scientific explanation? In
pursuit of that goal I apply philosophical methods such as conceptual analysis and
case studies. Because the claims I want to make are general, I need to appeal to a
wide base of evidence. But I cannot analyze all 781 Science articles. Instead I apply
some novel methods that allow me to draw inferences about practises of explanation
across the large data set. In this chapter I discuss my text mining methods and apply
them to several questions about the practise of scientific explanation.
2.1 Text Mining
Text mining is the analysis of large sets of textual data using automated methods.
These methods usually involve some sort of natural language processing of the data.
My uses of these techniques are humble, amounting to different forms of comprehen-
sive search. The important thing for the current purpose is not the sophistication of
the text processing but the inferences that we can draw about the data set. By using
automated techniques we can consider much larger data sets, and with larger data
sets we can ensure that we are representing the diversity of scientific practise more
accurately.
In broad strokes what I have done is collect electronic copies of the text of the
Science articles and used a set of computer programs to find patterns in that text. The
programs are built using the Natural Language Tool Kit (NLTK, http://nltk.
org), an open-source library of software tools for natural language processing. Code
listings of the programs I have written are provided in appendix B.
Text mining is fundamentally about matching sequences of characters. However
the relationships between sequences of characters and words is not straightforward.
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The sequences “explain”, “Explain”, and “ex-plain” are distinct, although they are
all tokens of the same word. A computer needs to be told that “explain”, “explains”,
“explained”, and “explaining” are grammatical inflections of the same word. Even
dividing sequences of characters into token words can be difficult. Although words
are usually separated by spaces or line-breaks, there are also periods, commas, colons,
hyphens, quotation marks, apostrophes, and other characters that sometimes separate
words but are sometimes part of a word. For instance, periods terminate sentences,
but they are also included in acronyms and abbreviations, making it difficult to
automatically break a text into sentences.
Natural Language Processing (NLP) is the wider field that encompasses text min-
ing techniques. NLP researchers have developed heuristics and algorithms for break-
ing sequences of characters into their lexicographical parts. These include methods
for tokenizing (distinguishing word tokens from their surroundings), stemming (dis-
tinguishing the root of a word from its affixes), and lemmatising (grouping inflections
of the same stem together). These tools are supported by enhanced dictionaries
such as WordNet (http://wordnet.princeton.edu) that describe networks of
relations between words.
Philosophers use language carefully and pay close attention to small variations
in the usage of words. Dictionary definitions are often too crude to be helpful for
philosophical analysis. But philosophers usually pay less attention to syntactic varia-
tions, and these are of primary importance for text mining. To perform an automated
search for explanations in scientific literature we would need to build a list of all the
syntactic representations of explanations that we want to match.
The relationship between sequences of characters and words is complex, but the
relationship between words and concepts is even more so. Philosophers are interested
in the concepts being expressed rather than the words that express them. When it
comes to explanation, philosophers are not primarily interested in the words “explain”
or “explanation”, but in explanations regardless of the details of the phrasing. I accept
that concepts and not words are the proper targets of philosophical analysis.
However we must also offer evidence to support our philosophical analysis. Evi-
dence is more convincing when it is publicly available, so that anyone can assess its
value. Philosophical intuitions are a difficult sort of evidence to deal with. They
are not public, and even when they are largely shared it is often hard to discern the
differences between them. Philosophers have methods for doing so and I do not reject
intuitions as a source of evidence for philosophy. But I do claim that we should also
look to public forms of evidence, of which the use of language in published texts is
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one form. The task is then to transform public facts about language use into evidence
about concept use.
In the following sections I make three main claims about the practise of scientific
explanation and then use text mining methods to test them. While the focus is on
the use of words, the goal is to learn about the concept of explanation.
2.2 Importance of Explanation
I have claimed several times already that explanation is an important scientific prac-
tise. Is there evidence to support this claim?
One of the simplest ways to assess the importance of a concept in a body of text
is to measure the frequency with which associated words are used. If those words are
used frequently then we have some reason to believe that the concept is important in
that corpus. Conversely, if those words are used infrequently then we have some reason
to believe that the concept is unimportant in that corpus. Relative frequencies can be
more informative than absolute frequencies. If one set of words occurs more frequently
than another then we have some reason to believe that the concept associated with
the first set is more important for that corpus than the concept associated with the
second set. However we must also be aware of word ambiguity. If one word can be
associated with more than one of the concepts we are trying to investigate then this
will undermine our inferences about importance based on frequency.
To measure the frequency of the words associated with a concept we must make
a list of the strings of characters we are interested in. (Our tools can be designed
to ignore certain differences, such as letter-case.) Here I have listed some words of
interest, grouped by concept. Our primary target is the “explain” concept by means of
variations on the word “explain”. I have included groups for several concepts related
to explanation, such as “because” and “understand”. And I have included other
important terms from the general philosophy of science such as “cause”, “evidence”,
“theory”, “law”, “mechanism”, and “model”.
explain explain, explains, explained, explaining, explainable, explanation, explana-
tions, unexplained, unexplainable, explicate, explicates, explicated, explicable,
inexplicable
because because
reason reason, reasons, reasoning
account account, accounts, accounted, accounting
understand understand, understands, understood, understanding
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evidence evidence, evident, evidential
show show, shows, showed, shown, showing
discover discover, discovers, discovered, discovering, discovery, discoveries
reveal reveal, reveals, revealed, revealing
suggest suggest, suggests, suggested, suggesting
implication imply, implies, implied, implying, implication, implications
indicate indicate, indicates, indicated, indicating
confirm confirm, confirms, confirmed, confirming
establish establish, establishes, established, establishing
cause cause, causes, caused, causing, causal, causation
theory theory, theories, theoretical
law law, laws, lawful
mechanism mechanism, mechanisms
model model, models, modelled, modelling
phenomena phenomena, phenomenon
effect effect, effects
The next step is to write a program to determine the word frequencies. NLTK
provides a library of tools for this purpose. I have written a short program (see
appendix B.4) that uses the NLTK tokenizers and frequency distribution tools to
count the number of occurrences of words from each group in two different ways.
First, we are interested in the number of articles in which the concepts of interest are
deployed, so I have measured the number of articles for which at least one word in
the group occurs. Second, we are interested in the number of times the concepts are
deployed, so I have measured the total number of occurrences of words in each group.
Table 2.1 shows the results. Figure 2.1 plots the percentage of articles that include
at least one token from each word group. Figure 2.2 plots the number of tokens for
each word group.
These results show the “explain” group of words being used less frequently than
we might have expected. The first conclusion we might draw is that scientific expla-
nation is not as important as I have claimed. A closer look at the data tells a more
complicated story. “Explain” is used about as often as “understand” and “cause”.
The “evidence” group has slightly more tokens and occurs in slightly more articles.
“Explain” is used significantly more often than “theory”, and much more often than
“law”. Even the “mechanism” and “model” groups of words are not used in too many
more articles than “explain”, although they both have markedly more tokens. If this
evidence suggests that philosophers are wrong about explanation being important
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explain 353 45.2 747 0.96
because 705 90.3 2516 3.22
reason 81 10.4 132 0.17
account 257 32.9 434 0.56
understand 366 46.9 620 0.79
evidence 410 52.5 843 1.08
show 737 94.4 4075 5.22
discover 135 17.3 226 0.29
reveal 485 62.1 1101 1.41
suggest 647 82.8 2497 3.20
implication 295 37.8 512 0.66
indicate 578 74.0 1636 2.09
confirm 346 44.3 654 0.84
establish 247 31.6 391 0.50
cause 404 51.7 938 1.20
theory 216 27.7 608 0.78
law 32 4.1 66 0.08
mechanism 460 58.9 1368 1.75
model 482 61.7 2084 2.67
phenomena 119 15.2 173 0.22
effect 534 68.4 2278 2.92
Table 2.1: For each word group we make four measurements: the number of articles
containing at least one word in that group; the percentage of such articles among the
781 in the data set; the number of tokens matched from that group; and the number
of tokens from that group averaged over all of the articles in the data set.
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Figure 2.1: Plot of the percentage of articles that contain one or more tokens from
each word group.
e
x
p
la
in
b
e
ca
u
se
re
a
so
n
a
cc
o
u
n
t
u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
e
v
id
e
n
ce
sh
o
w
d
is
co
v
e
r
re
v
e
a
l
su
g
g
e
st
im
p
lic
a
ti
o
n
in
d
ic
a
te
co
n
fi
rm
e
st
a
b
lis
h
ca
u
se
th
e
o
ry
la
w
m
e
ch
a
n
is
m
m
o
d
e
l
p
h
e
n
o
m
e
n
a
e
ff
e
ct
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
T
o
ke
n
s
Figure 2.2: Plot of the number of tokens from each word group.
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in science, then it also suggests that we are wrong about understanding, causation,
theories, mechanisms, and models being important.
The word group that is used most frequently in the data set is “show”. Unfor-
tunately “show” is ambiguous between an evidential sense that interests us and uses
such as “figure 3 shows a decline” that are more difficult to connect to explanation.
Just behind “show” is “because”, which is also used in multiple ways that may not
all indicate explanations. The “suggest” group is almost as ubiquitous, and plays an
important role in claims about evidence. The “indicate” group occurs in almost as
many articles as “suggest” but has far fewer tokens.
The high frequency of these words suggests that they are more important in
scientific writing than they are in other genres and thus that explanatory concepts
are relatively more important in science. I have tested this hypothesis by comparing
the frequency of the the words of interest in the Science data set to their frequency in
two other genres, using bodies of text provided by NLTK. The first comparison corpus
contains 18 long-form works of English literature selected from Project Gutenberg.1
The second is the Reuters Corpus, containing 10 788 news articles. I used NLTK to
count the number of occurrences of the word groups in the two comparison corpora
and then compared the number of tokens per million words for each group. Table 2.2
and figure 2.3 show the results.
Here we see that for many of the words of interest the frequency in the Science
corpus is significantly greater than in the comparison corpora. “Explain” words are
used four times as often in Science as in the Gutenberg corpus and almost eight
times as often as in the Reuters corpus. The results for “evidence”, “show”, “reveal”,
“suggest”, and “indicate” are similarly dramatic, while “because” is used roughly
twice as often in the science genre than the other genres. I take this to show that
explanation, and related concepts for dealing with evidence, are more important in
science than in fiction and news reporting.
Given that explanation is more important in science than in some other areas,
why does “explain” only occur in less than half of all articles while “because” and
“show” are ubiquitous? I propose that scientists think of “explain” as a strong word.
While they may frequently be explaining, they only use the word “explain” and its
1See http://www.gutenberg.org/. The works are: Jane Austen’s Emma, Persuasion, and
Sense and Sensibility; The King James Bible; William Blake’s The Poems of William Blake; Sara
Cone Bryant’s Stories to Tell to Children; Thornton W. Burgess’ The Adventures of Buster Bear;
Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland; Gilbert K. Chesteron’s The Ball and the Cross, Father Brown,
and The Man Who Was Thursday; Maria Edgeworth’s The Parent’s Assistant; Herman Melville’s
Moby Dick; John Milton’s Paradise Lost; William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, Hamlet, and Macbeth;
and Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass.
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explain 368 90 49
because 1241 723 625
reason 65 209 110
account 214 123 456
understand 305 315 49
evidence 415 32 41
show 2010 172 461
discover 111 78 49
reveal 543 37 14
suggest 1231 27 87
implication 252 9 31
indicate 806 11 119
confirm 322 25 87
establish 192 64 88
cause 462 252 211
theory 299 14 4
law 32 329 152
mechanism 674 0 18
model 1027 8 15
phenomena 85 2 5
effect 1123 61 218
Table 2.2: The number of tokens per million words for each word group in each of
the three corpora.
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Figure 2.3: Plot of the number of tokens from each word group for the three corpora.
variants when they present or refute strong explanatory claims.
To test this hypothesis I have compiled a list of the phrases that the words “ex-
plain” and “be explained” occur in. Table 2.3 lists the most frequent short phrases.
What is notable about these lists is how many of the phrases qualify or negate the
word “explain” or “be explained”. This provides some evidence that scientists treat
“explain” as a strong word.
I then generated a list of qualified and negated phrases. The first part of each
phrase is either “may”, “can”, or “could”. The last part of the phrase is either
“explain”, “explained”, or “show”. I also added negations for each of these phrases
(note that the contraction “cannot” is automatically separated into “can” and “not”
by the NLTK word tokenizer). Then I counted the number of occurrences of these
qualified phrases in the data set and calculated the percentage of qualified phrases
among all the occurrences of “explain”, “explained”, and “show”.
Table 2.4 lists the results. The differences are striking. More than a third of all uses
of “explain” and “explained” are simple qualifications or negations. Of course, other
uses may be qualified in more complicated ways not measured here. By comparison,
only a handful of uses of “show” were so qualified.
In summary, I have shown how a number of different text mining techniques
can be employed to answer questions about the use of “explain” and other words
of interest in scientific articles. In considering whether explanation is important in
science we have seen that words from the “explain” group are used in approximately
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# % Top 2-Grams
144 30.57 explain the
114 24.20 to explain
98 20.81 explained by
94 19.96 be explained
36 7.64 may explain
34 7.22 explain why
24 5.10 can explain
22 4.67 could explain
21 4.46 not explain
20 4.25 explained in
# % Top 3-Grams
66 14.01 be explained by
58 12.31 to explain the
36 7.64 can be explained
34 7.22 explained by the
16 3.40 not be explained
15 3.18 explain the observed
13 2.76 may explain the
12 2.55 can explain the
12 2.55 can not explain
12 2.55 may explain why
# % Top 4-Grams
25 5.31 be explained by the
25 5.31 can be explained by
12 2.55 can not be explained
10 2.12 explained in terms of
10 2.12 not be explained by
9 1.91 be explained in terms
9 1.91 may be explained by
8 1.70 can not explain the
8 1.70 proposed to explain the
8 1.70 to explain the observed
# % Top 5-Grams
9 1.91 be explained in terms of
9 1.91 can be explained by the
7 1.49 can not be explained by
6 1.27 been proposed to explain the
6 1.27 can be explained in terms
6 1.27 have been proposed to explain
4 0.85 ) , which may explain
4 0.85 can only be explained by
4 0.85 may be explained by the
3 0.64 could not be explained by
Table 2.3: The four lists show the ten most common “n-grams” – two-word, three-
word, four-word, and five-word phrases – that include either “explain” or “be ex-
plained”. For each phrase the number of occurrences is listed as well as its percentage
among the 471 total occurrences of “explain” and “be explained” in the data set.
# % Phrases (“explain”, “be explained”)
36 7.64 can be explained
36 7.64 may explain
24 5.10 can explain
22 4.67 could explain
12 2.55 can not explain
12 2.55 can not be explained
10 2.12 could be explained
10 2.12 may be explained
3 0.64 could not be explained
1 0.21 may not explain
166 35.24 TOTAL (of 471 tokens)
# % Phrases (“show”)
3 0.27 may show
2 0.18 could show
1 0.09 can show
1 0.09 may not show
7 0.62 TOTAL (of 1122 tokens)
Table 2.4: The two lists show the most common phrases from the list generated by
a systematic combination of a modal [“may”, “can”, “could”] with a base [“explain”,
“be explained”, “show”] and negations. For each phrase the number of occurrences
is listed, as well as its percentage among the total occurrences of the base phrase(s)
in the data set.
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half of all articles in the data set. This is comparable to the “cause” group, more
than the “theory” and “law” groups, and less than the “model”, and “mechanism”
groups. Explanatory and evidential words are used much more often in the Science
corpus than in two comparison corpora. But while “show” is hardly every used with
qualifying words and negations in the Science corpus, “explain” is very often qualified.
Taken together, we have a variety of evidence to support the claim that explana-
tion is important to science, but also that scientists consider “explain” words to be
strong ones and use them sparingly.
2.3 Generality of Explanation
In addition to the importance of explanation I have also claimed that it is general –
that explanations can be found in a wide range of sciences. The evidence to support
this claim is more straightforward.
While table 2.1 provides totals across the data set, we can also measure the number
of articles, percentage or articles, number of tokens, and average tokens within each
keyword group. The disadvantage is that this breaks up our large data set into many
pieces, some of which are too small to allow us to draw strong conclusions. Figure
2.4 is a plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token of a word
in the “explain” group, broken down by keyword. We see that “explain” words are
used by one or more articles in every keyword group. The percentage within each
keyword group varies, and some of the samples are small, but it is clear that “explain”
is used with more-or-less the same frequency across most of the scientific disciplines
considered. Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the ubiquity of “because” and “show”.
This is not the case for all of the word groups. For instance, “law” is used in-
frequently overall but also confined to a limited number of fields as figure 2.7 shows.
The “theory” group is used in most fields, but is only prevalent in a few, as seen in
figure 2.8. Again, when broken down by keywords, some of the sample sizes are small,
but each of the “cause”, “mechanism”, and “model” groups has at least one keyword
for which no articles appear (see figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11).
In short, explanatory words are used across scientific fields, supporting the claim
that explanation is a general practise found across the sciences.
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Figure 2.4: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from the
“explain” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall
percentage.
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Figure 2.5: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token of “be-
cause”, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall percentage.
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Figure 2.6: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “show” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall
percentage.
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Figure 2.7: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “law” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall
percentage.
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Figure 2.8: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “theory” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall
percentage.
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Figure 2.9: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “cause” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall
percentage.
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Figure 2.10: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “mechanism” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the
overall percentage.
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Figure 2.11: Plot of the percentage of articles that include at least one token from
the “model” word group, broken down by keyword, with a line indicating the overall
percentage.
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Figure 2.12: Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of words in the
“explain” group occur in articles.
2.4 Explanation as a Goal
I began this dissertation by claiming that explanation is a goal of science. Text mining
techniques can provide some support here as well. In this case a relevant measurement
is the position of the target words in the text. Since the abstract, introduction, and
conclusion of a scientific paper lay out and evaluate the goals of the paper, words
that are used more frequently near the beginning and end of the article than in the
middle can be associated with the setting of goals.
Figure 2.12 shows a histogram of position data for the “explain” word group.
After an initial peak the rate drops and then builds toward the end of the article. The
“show” group has a somewhat similar pattern. The trend is clear but less dramatic
than the plot for “understand” (figure 2.13), which has a strong “U” shape. Scientists
tend to talk about understanding as they are setting out the plan of the article or
reviewing what they have said. I take this as clear evidence that understanding is
another goal of science, connected, of course, to explanation.
Other words of interest have relatively flat histograms, such as “because” and
“cause” (figures 2.14 and 2.15). I believe that the differences between the histograms
for the “explain”, “because”, and “show” can be accounted for in part by differences
in the strength of the words.
The association between the use of “explain” words and the abstract, introduction,
and conclusion provides weak evidence that explanation is a goal of science. The
strong association for “understand” words is stronger evidence. In what follows I
provide a stronger test by considering whether the central claims made in the abstracts
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Figure 2.13: Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of words in the
“understand” group occur in articles.
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Figure 2.14: Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of “because” occur
in articles.
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Figure 2.15: Histogram of the relative positions at which tokens of words in the
“cause” group occur in articles.
of a representative sample of papers conform to my account of scientific explanation.
2.5 Evidence for Philosophical Accounts
In this chapter I have collected a range of evidence about the use of “explain” and
other words of interest in the Science data set. This evidence supports my claims
about the importance and generality of explanation and its role as a goal of science.
The evidence is also telling for some of the philosophical accounts of explanation I
surveyed in the first chapter.
One of the main divisions in the explanation literature is over the importance of
causation. Is all explanation in science causal or is causal explanation just one type
among others? My data shows that the usage of “explain” and “cause” is similar
in many respects. They have approximately the same number of tokens, the same
percentage of articles, and are both used across a range of scientific fields. One
difference is in the position data.
Anscombe claims that the word “cause” acts as a placeholder, to be more fully
determined by some more specific causal concept such as “scrape, push, wet, carry,
eat, burn, knock over, keep off, squash, make (e.g. noises, paper boats), hurt” (original
emphasis; Anscombe 1971, p. 9). This suggests that causal language is much more
prevalent in the data set than a search for “cause” would show. I accept this point,
but I believe that it is also true of explanation: “explain” acts a placeholder for
more fully determined explanation concepts. This is an implication of the account of
explanation I present in the next chapter.
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The evidence about the use of “law” tends to undermine D-N as a general model
of explanation in the sciences. This comes as no surprise, but the scarcity of uses
of “law” is somewhat striking. “Theory” is more common and more general but the
evidence does not provide much support for the unification account as the primary
form of scientific explanation. The evidence supports the claim that mechanisms
are important, particularly in certain sciences, and that description of mechanisms
is a goal of science. It also supports the importance and generality of models and
modelling. This set of evidence does not, I think, tell us much about the pragmatic
account or asymptotic explanation.
2.6 Conclusions
Applying these text mining techniques to the Science data set reveals a range of
information about “explanation” and related words. “Explain” words are common
but not ubiquitous, used with a frequency comparable to other words of interest to
philosophers of science. “Explain” is used much more in scientific writing than in other
genres, and it is used across scientific disciplines. I think that these results provide
confirmation of widely shared intuitions among philosophers about the generality and
importance of scientific explanation. Perhaps surprising is the fact that such a large
number of the uses of “explain” are qualified or negated. This indicates that “explain”
is a strong word that scientists use sparingly, and perhaps accounts for the relatively
low frequency with which these words are used by scientists in their articles, given
the importance of explanatory practises.
This information is useful and it guides my further analysis, but text mining
techniques can only tell us so much. They are no substitute for conceptual analysis,
but rather a supplement. As philosophers analyzing a concept we consider the usage
of words, often with a handful of examples in mind. With these methods we get
a wider perspective on the usage. In the next chapter I turn to a more traditional
philosophical analysis of explanation in light of what we have learned here.
39
Chapter 3
Analysis
I have offered evidence and arguments for the importance of explanation to a wide
range of sciences. This makes it a good topic for general philosophy of science, at
least prima facie. However it is still possible that scientists in each specific science
mean something significantly different by “explain”. If so, then the analysis of these
different senses of explanation is a task for philosophies of specific sciences, and the
philosophical literature on explanation is justifiably fragmented.
To show that scientific explanation is general I need to provide an account of
explanation that brings some unity to the concept and that applies to a wide range
of sciences. Such an account must also allow for the diversity of scientific practises
that we observe.
In this chapter I step beyond the limitations of text mining techniques and turn
to case studies. In order to support the broad claims I wish to make I select my cases
in a novel way. By choosing randomly from the Science data set I can avoid bias in
my selection of cases, and by using a large number of small cases I can show that my
account applies to a wide range of scientific practise.
I proceed in five stages. First I describe and defend my methods for selecting
cases. Second, I draw on the clearest sampled cases of scientific explanation to begin
building my account. I introduce several examples from sample A, which contains 25
cases where scientists explicitly use the word “explain”, “explains”, or “explained”.
Then I present my methods for analyzing the cases and build toward a description of
my general philosophical account of scientific explanation. Third, I test the account
against sample B, which contains 100 random sentences from the Science data set. I
also extend the account slightly to allow for cases of inference to the best explanation.
Fourth, I present sample C, and argue that the main claims of all the abstracts in
that random sample are either explanations or inferences to the best explanation.
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Fifth and finally, I gather evidence from my analysis of sampled cases to support
my answers to the three main questions: explanation is an important general goal of
science.
3.1 The Case Study Method
Philosophers of science have long used the case study method for motivating and
supporting philosophical claims. There are standard cases known to everyone in the
field and there are new cases developed to test standing accounts or present new ones.
Most papers that include a new case study include only one – they require significant
effort to develop and present. The case studies that are used are carefully chosen.
A single case can be used as a counterexample to a general claim or as a demon-
stration of an existence claim. But philosophers usually want to do more than this.
They want to use a small number of cases to support a general claim. This general-
ization step should be supported by some sort of argument.
However this step is usually left implicit in philosophy of science. I think that
providing an explicit argument can be important, and is more important when the
claim is more general. The claims I am making here are intended to apply to practises
of explanation across a wide range of sciences, and so I have tried to justify them in
their generality.
In this section I describe my methods for taking representative random samples
of sentences from the data set and developing case studies from them. The nature
of the data set, the sampling method, and the sample size provide support for the
generality of my claims.
3.2 Selecting Cases
I have selected three sets of cases which I label samples A, B, and C. Each sample
was collected to serve a different purpose but together they form a broad set of case
studies in scientific explanation.
To support the generality of the claims I am making about explanation I need a
large number of cases. By practical necessity, I cannot treat them all in great depth.
My approach has been to select a single sentence as my target, fill in the necessary
context, and use this as a small case study.
We have seen that uses of “explain” words are often qualified. I take this as
evidence that “explain” is a strong word and that scientists use it carefully. So if we
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want to find cases where scientists are being careful about what is and is not being
explained it makes sense to look for tokens of “explain”. I collected sample A by
randomly sampling 25 tokens of the words “explain”, “explains”, and “explained” in
the data set and developing each case from the sentence in which the token occurs. I
use sample A to establish the core of my account of explanation.
Scientists often explain without using the word “explain”. With the core of my
account of explanation and the list of associated phrases in hand, I move beyond
“explain” and look for other instances of explanation that fit the structure. To collect
sample B I selected 100 sentences at random from the Science data set.
I have also claimed that explanation is a goal of science. The text mining evidence
for this claim was weak. I have collected stronger evidence by looking at the central
claims made in the abstracts of papers in the data set, and checking that claim against
my account of explanation. I collected sample C by randomly selecting 25 articles
from the data set. I then looked for the central claim made in the abstract of each
article and tested whether my account applies.
With the three samples combined, I have 150 cases of from which to build and
test my general philosophical account of scientific explanation. Appendix A includes
a full listing of all the samples with my analysis of each.
3.3 Sample A – Cases of “Explain”
Sample A consists of 25 quotations that contain at least one of the words “explain”,
“explains”, or “explained”, selected at random from the Science data set. Of the 25
quotations in sample A, three did not seem to involve scientific explanations: cases
A2, A16, and A25. Here is the text of case A2:
For each value of Tc, we compute [equation 4] where the errors in the
experimental and lattice QCD [quantum chromodynamics] quantities are
obtained as explained above. (S. Gupta et al. 2011, p. 1527)
This use of “as explained above” seems to me to be synonymous with “as described
above”. Since descriptions do not answer “what if things had been different” ques-
tions, I do not think this is a case of scientific explanation.
The remaining 22 sentences from sample A each seem to involve at least one
scientific explanation of some sort. As expected, the range and variety of explanations
is large. The following four examples demonstrate some of the diversity.
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3.3.1 Case A12
In summary, changes in water mass formation processes are not necessarily
required to explain the high GNAIW [Glacial North Atlantic Intermediate
Water] end-member δ13C values. (Olsen and Ninnemann 2010, p. 695)
This sentence occurs in an article discussing the structure of the Atlantic Ocean
in the context of the Earth’s history of glaciation. Here the authors conclude their
argument that the Industrial Revolution modified carbon isotope ratios in the North
Atlantic. This accounts for some of the differences between the modern ocean and
prehistoric glacial oceans, and so those differences no longer need be explained. The
authors thereby solve an outstanding puzzle in the field. Note that the “Glacial North
Atlantic Intermediate Water” is a proper noun – the name of a historical “formation”
of water that scientists refer to in the same way as they refer to a particular formation
of rock, e.g. the Canadian Shield.
3.3.2 Case A14
Monoclonal conversion rules out a simple model of tissue maintenance
that originates from a population of long-lived stem cells following a strict
pattern of asymmetric division, and can be explained by two classes of
behavior. First, crypts could be maintained by a hierarchy in which a
single stem cell generates, through a sequence of asymmetric divisions,
stem cells with a more limited proliferative potential. Second, tissue could
be maintained by an equipotent stem cell population, in which stem cell
loss is perfectly compensated by the multiplication of others. (Lopez-
Garcia et al. 2010, p. 822)
(The first sentence was randomly selected, and the second and third are included as
the referents of “two classes of behavior”.) Intestinal epithelial tissues are maintained
by populations of stem cells. This quotation comes from a paper that discusses the
mechanism by which those stem cell populations coordinate their growth. Monoclonal
conversion is the eventual complete domination of crypts by cells sharing a single
(recent) common ancestor.1 Here the authors mention three possible models for
monoclonal conversion. They dismiss the first as too simple and give brief overviews
of the other two.
1This simulation illustrates the process: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
Jw3mXwOUpPk.
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In the course of their paper the authors settle on a model in the third class, so I will
focus on that explanatory claim. On this model it is the balance of the population,
maintained by perfectly compensated multiplication of equipotent stem cells, that
explains the eventual occurrence of monoclonal conversion in crypts of stem cells in
intestinal epithelial tissues.
3.3.3 Case A4
Physiological concentrations of ADP [adenosine diphosphate] inhibit ki-
nase activity in the oscillator, and a mathematical model constrained by
data shows that this effect is sufficient to quantitatively explain entrain-
ment of the cyanobacterial circadian clock. (Rust, Golden, and O’Shea
2011, p. 220)
Circadian clocks are biological systems that oscillate with a regular frequency and
allow organisms to regulate processes such as their day/night cycle, even when the
original stimulus is not present. Such a clock becomes “entrained” when its oscillation
synchronizes with the stimulus. The authors of this paper studied the biological clocks
of cyanobacteria. They succeeded in their goal of creating a mathematical model that
could account for their observations and make predictions about the rates at which
the clocks become entrained to stimuli.
“Quantitatively explain” is a peculiar phrase, but I take it to mean that the math-
ematical model makes numeric predictions that match measured magnitudes such as
the rate at which the oscillations synchronized. Here the authors state that the con-
centration of ADP is the key parameter for their model. In short, a parameterization
of their model explains their data about entrainment of the cyanobacterial circadian
clock.
3.3.4 Case A10
No clear theoretical predictions for a star with parameters similar to those
for HIP 13044 exist, hence it is possible that some high-order oscillations
can explain the 1.4- or 3.5-day signal. (Setiawan et al. 2010, p. 1643)
A number of the Science articles report on the discovery of planets around distant
stars. The method is usually to watch the star closely for periodic reductions in the
brightness, possibly indicating that a planet has occluded the star. From the size,
duration, and spacing of these reductions astronomers can infer the number, size,
44
mass, and orbits of planets around the star. While the targets of these methods
have usually been young stars, this paper reports on the discovery of a large planet
around a star in the late stages of its evolution. Here the authors try to account
for two unexplained signals in their data that are too frequent to indicate planetary
occlusion but too slow to indicate the expected pulsations in the brightness of the star
itself. They propose that something about higher-order oscillations in the brightness
of the star itself may explain the length of the signals.
3.3.5 Phrases
In the 22 successful cases of explanation in sample A the following explanatory phrases
occur at least once:
1. able to explain (2)
2. appears to explain, at least in part
3. are not necessarily required to explain
4. can also explain
5. can be explained by (7)
6. can possibly explain
7. cannot be explained by
8. could plausibly be explained by
9. explain why
10. explained
11. explained by
12. have been proposed to explain (2)
13. is explained in part
14. is not necessarily explained by
15. is sufficient to quantitatively explain
16. may be explained by
17. may best be explained in terms of
18. previously invoked to explain
19. this explains why
20. to explain
21. were not explained by
In every case, the “explain” word seems to indicate a binary relation: X explains Y .
I take this binary explain-relation to be the target of my analysis.
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What are the relata of the explain-relation? Following Hempel I label them the
“explanans” and “explanandum” – the explanans explains the explanandum. I dis-
tinguish between statements of explanations and explanations themselves, and unlike
Hempel I do not restrict the explanans and explanandum to propositions or parts of
a statement.
3.3.6 Preliminary Glosses
In order to understand the structure of the explanations in the example cases, I isolate
the statements of the explanations from the rest of the text and provide a gloss that
expresses what I think the explanation is. This inevitably involves some degree of
interpretation. I have italicized the portions of the glosses that do not appear on the
surface of the text, and are thus the most open to interpretation, but there may still
be room to dispute the remaining portions. I have tried to give the most natural
reading I can of the cases in a self-contained sentence with “X explains Y ” form.
The phrase referring to the explain-relation is rendered in small-caps.
A12 Changes in water mass formation processes are not necessarily required
to explain the high GNAIW end-member δ13C values.
A14 The balance of the population in a model of perfectly compensated multiplica-
tion of equipotent stem cells can explain the eventual occurrence of mono-
clonal conversion in crypts of stem cells, in the maintenance of intestinal ep-
ithelial tissues.
A4 The physiological concentration of ADP in a mathematical model of kinase ac-
tivity in circadian clocks of cyanobacteria is sufficient to quantitatively
explain the rate of entrainment of the circadian clocks of cyanobacteria.
A10 High-order oscillations in the luminance of stars can possibly explain the
length of the signals in the luminance of HIP 13044.
The gloss of A12 is nearly identical to the original quotation. However in most of
the cases it is more difficult to gloss the explanatory claim. This can be due to the
order in which the claim is stated, because of implicit parts of the claim, for both
reasons, or for some other complexity of English grammar.
In the gloss of A14 I emphasize the implicit claim that it is the balance of the
population in the model that explains the eventual occurrence of monoclonal conver-
sion. In both the explanans and the explanandum the context is the maintenance of
intestinal epithelial tissues.
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For case A4 I have reorganized and combined parts of the original to make the
structure of the explanation clear. There is a parameter of the model, the concentra-
tion of ADP, that allows the model to predict the rate of entrainment.
Finally, for case A10 the context but not the quoted sentence makes clear that it is
patterns in the luminance of the star HIP 13044 that are in need of explanation. What
this gloss does not take fully into account is the language of “theoretical predictions”
in the original.
These glosses are intended as starting points for my analysis. These glosses express
well-formed explanations, but their structure is not yet entirely clear, and I believe
that there is much that is still left implicit. What we need is a reliable method for
bringing out the underlying structure.
3.3.7 Normal Form
English grammar is complex. In order to draw out the structure of the cases of
explanation it would be good to simplify the glosses in some way. The main verb in
these glosses is always “explain”, which divides the statement of the explanans from
the statement of the explanandum. Within the two parts, most of the significant
words are either common nouns or adjectives modifying these nouns. In English it is
often possible to switch between adjectival and noun forms. In order to clarify the
explanatory structure of these cases I have normalized them by converting adjectives
into noun form wherever possible. The effect is to create a “stack” of noun phrases
connected by prepositions such as “of”, “in”, and “by”.
This technique produces simple, ugly sentences. The advantage is that they make
it much more clear just what things are involved in the explanation and what role
they play. The normalized glosses show a number of robust patterns that were not
visible in the originals. Without this step that structure remains hidden.
Here are the normalized forms of the four example cases:
A12 Changes in the processes of formation of water masses are not necessarily
required to explain the large size of values of δ13C in end-members of
GNAIW.
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are not necessarily required to explain
Changes
in the processes
of formation
of water masses
the large size
of values
of δ13C
in end-members
of GNAIW.
A14 The balance of the population in a model of perfect compensation in the mul-
tiplication of equipotent stem cells by crypts of stem cells in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue of intestines can explain the eventual occurrence of mono-
clonal conversion in crypts of stem cells in the maintenance of epithelial tissue
of intestines.
can explain
The balance
of the population
in a model
of perfect compensation
in the multiplication
of equipotent stem cells
in crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines
the eventual occurrence
of monoclonal conversion
in crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines.
A4 The physiological concentration of ADP of the mathematical model of the activ-
ity of kinase in circadian clocks of cyanobacteria is sufficient to quantita-
tively explain the rate of entrainment of circadian clocks of cyanobacteria.
is sufficient to quantitatively explain
The physiological concentration
of ADP
in the mathematical model
of the activity
of kinase
in circadian clocks
of cyanobacteria
the rate
of entrainment
of the circadian clocks
of cyanobacteria.
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A10 The high-order of oscillations in the luminance of stars can possibly explain
the length of the signals in the luminance of HIP 13044.
can possibly explain
The high-order
of oscillations
in the luminance
of stars
the length
of the signals
in the luminance
of HIP 13044.
3.3.8 Patterns of Explanation
These example cases include a number of patterns that are representative of the other
cases in sample A. In this section I describe some of the patterns in order to motivate
my general account.
In case A4 we have ten distinct noun phrases: the physiological concentration,
ADP, the mathematical model, the activity, kinase, circadian clocks, cyanobacteria,
the rate, entrainment, the circadian clocks. Among these are nine types of things:
physiological concentrations, ADP, mathematical models, activities, kinase, circadian
clocks, cyanobacteria, rates, entrainment. Some of these types are good candidates for
natural kinds: ADP, kinase, circadian clocks, and cyanobacteria. Natural kinds play
an important explanatory role in philosophical accounts such as D-N. Mathematical
models are another type of model that has been taken to play an important role in
scientific explanations. The remaining types (physiological concentrations, activities,
rates, entrainment) are also kinds of things, but perhaps not natural kinds. I propose
a use of “kinds” that covers all these types – a more general sense than “natural
kinds”. I will develop this concept of a kind as we proceed.
In addition to these common nouns, two of the example cases include a proper
noun: “HIP 13044” and “GNAIW”. Each is clearly understood to be an instance of a
kind in the explanation: a star and a water mass, respectively. We could add another
implicit item below each of these proper names, specifying that HIP 13044 is a star
and that GNAIW is a water mass.
If we add those items then a pattern emerges in these normalized examples: the
bottom member or members of the explanans stack and the explanandum stack are
identical kinds:
A12 water masses
A14 crypts of stem cells in the maintenance of intestinal tissue
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A4 the circadian clocks of cyanobacteria
A10 stars
I call this kind the “base” of the explanation. It is something that the explanans and
the explanandum share in common – the “topic” of the explanation.
A second pattern occurs at the top of the stacks. The top items are not natural
kinds, but rather qualities of the next item. They pick out some quality of the ex-
planans that is particularly salient for some quality of the explanandum, or conversely,
some quality of the explanandum that depends on some quality of the explanans. This
makes good sense – it is never everything about the explanans that explains every-
thing about the explanandum, otherwise the two would (arguably) be identical. I call
these the “explanans quality” and the “explanandum quality” respectively, or the
“top qualities” of the explanation collectively.
If we take just those qualities from the explanans and from the explanandum,
and join them with “explain(s)”, then we get a well formed (though abbreviated and
perhaps untrue) explanation:
A12 Changes explain the large size.
A14 The balance explains the eventual occurrence.
A4 The physiological concentration explains the rate.
A10 The high-order explains the length.
We can imagine a teacher making such a statement to drive home the key point at
the end of a lesson. This suggests that the place to look for the explain-relation is at
the top of the stacks.
Between the base and the top are the “cores” of the explanans and the explanan-
dum. The cores bear the weight of the explain-relation. However they do not seem
to be the relata of the explain-relation. Among the cores of the example cases we can
see some other patterns. The word “model” occurs in the explanans. Words such as
“values” and “signals” occur in the explanandum. The two proper nouns occur on
the explanandum side of the core. Other kinds occur on both sides. These patterns
hold for the rest of the cases of explanation in sample A. Words such as “rate” and
“value” are qualities that modify other special kinds such as “measurement” and “ob-
servation”. These always occur higher on the explanandum side than proper nouns
do – they refer to data collected about particular things. Words such as “model” and
“mechanism” always occur above some kind – they are models and mechanisms of
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phrase is sufficient to quantitatively explain
top The physiological concentration the rate
core of ADP
in the mathematical model
of the activity
of kinase
of entrainment
base in circadian clocks
of cyanobacteria
in circadian clocks
of cyanobacteria.
Table 3.1: Normalized structure of the explanation in case A4.
kinds. The occurrences of these “special types” shape the form of the explanation.
Table 3.1 shows the structure just described for case A4: the top, core, and base for
the explanans and explanandum, with some of the special types marked in the core.
After normalizing all of the cases in sample A there is enough evidence to motivate
my general account. The sample A cases are core cases of explanation where the word
“explain” is explicitly used. I develop my account from these core cases and then test
it against samples B and C in the following sections.
3.3.9 Categories and Forms
At the centre of my account are five coarse categories that capture all of the noun
phrases in sample A. We have already seen the “special types” that occur explicitly
in the example cases, and there are many others in sample A:
models “model”, “mechanism”
entities proper nouns, definite descriptions, “sample”, “specimen”
data “measurement”, “observation”
kinds all other kinds
There is one more category that does not occur on the surface of any of the cases in
sample A, but is important to their structure. I label this fifth category “theories”.
The five categories are then theories, models, kinds, entities, and data. Each
demands a fuller analysis, and the following five chapters are dedicated to that task.
But in very rough terms we can understand them as follows:
theories On my usage, a theory is a principle, set of principles, or a formal system
that is a building block for models.
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Types of theory: laws, empirical generalizations, mathematical formalisms.
Examples of theories: the theory of chromosomal supercoiling (B21), universal
hydrodynamics (B2), the defensive function of sabre teeth (B54), the mathe-
matical theory of differential equations (B45).
models A model is an abstract description of the relationships that hold between
kinds and their qualities. A model articulates a kind.
Types of model: sets of differential equations, mechanisms, flow charts.
Examples of models: Brownian random walks modelling foraging behaviour
(B49), reaction-diffusion equations modelling spatially periodic biological struc-
tures (B45), a hierarchical model of stem cell crypts (A14).
kinds A kind is an abstract universal class of entities that supports counterfactual
reasoning.
Types of kinds: natural kinds, species, universals.
Examples of kinds: lithium (A1), E. coli (A8), Mn4CaO2 (B68), ADP (A4),
circadian clocks (A4).
entities An entity is a concrete particular thing. I include both substances and
processes under “entities”. An arbitrary collection of entities can also count as
an entity. References to entities often take the form of proper nouns or definite
descriptions.
Types of entities: stars, samples, specimens.
Examples of entities: star HIP 13044 (A10), the Tagish Lake meteorite (A19),
the sample of carbon monoxide extracted from ice core D47 in (A15).
data For our purposes, a datum is a statement about an entity. In Science articles
they are usually referred to collectively as “data” and they come in several
forms.
Types of data: measurements, observations, images.
Examples of data: the measurements of end-member δ13C values in case A12,
the measurements of rates of entrainment of circadian clocks in case A4, the
observations of the severity of the Fog phenotype in C. elegans in case B58.
Why these five categories? Although this categorization is supported by the evi-
dence I collect, I did not come to it through some process of induction from the data
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set. Instead I used my best judgement, informed by philosophical training. I began
with the categories of “model” and “kind”. Philosophers have long thought these two
to be both significant and distinct. Kinds demand instances, my “entities”. Data
are important to science, and data about entities must be distinct from the entities
themselves. Finally, philosophers have usually distinguished models from theories,
and sought to account for both. Finer distinctions are certainly possible, but more
categories would mean that my analysis would require even larger sample sizes than
it already does. These five coarse categories allow me to distinguish many forms of
scientific explanation, describe my samples in a rich way, and place many existing
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation into a general structure.
Pairs of instances of adjacent categories on this scheme have standard relation-
ships. Theories are the principles and systems used to justify a model. A model
models a kind. Kinds are instantiated by entities. And entities have complex mea-
surement relations to data. I call these the “primary” relations. Pairs of instances
from the same category can have various “secondary” relations. Figure 3.1 shows this
structure.
We can categorize explanantia and explananda according to this scheme. We do
this by taking the highest item on the stack that is a theory, model, entity, or sort of
data. If there is none, then we apply the default category of “kind”. I call the pair
of the category of the explanans and the category for the explanandum the “form”
of the explanation. For instance, the form of example A4 is “model-data”, because
“model” occurs highest in the explanans and because “rate” (associated with the
“data” category) occurs highest in the explanandum. In other words, in example A4
it is something about the model that explains something about the data.
3.3.10 The Structure of an Explanation
The most complex form of explanation on my account is a theory-data explanation.
In a theory-data explanation we have at least one item from each of the categories:
theory, model, kind, entity, and data. The relation between the theory and the data
is the composite of the relations between the parts. Figure 3.2 depicts this form of
explanation.
The theory-data form of explanation is the most complex. Other forms involve
shorter chains of relationships. But while the chains may be shorter, they cannot
skip any steps. If the form is theory-kind, then there must be a model somewhere
in the explanation: the theory justifies part of the model and the model models the
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Theories Models Kinds Entities Data
justifies models instantiated by measured by
unifies submodel of subkind of causes correlates with
Figure 3.1: The five categories, four primary relations, and examples of five secondary
relations.
to
p
co
re
b
a
se
quality A
theory
model
kind X kind X
entity
data
quality B
b
ea
rs
b
ea
rs
ju
stifi
es
m
o
d
els
identity i
n
st
an
ti
at
ed
b
y
m
ea
su
re
d
b
y
explains
core relation
Figure 3.2: General structure of a theory-data explanation.
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kind. The intervening step might be implicit because it is not one particular model
that the authors have in mind, but rather just some model that involves the theory
and models the kind. Likewise, a model-data explanation requires some kind and
some entity: the model models the kind, which is instantiated by the entity, which is
measured to result in some data. Again, some of these might be implicit.
Why not skip steps? The full answer requires a more detailed analysis of each
of the categories, and that will come in the following chapters. But the question is
important enough to address here in a preliminary way.
1. Why posit an implicit entity in an explanation of kind-data form? Because
kinds are abstracta, lacking in causal powers. There are no measurements or
observations or images of kinds, only the entities that are instances of them.
For example, while all stars have mass, and we can measure the masses of stars,
the kind star has no mass to measure. The trickier case is comparing kinds
to those entities that are really collections. Data about collections of entities
are really collections or summaries of data about particular entities, where each
entity has causal powers while the collective itself does not.
2. Why posit an implicit kind in an explanation of model-entity form? Because the
model will always apply not only to that particular entity, but to other entities
(both actual and counterfactual) that are similar to it in the relevant respects –
which is to say that the model applies to the kind. For example, a model of the
brightness of star HIP 13044 over time will encode its mass and radius, but not
other qualities, such as its position or momentum. The same model will apply
to other stars that are similar in the relevant respects but differ in the irrelevant
ones. Thus the model models the kind of star with that mass and radius.
3. Why posit an implicit model in an explanation of theory-kind form? This
is perhaps the most difficult distinction to defend. In principle it is easy to
distinguish between the law of gravitation and an equation that models the
orbit of a planet. In practise, at least in sample A, there are no clear references
to laws. Instead we see kind terms, such as “the luminance of stars”, but we
know that there is a complex body of theory describing the dynamics of a star.
In order to apply the theory to a class of entities we need to add additional
assumptions and fix parameters. This is a process of model building, and the
resulting model is distinct from the original theory.
For more thorough discussions of these points see the relevant chapters for kinds,
models, and theories.
55
This general structure is powerful. All of the cases of explanation in sample A
can be interpreted as explanations of this sort. However there are often implicit steps
in the explanations. For instance, the statement of the explanation may mention a
relationship between qualities of two kinds without using the word “model”. Or it
may say that some general principle does the explaining without mentioning either a
“theory” or a “model”. In order to express the structure of such explanations I insert
implicit items, marked in italics, into the explanans and explanandum. Sometimes it
is the implicit items that determine the form of the explanation.
3.3.11 Revised Glosses
While there is no algorithm for extracting the structure from a statement of an
explanation, my method is designed to be easy to apply and reproducible. First, gloss
the explanation. Then put it in normal form as a series of noun phrases. At the top,
try to find the qualities of the explanans and explanandum, which may be implicit. At
the base, try to match the bottom items of the explanans and explanandum. In the
core, try to categorize the explanans and explanandum. This may require inserting
implicit items to make clear that claims about theories, models, entities, or data are
involved. The categories of the explanans and explanandum determine the form of
the explanation.
Here are the final glosses and tables for the four example cases. Appendix A
contains the quotations, notes, glosses, and tables for all of the cases in samples A,
B, and C.
A12 Kind – data explanation
Changes in the processes of formation of water masses are not necessar-
ily required to explain the large size of measurements of δ13C in end-
members of GNAIW which is a water mass.
are not necessarily required to explain
Changes the large size
in the processes
of formation
of measurements
of δ13C
in end-members
of GNAIW
of water masses which is a water mass.
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A14 Model – kind explanation
The balance of the population in a model of perfect compensation in the mul-
tiplication of equipotent stem cells by crypts of stem cells in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue of intestines can explain the eventual occurrence of mon-
oclonal conversion in crypts of stem cells in the maintenance of epithelial tissue
of intestines.
can explain
The balance the eventual occurrence
of the population
in a model
of perfect compensation
in the multiplication
of equipotent stem cells
of monoclonal conversion
by crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines
in crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines.
A4 Model – data explanation
The physiological concentration of ADP in the mathematical model of the
activity of kinase in circadian clocks of cyanobacteria is sufficient to quan-
titatively explain the rate of entrainment in the measurements of the
circadian clocks in a sample of cyanobacteria.
is sufficient to quantitatively explain
The physiological concentration the rate
of ADP
in the mathematical model
of the activity
of kinase
in circadian clocks
of entrainment
in the measurements
of the circadian clocks
in a sample
of cyanobacteria of cyanobacteria.
A10 Theory – data explanation
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The high-order of oscillations of luminance in the theory of stellar dynamics
in models of stars can possibly explain the length of the measurements
of the oscillations of luminance of HIP 13044 which is a star.
can possibly explain
The high-order the length
of oscillations
of luminance
in the theory
of stellar dynamics
in models
of the measurements
of the oscillations
of luminance
of HIP 13044
of stars which is a star.
3.3.12 Preliminary Evidence for the Account
Having normalized all of the cases in sample A we can consider all the pairs of the
types of the explanantia and explananda. While any of the 25 pairings is possible
prima facie, we see that not all of them occur in the data set. Table 3.2 shows the
results, and figure 3.3 presents a visualization.
In sample A all of the explanations fall on the left-lower half of the table. There
are model-kind explanations, but no kind-model explanations. There are theory-
data explanations but no data-theory explanations. There are also some kind-kind
explanations. The two most common forms are model-kind and model-data.
Given the prevalence of model-kind and model-data explanations, we might be
tempted to say that when scientists say “explain” they mean that they have a model
that explains a kind or some data about entities of that kind. I allow that model-kind
explanation is the prototypical use of “explain”. But while model-kind explanation is
more common than the other forms, by focusing on models as the explanans we ignore
half of the explanations in sample A. I have argued that there is a similar structure
in each case, with the key difference being the core relation. In the next section I
will defend the claim that the core relations for all the forms share a common thread:
they all support the counterfactual reasoning that is required for explanation.
This evidence provides some preliminary support for my account: it is general
enough to cover a wide range of cases, and any additional complexity is justified by
the flexibility to cover many forms of explanation that occur in sample A. Since the
account was designed specifically to handle the cases in sample A, this is no surprise.
The account must be tested against a wider range of cases to see whether it stands
up.
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data 0 0 0 0 0
entity 2 3 0 0 0
kind 1 1 3 0 0
model 5 1 9 0 0
theory 2 1 1 0 0
Table 3.2: The number of cases in sample A for each of the 25 forms of explanation,
where each form is the pair of an explanans type (row) and an explanandum type
(column), and the five categories of data, entity, kind, model, and theory classify both
explanans and explanandum.
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Figure 3.3: Visualization of table 3.2 in which darker colours indicate larger values.
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3.4 A General Philosophical Account of Scientific
Explanation
In scientific explanation the explain-relation holds between two qualities: the ex-
planans quality and the explanandum quality. The explanandum quality depends
on the explanans quality. If the explanans quality were different then the explanan-
dum quality might also be different. Explanations allow us to reason counterfactually
about the dependence of the explanandum on the explanans.
This much has been said before by philosophers of science. Woodward’s influ-
ential account of explanation in terms of ideal interventions in causal processes is
a counterfactual model of explanation (Woodward 2003). And the same insight can
also be seen in other philosophical accounts, such as mechanistic, asymptotic, and
model-based explanations. But the account I am proposing allows us to go further.
The explain-relation is always layered on top of some other relation between the
explanans and the explanandum. I call this the “core relation”. What I have called
the “form” of the explanation determines, in a general way, the nature of the core
relation. For example, in a model-kind explanation such as A14 the core relation is
modelling. The counterfactual dependence of the eventual occurrence of monoclonal
conversion on the balance of the population holds only to the extent that the model
of the reproduction of the equipotent stem cells models crypts of stem cells in the
maintenance of intestinal epithelial tissue. In a kind-data explanation such as example
A12 the core relation is a composite of the instantiation of the kind by the entity (i.e.
GNAIW is a water mass) and the measurement relation between the entity and the
data (i.e. between GNAIW and the measurements of δ13C in end-members). If
GNAIW were not a water mass, the explain-relation would fail. If the measurements
were not of GNAIW end-members, the explain-relation would fail to hold.
In general, the counterfactual supporting explain-relation between the explanans
quality and the explanandum quality will hold as long and to the extent that the
core relation holds between the explanans and the explanandum. We understand
the details of the explain-relation in a given case by understanding the details of the
counterfactual reasoning that the core relation supports.
Although the core relations can vary widely in different explanations across the
range of scientific disciplines, the explain-relation is essentially the same. Scientists
use “explain” in many different contexts, asserting an explain-relation between the
qualities of various sorts of explanantia and explananda. The diversity of the uses of
“explain” makes sense once we understand that there are diverse core relations sup-
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porting the explain-relation in different cases. Scientific disciplines may rely on some
forms of explanation more than others. The five coarse categories I have proposed,
and the forms of explanation based on them, are only a starting point, and there
is room for more detailed analyses of specialized forms of explanation that may be
unique to particular scientific disciplines.
3.4.1 Connections to Other Accounts
My account is designed to be a general one, covering explanatory practises across
the sciences. I selected my evidence base and designed my methods with this in
mind, keeping the focus firmly on scientific practise. My approach has not been
to start with philosophical accounts of explanation and discover what they have in
common. However, because various existing philosophical accounts do accurately
describe practises of explanation, there are places for them within my general account.
If the deductive-nomological account had been completely wrong about scientific
explanation then it would most likely have been rejected and forgotten. Instead it
has lived on for decades as a spur and foil for new accounts. I think that D-N tangles
together a number of insights that can be pulled apart using the distinctions I have
developed. My view is that D-N describes theory-data explanation – a relatively rare
form but a philosophically interesting one.
The nomological part of D-N explanation comes from the central role of laws of
nature, which I classify under “theories”. The conclusion of a prototypical D-N ar-
gument is a prediction or retrodiction of a measurement or observation about some
entity, which I classify under “data”. In the deductive form of a D-N explanation the
data are statements about individuals, which I am calling “entities”. The connection
between laws and individuals is mediated by natural kinds, expressed by the predi-
cates that apply to the individuals. These are included under my “kinds” category.
And the role of models is apparent if one simply relaxes the D-N premises about
initial conditions, leaving the rest of the laws, boundary conditions, and deductive
structure intact. The result is a sort of argument schema with a free variable, which
is a special case of what I am calling a “model” over a range of initial conditions.
Other existing accounts fit more easily into my general picture. Models have their
own category, which I treat in chapter 7. I have argued elsewhere that mechanisms
are best understood as a special class of abstract mathematical models (Overton
2011). Unification and asymptotic explanation have a place as forms of theory-theory
explanation. Causal mechanical explanation fits as a form of singular causal entity-
61
entity explanation.
Among the philosophical accounts I surveyed in chapter 1, my account is closest
to Woodward’s causal intervention account. Both take counterfactual claims to be
essential to explanation. While Woodward focuses on causal relations to support the
counterfactuals, I generalize to a wider set of core relations.
Statistical relevance is an outlier – I do not have a place for it in my account.
I share many of the doubts Woodward expresses about what statistical relevance
actually explains (Woodward 2011, §3.3). In my cases I did not find any examples of
a statistical explanans of a non-statistical explanandum.
In a following section I discuss the evidence I have collected in support of this
account. That an account with this much structure can be so successful in describing
practises of scientific explanation tends to count against van Fraassen’s unstructured
pragmatic account.
3.5 Sample B – Beyond “Explain”
My account of scientific explanation was designed around the cases in sample A, so
it is no great surprise that those cases fit the account. Our confidence in the account
will be much stronger if it can handle a wider range of fresh cases.
I collected sample B by taking a random sample of 100 sentences from the Science
data set. Unlike sample A, I did not filter the selection for words of interest such as
“explain”. One of the limitations of the text-mining done in chapter 2 is the focus on
particular words. In the analysis of sample B I have looked for explanations without
restriction on the words used to express them.
After normalizing and structuring the explanations in sample B, I find 29 cases
that fit my account of scientific explanation. A few of these use “explain” phrases
but the majority use other language.
1. –
2. accounted for
3. because (3)
4. blocked
5. by showing that
6. can cause
7. could affect
8. could have served (3)
9. depended
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10. did not significantly reduce
11. diminished
12. due to
13. induced (4)
14. inspired
15. is associated with
16. is best described by
17. is predicted to
18. is primarily set by
19. may be better understood . . . in terms of
20. may be better understood . . . not in terms of
21. might explain
22. one reasonable way to explain
23. owing to
24. protected
25. rescue
26. simulated
27. was proposed as a major source
28. we found a clear similarity between (2)
29. we reject the hypothesis (2)
Many of these phrases are much weaker than the “explain” phrases discussed above.
The weaker phrases are not characterized in the same way by the use of qualifying
words and negations. This much is no surprise.
The sentences in sample B also included phrases such as the following:
1. allow us to confirm that
2. as revealed by
3. demonstrated (3)
4. establishes experimentally
5. evince
6. imply that
7. it is highly probable that
8. it seemed likely
9. likely represent
10. might be evident in
11. most likely correspond
12. records (2)
13. reveal
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14. revealed (3)
15. suggest that (2)
16. suggesting
17. suggesting that
18. suggests that
19. supports
20. were most likely due to
21. were most likely due to . . . rather than
These phrases do not express explanatory claims but rather some form of evidential
claim. What is surprising is that the structure of these sentences matches the structure
of the explanation sentences almost perfectly. If we normalize them and apply the
same scheme we find top qualities, bases, and cores with items from the same five
categories.
The key difference is that the direction is reversed. Whereas explanations have
model-kind or theory-data form, these cases have kind-model or data-theory form.
Instead of moving from the more abstract categories on the left of figure 3.1 to the
more concrete categories on the right, in these cases we move from the right to the left.
For each of these evidential claims, if we reverse the direction we get a well-formed
explanatory claim.
3.5.1 Case B1
Consider an example:
Surface-layer Mn, however, showed little if any shift (0.008 ± 0.008 V),
again suggesting that such impurities do not respond to TIBB [tip-induced
band bending]. (D. H. Lee and J. A. Gupta 2010, p. 1808)
This paper is about manipulation of electromagnetic fields of single atoms in doped
semiconductors. TIBB is a change in the semiconductor bands caused by the tip of
the scanning tunnelling microscope. I classify TIBB as a theory because it is only
one factor in a model of semiconductor band behaviour. Here the authors state that
TIBB does not change the magnetic field of Mn atoms, in contrast to Zn atoms where
it plays a role.
I take the structure of this evidence claim to be as follows:
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The small size or absence of a shift in the measurements of the voltage of the
resonance peaks in a sample of the Mn atoms on the surface layer of doped semi-
conductors suggests the lack of a response in the theory of TIBB in models of
the semiconductor bands of Mn atoms on the surface-layer of doped semiconductors.
suggests
The small size or absence the lack
of a shift
in the measurements
of the voltage
of the resonance peaks
in a sample
of a response
in the theory
of TIBB
in models
of the semiconductor bands
of the Mn atoms
on the surface layer
of doped semiconductors
of Mn atoms
on the surface-layer
of doped semiconductors.
In an explanation we usually have a more general explanans on the left and a more
specific explanandum on the right. (The exception is an explanation of secondary
form, such as kind-kind or model-model, where there may not be a difference in
generality.) In this case the left side is more specific, referring to data, and the right
is more general, referring to theories. But as in an explanation we have the top
qualities, the core, and the base, with the data above entities and theories above
models. This evidence claim has the same structure as an explanation claim, except
that the claim moves from the specific to the general rather than from the general
to the specific. Simply switching the direction and substituting “explains” for the
evidential phrase gives us a well formed scientific explanation. There are 23 cases
like this in sample B. There are several cases where explanatory and evidential claims
are mixed together. There are also several cases where it is difficult to determine
from the structure of the sentence whether the claim is explanatory or evidential.
3.5.2 Evidence and Explanation
The standard high-level division of methods of inference is three-way: deduction,
induction, and abduction. All three can be seen in scientific practise. Deduction
is important when applying logical and mathematical theories, and when designing
experiments to rule out alternatives. Various forms of induction are important in
statistical methods. However the most characteristic form of inference in science is
abduction, or inference to the best explanation.
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The term “abduction” was coined by Charles Sanders Pierce in order to distin-
guish what he saw as a central scientific method from the more familiar methods
of induction. Douven takes the key difference between the two to be the presence
of explanatory considerations (Douven 2011, §1.1). Many philosophers recognize ab-
duction as central to everyday reasoning, and many philosophers of science see it as
central to scientific reasoning. Ernan McMullin’s book on the topic is called The
Inference that Makes Science (1992).
The striking similarity of structure in the explanatory and evidential cases strongly
suggests that the latter are inferences to the best explanation. In sample B there are
about the same number of cases of each type and there are several cases where both
explanatory and evidential claims are being made. In many cases it seems somewhat
arbitrary whether the authors phrased their claim in explanatory or evidential form.
Were I to remove the linking phrase (e.g. “explains” or “suggests”) and scramble the
order, I doubt that a reader could tell which form the original took. Explanatory
reasoning and these cases of evidential reasoning are tightly linked, and deserve to be
analyzed together.
Unfortunately, a full analysis of the evidential cases as instances of abduction, and
of the relationship between explanations and abductions, is beyond the scope of this
dissertation. I leave that fascinating topic to future work. In my analysis of cases
(listed in appendix A) I have marked each as either explanatory or evidential based
on the phrasing and whether the direction runs from general to specific or specific to
general. In the following five chapters on data, entities, kinds, models, and theories
I have included examples of both types for discussion. But my focus remains on the
question what is a scientific explanation? In the tables and figures that summarize
my results I have included both the explanatory and evidential cases in order to show
the full scope of this account of scientific explanation, but I have also pulled apart
the two types in order to show the differences.
3.5.3 The Importance of Explanation
In chapter 2 the text mining results showed that “explain” words are used in just
less than half of the articles in the Science data set. I noted that this was surprising
if explanation is as central to science as many philosophers of science have thought.
Other methods showed that “explain” is a strong word that scientists do not use
lightly, but did not shed much light on the actual frequency of explanation within
Science articles.
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My analysis of sample B answers these questions about the importance of expla-
nation in a much more direct way. Although the sample size does not compare to the
comprehensive searches in chapter 2, this method is not restricted to predetermined
lists of words of interest and it avoids many problems of word ambiguity.
The results from sample B show that 29 of all the randomly sampled sentences
contain scientific explanations and that 23 of all the randomly sampled sentences
include some evidential claim with a similar structure. Because the sentences were
sampled randomly, we have reason to believe that a similar portion of all the sentences
in the abstracts and bodies of the all the recent articles in Science are explanations
or evidential claims with that structure. Once we step beyond the word “explain” we
see that explanations are ubiquitous in science.
Finally, it is worth noting that the distribution of the forms of explanation across
the cases is more uniform in sample B than in sample A. More forms are represented
but for each there is a relatively small number of cases. I summarize this data below.
3.6 Sample C – Aiming to Explain
To create sample C I randomly selected 25 abstracts from the Science data set. In
each case I looked for the main claim being made in the abstract. Most of the
sampled abstracts follow a very similar form: establish the problem area, describe
the approach, summarize the results, and perhaps point to an application. The main
claim for these cases is usually contained in the final or second-to-last sentence of the
abstract, but sometimes it spans several sentences.
3.6.1 Case C4
Consider the following abstract from a paper about the structure of ribosomes.
During protein synthesis, the ribosome controls the movement of tRNA
[transfar RNA] and mRNA [messenger RNA] by means of large-scale
structural rearrangements. We describe structures of the intact bacte-
rial ribosome from Escherichia coli that reveal how the ribosome binds
tRNA in two functionally distinct states, determined to a resolution of
∼3.2 angstroms by means of x-ray crystallography. One state positions
tRNA in the peptidyl-tRNA binding site. The second, a fully rotated
state, is stabilized by ribosome recycling factor and binds tRNA in a
highly bent conformation in a hybrid peptidyl/exit site. The structures
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help to explain how the ratchet-like motion of the two ribosomal sub-
units contributes to the mechanisms of translocation, termination, and
ribosome recycling. (Dunkle et al. 2011, p. 981)
This abstract summarizes a complex argument for which the conclusion (and the
main claim of the abstract) is the final sentence. I believe it to be an explanation
with the following structure:
The ratchet-like quality of the motion in models of the structures of the subunits of
the ribosome explains in part multiple qualities of the translocation, termination,
and recycling of the ribosome.
explains in part
The ratchet-like quality multiple qualities
of the motion
in models
of the structures
of the subunits
of the translocation, termination,
and recycling
of the ribosome of the ribosome.
3.6.2 Explanation as a Goal
In all 25 of the sample C cases it appears to me that the main claim being made is
either an explanatory or an evidential claim matching the structure I have described.
I count 14 explanatory and 11 evidential cases. But even more than in sample
B, the distinction between evidence and explanation seems to be fuzzy. I did not
discern a clear pattern that would distinguish cases where an explanatory claim is
made from the cases where an evidential claim is made. The abstracts always include
claims about the specific data or results, and general claims about the kind, models,
or theories that account for them.
In chapter 2 I claimed that explanation is a goal of science and used text mining
techniques to test that claim. My methods included measurements of the relative
location of the words of interest. A pattern that emphasizes the beginning and end of
the article provides weak evidence that the words of interest are used in setting and
assessing the goals for the paper. I concluded that there was some weak evidence to
support the claim that explanation is a goal of science.
With sample C we have much stronger evidence for this claim. In all 25 of the
sampled abstracts an explanatory structure is clear in the authors’ main claim. In
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half of the cases the main claim is explanatory while in the other half it is evidential.
Without a full analysis of these evidential claims as abductions, my conclusion is not
as strong as it could be. But on the basis of the structure alone I am confident in
saying that explanation is a goal of the large majority of articles in Science.
3.7 Evidence for This Account
My account of scientific explanation is intended to stand alone as a plausible philo-
sophical account. The explain-relation between the qualities of the explanans and
explanandum depends upon a core relation that holds between the explanans and
explanandum. The explanans and explanandum fall into five coarse categories of
increasing generality: data, entities, kinds, models, and theories. Although expla-
nation is essentially the same across a wide range of uses, there are many forms of
explanation that differ in the details of the core relations. And although I have not
provided a full analysis of abduction, there seem to be many cases of inference to the
best explanation that match this structure.
In developing and testing this account I have collected a set of data about its
successes and failures and the various forms of explanation in the Science data set.
I take this evidence to show that my account is not only plausible, but successfully
accounts for a wide range of scientific practise.
Table 3.3 summarizes the results. Of the 25 cases of “explain” sentences in sample
A, nearly all fit my account. Of the 100 random sentences in sample B, half are either
explanatory or evidential. Of the main claims of the 25 abstracts in sample C, every
one is either explanatory or evidential.
3.7.1 The Generality of Explanation
I take the results of sample B to have established that explanations are ubiquitous
in scientific articles and thus important for understanding scientific practise. Sample
C was designed to show that explanation is a goal of science. The last of the three
main questions I asked in chapter 2 is whether explanation is general, applying across
a wide range of scientific disciplines.
The 150 cases in samples A, B, and C are large enough to draw conclusions
about scientific explanation in general. When those 150 are divided among the 33
disciplines in the Science data set, which are unevenly distributed, we do not have
large enough samples to draw strong conclusions for each area. But a preliminary
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A 25 22 0 22 88.0 0.0 88.0 29 0 29
B 100 29 23 51 29.0 23.0 51.0 38 27 65
C 25 14 11 25 56.0 44.0 100.0 18 12 30
ABC 150 65 34 98 43.3 22.7 65.3 85 39 124
Table 3.3: Summary of results by sample and in total, showing: 1. the number of
cases sampled; 2. the number of cases for which at least one explanation on my
account was found; 3. the number of cases for which at least one evidential claim on
my account was found; 4. the number of cases for which at least one explanation or
evidential claim on my account was found; 5. the percentage of cases containing at
least one explanation on my account; 6. the percentage of cases containing at least
one evidential claim on my account; 7. the percentage of cases containing at least
one explanation or evidential claim on my account; 8. the number of explanations on
my account found across all cases; 9. the number of evidential claims on my account
found across all cases; 10. the sum of the number of explanations and evidential
claims on my account found across all cases.
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analysis is worthwhile with the data that we have.
Table 3.4 shows the results of my analysis of the three samples broken down by
keyword. Five disciplines were not sampled at all: economics, engineering, epidemi-
ology, sociology, and virology. The small number of articles in each area makes this
no surprise. There are two disciplines that were sampled but for which there were no
successful explanations: computer science and mathematics (which Science groups
together), and genetics. For every other area there is at least one successful case of
explanation. In short, I have collected evidence that my account of scientific explana-
tion applies to 26 of the 28 sampled disciplines. While it is possible that my account
does not apply to explanations in computer science, mathematics, economics, and
engineering, I believe that we can easily find cases of explanation fitting my account
in genetics, epidemiology, sociology, and virology.
In chapter 2 we saw that “explain” words occur in all the disciplines in the Science
data set. These results show that not just the words but the practises of scientific
explanation occur across scientific disciplines. Although the forms of explanation may
differ, explanation is a general practise in science.
3.7.2 Forms of Explanation
It is the diversity of forms of explanation that allows my account to be as general and
flexible as the previous results show it to be. But this flexibility raises the question as
to whether we are talking about the meaning of “explanation” any more, or something
more general. And perhaps this complexity is unnecessary – perhaps scientists only
use some of the possible forms of explanation and not others.
Table 3.5 and figure 3.4 show the distribution of forms of explanation by sample,
both in the explanatory and evidential cases and when the two are combined. The
sample A cases were selected for the presence of “explain” words, and the distribu-
tion of forms of explanation shows that model-kind and model-data are the most
common. (There are no evidential cases in sample A.) In sample C the model-kind
form also dominates. And in the combined results there are more than double the
number of model-kind explanations as any other form. I take this to show that the
prototypical form of explanation in contemporary science is model-kind explanation.
When scientists use the strong word “explanation” in their publications they tend to
be proposing or refuting a model-kind explanation, and in the main claims of their
papers they tend to be proposing a model-kind explanation.
Sample B has much more variety in the forms of explanation than the other two
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Computers, Mathematics 3 0.38 1 33.3 1 0 0 0 0.0
Physics 60 7.68 9 15.0 9 3 3 6 66.7
Physics, Applied 26 3.33 4 15.4 4 0 1 1 25.0
Chemistry 65 8.32 10 15.4 10 4 1 5 50.0
Materials Science 36 4.61 7 19.4 7 4 0 4 57.1
Engineering 1 0.13 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 –
Astronomy 27 3.46 6 22.2 8 2 2 4 50.0
Planetary Science 29 3.71 4 13.8 4 1 1 2 50.0
Geochemistry, Geophysics 33 4.23 10 30.3 11 4 5 9 81.8
Atmospheric Science 19 2.43 5 26.3 6 3 1 4 66.7
Oceanography 12 1.54 5 41.7 5 2 2 4 80.0
Biochemistry 52 6.66 9 17.3 11 2 3 5 45.5
Molecular Biology 35 4.48 6 17.1 6 3 2 5 83.3
Microbiology 25 3.20 6 24.0 6 4 0 4 66.7
Cell Biology 50 6.40 7 14.0 8 5 1 6 75.0
Genetics 21 2.69 1 4.8 1 0 0 0 0.0
Development 26 3.33 1 3.8 1 1 0 1 100.0
Evolution 34 4.35 4 11.8 6 5 2 6 100.0
Ecology 27 3.46 6 22.2 6 2 1 3 50.0
Botany 23 2.94 6 26.1 7 2 2 4 57.1
Paleontology 18 2.30 3 16.7 3 1 2 3 100.0
Anatomy, Morphology, Biomechanics 3 0.38 1 33.3 1 1 0 1 100.0
Physiology 8 1.02 3 37.5 3 3 0 3 100.0
Virology 6 0.77 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 –
Immunology 19 2.43 2 10.5 2 1 0 1 50.0
Medicine, Diseases 26 3.33 4 15.4 4 1 2 3 75.0
Epidemiology 2 0.26 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 –
Neuroscience 54 6.91 8 14.8 10 7 1 8 80.0
Psychology 15 1.92 2 13.3 2 1 0 1 50.0
Sociology 3 0.38 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 –
Economics 2 0.26 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 –
Anthropology 14 1.79 5 35.7 6 1 2 3 50.0
Education 7 0.90 2 28.6 2 2 0 2 100.0
Table 3.4: Breakdown of results by article keyword, showing: 1. the number of
articles with that keyword; 2. the percentage of articles with that keyword among
all the articles; 3. the number of articles from which at least one case was sampled;
4. the percentage of the articles with that keyword from which at least one case was
sampled; 5. the number of cases sampled from articles with that keyword; 6. the
number of cases sampled from articles with that keyword that include at least one
explanation on my account; 7. the number of cases sampled from articles with that
keyword that include at least one evidence claim on my account; 8. the number of
cases sampled from articles with that keyword that include at least one explanation
or evidence claim on my account; 9. the percentage (if any) of cases sampled from
articles with that keyword that include at least one explanation or evidence claim on
my account.
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samples. There is also a large variety in the phrases used to express the explanation,
including everything from “could affect” to “induced”. But these various forms are no
less scientific explanations. They have the same structure as model-kind explanations,
differing mainly in their core relation. If we take model-kind explanation to be, not
the prototype, but the only legitimate form of scientific explanation, then we eliminate
at a stroke the large majority of the cases sampled. While there are more model-kind
explanations than any other form, there are four times as many explanations that
have some other form.
In the combined results for all three samples we see that there is at least one case
for each of the 25 forms of explanation. Some forms are only used once or a few
times in the sampled cases, with the right half of the table being particularly sparse.
Here we have another situation where the large number of cases becomes diluted
by the large number of available forms and our ability to draw strong inferences is
diminished. Nevertheless, the samples from the Science data set show a wide variety
of forms of scientific explanation, touching on each of the possibilities.
3.7.3 Evidence for Other Accounts
In my samples from the Science data set there are many references to mechanisms and
models and many causal claims. This tends to support the mechanistic, model-based,
and causal intervention accounts of scientific explanation. As I have argued elsewhere,
I think that the prominent MDC account of mechanisms should be recast as a sort
of causal modelling, but the importance of mechanisms particularly in biology and
neuroscience is not in doubt (Overton 2011). Both my account and Bokulich’s model-
based account build on Woodward’s counterfactual approach, and to that extent my
analysis of core relations in cases of modelling and causation tends to support their
respective accounts.
I did not find evidence supporting the other philosophical accounts of scientific
explanation in my samples. Regarding asymptotic explanation this is no surprise,
since the cases it was developed to support are discipline-specific and the focus is
on broad theoretical methods rather than the narrower topics that appear in Science
articles. For the unification account I expected to find some cases but did not. There
were few probabilistic explananda, and so few cases for which to apply the statistical
relevance account. Likewise, nothing quite like a D-N explanation appears in the
sampled cases. While there are cases of causal explanation, there are few that fit
Salmon and Dowe’s accounts of causal-mechanical explanation (one possible case is
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Table 3.5: The number of explanations and evidence claims on my account among
the sampled cases, broken down by form of explanation. The results are given by
sample and in total (major rows), and by type (major columns): explanations alone,
combined (explanations and evidence claims), and evidence claims alone. Within each
minor table the row provides the category of the explanans and the column provides
the category of the explanandum.
74
Explanation Combined Evidence
S
a
m
p
le
A
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
S
am
p
le
B
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
S
am
p
le
C
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
S
am
p
le
s
A
B
C
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
d
a
ta
e
n
ti
ty
ki
n
d
m
o
d
e
l
th
e
o
ry
data
entity
kind
model
theory
Figure 3.4: Visualization of table 3.5 in which darker colours indicate larger values.
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B60).
I recognize that my methods may not be sensitive to explanations of these sorts.
It is possible that they work above the level of sentences and paragraphs that I am
analyzing, or that they mainly involve theoretical forms of explanation that are not
prevalent in Science papers. However I think that the onus is on the proponents of
those views to show us particular cases where explanations of those sorts occur.
Arguably, each of the cases for which my account succeeds could be accounted
for as a pragmatic explanation. Perhaps even some for which my account fails would
count as successes of pragmatic explanation. However I take this to be a weakness
rather than a strength of the pragmatic account. The structure of my account, the
distinction of the five categories, and the forms of explanation all provide valuable
resources for analyzing particular cases. We do not learn nearly as much when we
discover that some claim is a pragmatic explanation.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter I have used a number of cases drawn from random samples of the
Science data set to develop and defend a general philosophical account of scientific
explanation. On my account an explanation consists of an explain-relation, an ex-
planans, and an explanandum. The explain-relation holds between qualities of the
explanans and the explanandum and allows for counterfactual reasoning about the de-
pendencies between the qualities. While this explain-relation remains essentially the
same, it always requires some core relation between the explanans and explanandum
for support. In order to understand the details of the dependencies between quali-
ties we must look to the core relation between the bearers of the qualities and the
counterfactual reasoning that it supports. Five coarse categories for the explanans
and explanandum help to distinguish a broad range of core relations, and there is
evidence that scientists do in fact use this full range of forms of explanation.
The application of my general account to the three samples allows me to address
the three main questions I introduced in chapter 1. Sample B shows that a large
portion of the claims in scientific articles are explanatory and thus that explanation
is important to science. Sample C shows that explanation is a goal of science, since
the main claim in every abstract considered is some sort of explanation or inference
to the best explanation. And there is strong evidence that my account applies across
a wide range of scientific disciplines.
The account also allows me to address the problem of fragmentation in the philo-
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sophical literature on scientific explanation. Philosophers have tended to focus on one
or a few forms of explanation, overlooking the others. This accounts for the striking
differences in relata for their explanations, from data to entities to kinds, models, and
theories. Several of the philosophical accounts in the literature fit as specific cases
of my general approach. But my account is not overly permissive. D-N explanation
is ultimately a poor fit, as is statistical relevance, and I see my highly-structured
proposal as at odds with pragmatic explanation.
This chapter comprises the core of the dissertation. In the following five chap-
ters I provide details and examples of the five categories and the various forms of
explanation. I also locate my categories within the larger philosophical literature. In
the process I raise many philosophical problems that I cannot fully address. The five
chapters are meant to supplement this one by helping to specify just what a scientific
explanation is on my general philosophical account.
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Chapter 4
Data
Much of the practise of science concerns the careful collection of data. In this chap-
ter I consider some examples of the role of data in explanations from the Science
data set and use these examples to chacterize the “data” category in my account of
explanation.
4.1 Examples
A12 In summary, changes in water mass formation processes are not nec-
essarily required to explain the high GNAIW [Glacial North Atlantic
Intermediate Water] end-member δ13C values. (Olsen and Ninnemann
2010, p. 659)
As we saw in the previous chapter, the explanandum of this explanation is a
set of carbon isotope ratios of end-member chemical compounds sampled from
a prehistoric formation of water.
B71 Using 10-min sliding window calculations, we found a clear similarity
in the time course between theta power and gridness . . . and a consis-
tent relationship between the power of theta and the gridness score
. . . . (Brandon et al. 2011, p. 597)
The authors investigated the association between theta oscillations in the brains
of rats and the activation of neurons believed to track spatial location.
A9 The exact origin of the size dependence activity is not yet known, and
our measurements cannot be explained by the change in coordination
78
number based on the Benfield geometric model. (Tedsree et al. 2011,
pp. 226-227)
Here the authors refer in a general way to the set of their measurements of the
adsorption energy of catalysts, ruling out one possible explanation of the data.
B58 The severity of the Fog phenotype in +/fem-1(Df) heterozygotes de-
pended not only on the identity of the deficiency but also on the his-
tory of the fem-1(+) allele. (C. L. Johnson and Spence 2011, p. 1314)
The Fog phenotype is a “feminization” of heterozygotes of C. elegans, which is
caused not only by the presence of a particular gene, but also by the history of
the presence of that gene in ancestors (i.e. its epigenetics).
B23 Cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM) images of these crystals revealed
notable ring-shaped (or, less likely, spiral-shaped) assemblies. (van
Breugel et al. 2011, p. 1198)
The images are of crystals of the SAS-9 protein, an important component of
cilia and flagella.
4.2 Discussion
The nature and role of data in scientific and non-scientific reasoning has been an
important philosophical topic. Much of the discussion has been part of the empiricist
tradition, or in response to it. Those questions have involved the nature of sense data,
the foundational status of sense data, the extension of the senses with instruments,
reliable forms of inference from data, etc. My goal here is certainly not to settle these
debates. Instead I want to characterize the nature and role of data in the explanatory
claims that appear in the Science data set.
I find it useful to start with the distinction between data and phenomena presented
in Bogen and Woodward 1988. The core of the distinction is between the data that
result from complex causal chains, and are thus tightly tied to the details of a given
experiment, and the general, repeatable phenomena that the data can tell us about.
Data are, as we shall say, idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts,
and typically cannot occur outside of those contexts. Indeed, the factors
involved in the production of data will often be so disparate and numerous,
and the details of their interactions so complex, that it will not be possible
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to construct a theory that would allow us to predict their occurrence or
trace in detail how they combine to produce particular items of data.
Phenomena, by contrast, are not idiosyncratic to specific experimental
contexts. We expect phenomena to have stable, repeatable characteristics
which will be detectable by means of a variety of different procedures,
which may yield quite different kinds of data. (Bogen and Woodward
1988, p. 317)
On the one hand, phenomena are general things that can be investigated in mul-
tiple ways and are the proper targets of systematic explanations. On the other hand,
data are idiosyncratic and tightly tied to the particular circumstances of a given ex-
periment. Data are connected to phenomena in particular cases by long and complex
chains of singular causation. The chains of causation are often so complex that we
have no hope of offering an explanation of them. Instead we design our experimental
methods to block confounding influences, we empirically assess the reliability of our
instruments, we repeat our experiments, and we then apply statistical methods to
the results. The goal is to step beyond the circumstantial limitations of the data and
establish a more general claim about the phenomenon.
In most cases I believe that what Bogen and Woodward intend by “phenomena”
is a close match for what I mean by “kind”. In their example of the melting point
of lead we collect data about many different specimens of lead in order to draw a
general conclusion about all lead. However this is not always clear in their paper, and
sometimes the better match seems to be my “entity” category. We might measure
the Sun in many different ways but the data are always about the Sun. In either case,
kinds and entities are proper targets for systematic explanations, and I agree that it
is often futile to try to explain the complex chains of singular causation that link an
entity to the data about it.
The distinction between data and phenomena helps to make clear how specific
data are, in contrast with the more general categories of kinds, models, and theories.
But what are data? I think it is clear that they are statements of measurements and
observations about their targets. This is at odds with what Bogen and Woodward say
at one point: “Data, which play the role of evidence for the existence of phenomena,
for the most part can be straightforwardly observed” (Bogen and Woodward 1988,
p. 305). Data certainly play the role of evidence, but to my understanding data are
not themselves observed – they are statements of observations. (Concrete records of
such statements can be observed, e.g. written on a page, but that is not the point
under discussion.) I think that my usage conforms to the standard usage in science.
Because they are statements, data can be made concrete in various sorts of records.
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There can be multiple copies of a set of data, in computer files, in print, or perhaps
stored in the minds of people. The recording and transmission of data can involve long
and complex chains of singular causation, but this is rarely the subject of scientific
explanation. In the following chapter I say more about the processes of measurement
and observation that link data to entities and the complex chains of singular causation
those processes require. For the purposes of this account my main interest is in the
shift from entities to statements about entities. I leave aside any further discussion
of how data are recorded and focus on the data themselves as statements.
Data are statements of measurements and observations. Measurements and ob-
servations are about concrete particular things. As Bogen and Woodward point out,
data are idiosyncratic in the sense that they are tied to the details of particular ex-
periments. Particular chains of singular causation link the targets to the observers
and measurement devices, and the details of those chains are rarely the subject of sci-
entific explanation. Instead, scientists design their experiments and empirically test
the reliability of their instruments to ensure that the details of those causal chains
do not matter. In this way they can move beyond the specificity of the data to make
general claims about entities and kinds of entities.
4.3 Data in Science
It is worth noting that explanations involving data are not the most prevalent group
in the data set. For all the effort scientists put into carefully collecting the right data
to support their claims, the majority of the sentences in Science articles, judging by
my samples, are about the nature of the claims and not the data itself. Large sets of
data are usually summarized in a small number of figures.1 Additional discussion of
the details of the methods and the results may be left to the supplemental material
and not published in the article itself. In many cases the data themselves are not
published at all. This may be the result of the short form of Science articles, and
articles in other journals may differ. Nevertheless, the data category is an important
one, and many of my sampled cases include explanatory claims involving data.
In the examples above we have several different forms of data. The most straight-
forward is A12. Samples of ocean sediments deposited during the Holocene era (∼12
1I recognize that a shortcoming that my approach, shared with most other philosophical discus-
sions of explanation, is that I do not address the role of plots, figures, and other images in scientific
explanation. However I think there is room for them on my account. Plots, for instance, are a
good way to communicate certain sorts of complex counterfactual relationships. I leave this topic
to future work.
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000 years ago) were taken and analyzed using a mass spectrometer or other related
device in order to determine the ratio of carbon 13 to carbon 12. Measuring the δ13C
is a standard method for discovering the isotopic “fingerprint” of a material and es-
tablishing its age and origin. But the causal chain by which we go from the GNAIW
water mass that deposited the sediments to a numerical δ13C value is daunting. As
Bogen and Woodward note, most of the details of the singular causal chains do not
make a difference to the end result. The key is that the right kind of singular causal
chain holds between GNAIW and the numerical values. When the right kind of causal
chain holds, the numerical values will depend on the nature of GNAIW in the right
way, and we will have learnt something about GNAIW. If the causal chain is broken
the dependency will fail, and inferences about GNAIW will be undermined.
In case B71 we have more detail about how a set of data is analyzed. Here
the data are about the activation of neurons in the brains of rats and the goal is
to determine whether these particular neurons track spatial location. The authors
describe a correlation within the data set that they later take to reflect a general causal
relation between the power of theta oscillations and the activation of the neurons.
Again the causal chain between the brains of particular rats and the data is long and
complex. Here the goal is not to draw conclusions about the brain of a particular rat
but instead about the brains of all rats, and in turn the brains of similar organisms.
Not only is the right kind of causal link between entity and data required in each of
these cases, but the right kind of inference between kind and entities as well. This is
discussed in chapter 6.
Case A9 is typical of many references to data among the sampled cases. Rather
than referring to the data in detail, the authors refer in a general way to the data
they have collected about the size of the catalysts and their adsorption energy. As in
B71 it is correlations in the data that are of immediate interest. The dependence of
the adsorption energy on the size of the molecule demands an explanation, and the
authors assert that one standard model cannot account for this important correlation
in the data.
In case B58 we do not have measurements in a traditional sense. The Fog phe-
notype is a bundle of qualities that are used to classify specimens of the C. elegans
nematode worm. Rather than measuring the length or weight of the worm, biologists
make judgements about phenotypes using a set of criteria. While some phenotypes
are binary, e.g. present or not present, in this case the authors distinguish between
different degrees and make claims about the “severity” of the phenotype. I include
this example to show that data need not be numerical measurements made with some
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instrument, but can be standardized classifications of entities as judged by human
observers.
Case B23 is interestingly different. Instead of measurements or values we have
“images”. Images are not usually understood to be statements, but the image from
a modern digital camera is quite clearly a 2-dimensional grid of measurements of the
intensity of light in three or four ranges of wavelengths. For analogue photography,
instead of pixels we have crystals of silver iodide or other photosensitive chemicals,
and “measurement” is the transformation of the chemical in response to light. Often
it is not the image itself but judgements about the image that are really the data
being considered. In all these cases the causal chain between the entity and the data
is long and complex, but if the chain holds in the right way then the result is a
measurement of some quality of the target entity at that time.
These five examples show how references to data in the sampled cases are usually
but not always marked by keywords such as “measurement”, “observation”, “values”,
or “images”. Some cases can be problematic. For instance, “observation” is some-
times used to refer to the conclusion of some previous line of argument, as in case
A3 where sea temperatures from the Hirnantian era are not observed in any direct
sense. Similarly, the word “results” can refer to data, but often refers instead to the
conclusion of previous arguments. “Results” is used in many of the sample C cases
to refer to all the smaller arguments of the article and state how they support some
more general conclusion.
In summary, data are statements about entities collected in the course of scientific
practise in order to draw conclusions about those entities. The two main sorts of data
are measurements (e.g. δ13C values, intensities of electron streams) and classifications
(e.g. severe Fog phenotype). In my samples from the Science data set nearly all of
the references to data were collective. In every case the data are linked to the target
entity by a measurement or observation process involving a complex causal chain. The
details of those causal chains are not explained. Instead, as Bogen and Woodward
describe, the integrity of the causal chain is checked empirically, and experiments are
designed to avoid confounding influences and ensure that the details of the causal
chain can safely be ignored. The data are about the target entity only if the causal
chain holds.
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4.4 Forms of Explanation
In each of these chapters on the five categories I conclude with a discussion of the pri-
mary and secondary forms of explanation for which the explanans is in that category.
The primary forms hold between items in adjacent categories in figure 3.1, while the
secondary forms hold between items in the same category. Because the “data” cate-
gory is the least general of the five, there is no primary form of explanation for this
chapter. The next chapter discusses the primary form of entity-data explanations.
The secondary form of explanation between data is the only form discussed in this
chapter.
4.4.1 Secondary: Data-Data
A data-data explanation is one for which both the explanans and the explanandum
fall into the “data” category. The core relation must relate data to data in a way
that supports counterfactual reasoning. There are several relations that can play this
role. If the explanandum data are a subset of the explanans data then they depend
on the explanans data in the appropriate way, but it might be a stretch to call
this “explanation”. More interesting would be cases of mathematical or statistical
transformations of the explanans data, simplifying, summarizing, or drawing out
patterns that are stated in the explanandum. While there are many such possible
transformations, the minimum requirement is that the explanandum data depend on
the explanans data in a counterfactual-supporting way.
There is only one case of data-data explanation among my samples of the Science
data set: B71. The authors describe the results of “10-minute sliding window calcu-
lations” on their data set, which show “a clear similarity in the time course” between
two of their variables. Although it is possible that they are referring to entities or
kinds, their language focuses on patterns in the data. It can then be a quick jump
from these correlations in the data to the conclusions they later draw about medial
cortex neurons in general. Another possibility is to consider this a “data model”
(Frigg and Hartmann 2006, §1.2). But in this case there is not much of a model to
be seen – the authors merely state a correlation and do not go into significant detail
about the relationships between the variables.
The core relation for an explain-relation must support counterfactual dependencies
between the explanandum and the explanans. In the following chapters we will see
examples of causal and modelling relations that do exactly this. Causes and modelling
are more familiar cases of counterfactual-supporting relations, but there are many
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others. The key is Woodward’s observation that explanations must be able to answer
“what if things had been different” questions. While mere coincidences do not meet
this standard, most claims about correlations in science seem to me to be intended
to do just this. In B71 the authors are claiming that the gridness time course and
score depend on the theta power. Other relations, such as subset part-hood and
various mathematical and statistical transformations, can have the same properties.
While this is not a prototypical case of explanation, the structure is essentially the
same, and we can understand the details of the explain-relation in a particular case
by understanding the details of the core relation in that case.
Data are the foundation of empirical methods. But the immediate goal of collect-
ing the right sorts of data is to learn something about the entities that the data are
about.
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Chapter 5
Entities
The data that scientists collect are about things in the world. The collective label I
use for these things is “entities”. In this chapter I consider a range of examples of
entities in order to characterize this category and distinguish entities from the data
about them.
5.1 Examples
We have seen several examples in the previous two chapters where a particular entity is
involved in an explanation. In case A12 we have GNAIW, a large formation of water,
and in case A10 we have the star HIP 13044. In both of these cases it is something
about the data that is explained. In the following examples it is something about the
entity itself that is the explanans or explanandum.
A19 The differences in MCAs [monocarboxylic acids] among the Tagish
Lake specimens may be explained by differing degrees of parent body
modification. (Herd et al. 2011, p. 1305)
The Tagish Lake specimens are fragments from a meteorite recovered from Tag-
ish Lake in Canada’s Yukon Territory.
B63 The concurrent decreases in larval supply and mass flux were most
likely due to hydrodynamic transport away from the ridge rather than
changes in source production. (Adams et al. 2011, p. 580)
This paper describes how large-scale ocean eddies, caused by atmospheric events
such as El Nin˜o, can change deep-ocean currents and affect the ecologies of
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hydrothermal vents. Here the authors propose that these transporting currents
better explain the changes they observed than would changes at the source.
B100 This Hirnantian-aged unit [a sample of carbonate] records a major
drop in sea level and a large positive carbon isotope excursion; both
are recognized globally in other sedimentary successions. (Finnegan
et al. 2011, p. 904)
The Hirnantian is the final stage of the Ordovician period, occurring approxi-
mately 445 million years ago and lasting approximately 1.9 million years. It was
a period of glacial melting and rising sea levels, and corresponds with a major
extinction event. As such it is of great interest for climate scientists. Here we
have a sample from that period that provides evidence of some of these changes
in climate.
B60 Although the absolute delay τ , corresponding to a group velocity of
v = 1600 m/s, is small in the present system because of the relatively
small optical depth N , the observation nonetheless establishes exper-
imentally that a vacuum input control field can delay a probe pulse.
(Tanji-Suzuki et al. 2011, p. 1268)
Here we have a use of “observation” referring to an event rather than data.
The authors developed techniques for controlling the rate of interactions among
photons in an optical cavity.
B13 Seismic analysis of the Sun has already shown that merely reproduc-
ing the luminosity and temperature of a star will not guarantee that
the internal structure, and hence the underlying physics, is correct.
This inspired the inclusion of additional physics, such as the settling
over time of chemical elements because of gravity, in stellar models.
(Chaplin et al. 2011, p. 215)
In this quotation the authors discuss the history of models of the structure and
dynamics of the Sun.
5.2 Discussion
The nature and role of entities in science is the point of contention in one of the central
debates in the philosophy of science. The realist position, in broad strokes, is that
scientists discover truths about things in the world in the course of their work. The
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claim does not sound radical, and the majority of scientists and philosophers would
likely accept it. However problems arise on several counts. One is unobservable
entities, where our knowledge is quite indirect and subject to doubts. Key examples
include subatomic particles, stars too faint for the naked eye, or the inside of the Sun.
Another is the problem of the pessimistic meta-induction about theory change: if all
the scientific theories that have been replaced by our present theories made claims
that were not true, then we seem to have some reason to doubt that the “truths” we
hold today will stand the test of time. Other problems with strong realism arise in the
reduction/emergence debate, where objects at multiple levels of description seem to
have equal claims to causal powers, leading to problems of causal over-determination.
Adherents of various forms of empiricism, instrumentalism, and anti-realism oppose
realist claims in order to avoid or solve problems such as these.
In characterizing the “entity” category on my account, I wish to avoid taking
sides in the realism debate as much as possible. However the language used by the
scientists writing in Science is most consonant with a realist position: scientists seem
to refer to entities in the world, even quite strange entities, much as we do in our
everyday language. This fact about language use is one that any opposing view
must face. I have aimed for the most straightforward reading of the cases and so my
language largely matches that of the scientists. Ultimately I believe that proponents
and opponents of realism alike will be able to recast my account and my arguments
in their own terms, without undue distortion.
The starting point for my analysis of the “entity” category is that entities are con-
crete particulars. First, they are concrete as opposed to abstract, which means that
they participate in the causal nexus “inside of” space and time. The data discussed
in the previous chapter are statements, which may be recorded and transmitted in
various ways, but their content is timeless, has no location, and is not itself causal.
The kinds, models, and theories discussed in the next three chapters are also abstract.
But entities are things that begin or come into existence at some time, endure for
some period of time, and then end or are destroyed or transformed into something
else. While they exist, most entities are capable of interacting in causal chains, but
there are some marginal cases that I will discuss below. Second, entities are particular
as opposed to universal. While there are many men, there is only one Socrates. There
cannot be multiple instances of Socrates simply because entities are not such things
as to have instances. The following chapter on kinds contains a longer discussion of
universals and instantiation.
None of the members of the other four categories of my account are concrete
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particulars and so in this sense entities are easy to distinguish. However we must still
consider how references to entities occur in the Science articles. I also present a few
of the more difficult references to entities that are important for understanding the
cases.
In the Science data set references to entities come in several forms. The simplest
form is the proper name. HIP 13044 is a concrete particular star that formed at some
point in the past and will be destroyed at some point in the future. It was discovered
by the Hipparcos mission and given the proper name “HIP 13044” in the Hipparcos
Catalogue of stars. “Glacial North Atlantic Intermediate Water” (GNAIW) is the
name of a formation of water in the North Atlantic that is believed to have existed
during the Holocene era, circa 12 000 years ago, but no longer exists. GNAIW is
unobservable in the sense that it no longer exists and we rely on various natural
records to infer its existence. HIP 13044 has an apparent magnitude of 9.4, meaning
that it is invisible to the unaided human eye. But in both cases the use of proper
names here appears to be the same as the use of proper names in everyday language.
Other forms of reference to entities include definite descriptions and indexicals.
In the examples above we have “the Tagish Lake specimens” in case A19 and “This
Hirnantian-aged unit” in case B100. Tagish Lake is a particular place and the Hir-
nantian age is a particular period of time – more on places and times below. Often
the definite descriptions are more complex and do not involve proper names at all,
relying instead on kind-terms and qualities to form the description. The definite ar-
ticle “the” can indicate a reference to an entity, but this is not conclusive since there
are many examples where the reference may be to a kind: e.g. “the black bear is an
omnivore”.
Finally, many references to entities are implicit in the cases I sampled from Science.
Case B60 is an example. While there is no direct reference to a particular pulse of
light, it is clear from the meaning of the sentence that the authors must have observed
a delay of a certain sort in a particular pulse of light in the course of their experiments,
and are drawing conclusions about the possibility that vacuum input control fields
can delay pulses in general. In cases where there is a clear reference to data I have
inferred that there must be at least one entity involved, since the data must be about
something with causal powers and not just an abstract kind or model or theory.
The minority of references to entities in the sampled cases are singular. GNAIW
is a single water mass, HIP 13044 is a single star, Tagish Lake is a single place, and
the Hirnantian age is a single period of time. Singular entities are the most common
targets of proper names and ultimately it is single entities that participate in causal
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chains that generate data. However the majority of references are to collections of
entities. The individual members of these collections are not named in the Science
articles, although they may very well have names or serial numbers that are used in
the course of experiments. Ultimately it is the members of the collection that have
causal powers and not the collection itself.
The differences between the use of single entities and samples of kinds marks in
a general way the difference between historical sciences and experimental sciences.
It is in historical sciences such as astronomy, oceanography, climate science, geology,
paleontology, anthropology, etc. that proper names and explicit references to enti-
ties occur. In chemistry, biology, genetics, physics, neuroscience, immunology, etc.
samples of a kind are used to stand in for the kind itself.
Of the five categories that my account of explanation depends upon, entities are
perhaps the easiest to characterize and to distinguish in the samples from Science.
However there are some marginal cases that I wish to include under “entities” that
require some justification: processes, periods of time, regions of space, and collections.
The examples of entities given so far have been things that philosophers would
traditionally have classified as substances. The word “entity” also implies that we are
talking about static substances. However I also wish to include concrete particular
processes under the category of “entity”. There are many examples of processes in
samples from the Science data set, for instance A12 refers indirectly to the water
mass formation processes that created GNAIW. However none of these processes are
given proper names and so the references are either by definite description or implicit.
Other difficult cases include particular periods of time and particular locations
in space. The Hirnantian age and Tagish Lake are both particulars that came into
existence, endured, and will pass out of existence. However it is less clear that the
Hirnantian age is concrete or has causal powers. There is a difference between Tagish
Lake and the location in space that the Tagish Lake specimens were found, and one
can insist that spatial regions are not concrete or causal. While it is not clear that
periods of time or regions of space are concrete, neither are they abstract in the way
that data, kinds, models, or theories are. They are certainly particular. Despite these
difficulties, locations and periods of time are particular, and cannot have their own
instances. My considered opinion is that they best fit into the “entity” category, and
that is the approach I have taken in my analysis.
The final difficult case to consider is the most important. As mentioned above,
while the historical sciences often mention singular entities by proper name, the ex-
perimental sciences usually refer to unnamed collections of entities. I include these
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collections in my “entities” category and distinguish them from kinds.
Consider case A4 where the explanandum is data about the circadian clocks of
a sample of cyanobacteria. In that paper the authors discuss an experiment with
two branches, the first where they experimented on biological oscillators that they
had synthesized, and the second where they experimented on whole bacteria. In the
latter case it is clear that they did not experiment on all the cyanobacteria that
exist, have ever existed, or could ever exist, and so we are not discussing the kind of
cyanobacteria. Instead the authors experimented on a sample of cyanobacteria and
drew their conclusions about the kind on that basis.
The sample of cyanobacteria was a collection of some number of concrete particular
cyanobacteria. The collection came into existence at some point in time, endured and
presumably underwent some changes, and then ended (or will end at some time in the
future) when all the members died or were scattered. The collection was particular –
it was not such a thing as to have multiple instances. It could have been (and perhaps
was) given a proper name.
When we say that data were gathered about the collection we can rephrase this
claim as saying that a set of data was gathered about the members of the collection.
The collection does not have a circadian clock, but each of its members does. (There
are of course some measurements that can be made of the collection itself, such the
number of its members.) The collection has no causal powers above and beyond
the causal powers of its members. In the literature on reduction and emergence we
find philosophers such as J.S. Mill distinguishing such composites (mere sums of their
parts) from more interesting structures supporting emergent behaviours (McLaughlin
1992).
I use “collection” rather than “set” to mark several differences. Philosophers are
accustomed to thinking of sets in the mathematical sense, as abstracta. If we consider
collections simply to be sets then we are in danger of collapsing the distinction I wish
to make between entities and kinds. But as we will see in the next chapter, kinds are
quite different from these collections. Kinds are counterfactual-supporting because
they are intensional, while the collections I have in mind are purely extensional,
nothing more than the sum of their parts. There are sets of sets but I see no need to
posit collections of collections. To combine two or more collections were merely take
the union of their members.
While there are many debated questions about the nature of entities and their
role in science, all sides must account for the facts about the references to entities in
the scientific literature. Scientists seem to refer to entities in the same way that we
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do in everyday language: treating them as concrete particulars; using proper names
and definite descriptions; and referring to singular entities and collections.
5.3 Entities in Science
The examples given above cover a range of cases from my samples of the Science
data set. In case A10 we have a number of entities. “[T]he Tagish Lake specimens”
refers to a collection of fragments of a single meteorite (the Tagish Lake meteorite,
referred to here as the “parent body”) that fell on Tagish Lake at 16:43 p.m. UTC
on 18 January 2000.1 The authors propose that differences in the samples are due
to differences among the parts of the parent body, which was modified by various
natural processes between the time of its formation and the time of impact. This is
an example of the use of “specimens” where the specimens are from a single entity.
Although it does not occur explicitly in my samples from Science, the alternative
use of “specimens” is as specimens of a kind. In both cases the specimens form a
collection in my sense.
Case B63 includes references to entities by definite description, specified by ref-
erence to a particular underwater ridge. While the authors must have measured or
observed the larval supply and mass flux in some way, here they refer to the processes
rather than their data about the processes. Likewise “hydrodynamic transport” could
be a kind, but here I believe that it refers to a particular current.
The quotation for case B100 uses the indexical “this” in a description of a single
piece of carbonate formed during the Hirnantian age. The authors say that this “unit
. . . records” information about two other entities: the Earth’s ocean and an unnamed
“large positive carbon isotope excursion”. The latter is a somewhat strange elliptical
reference to some process, perhaps volcanic or biological, that changed the ratios of
carbon isotopes in the atmosphere of the Earth.
In case B60 we have an implicit reference to a concrete particular pulse of photons
inside a vacuum input control field. Whether we consider the pulse to be a singular
entity or a collection of particular photons is a difficult question that raises important
issues from the philosophical literature on reduction and emergence. This seems to be
an exceptional case from this area of physics, which is an experimental science. We
would expect to have data about a large sample of pulses that would be run through
various statistical tools and used to make a strong claim about pulses in general.
Instead we seem to have a single observation used to make a possibility claim about
1See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tagish_Lake_(meteorite).
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the kind.
Finally, case B13 is quite different and may in fact fall outside my account of
scientific explanation. Here we have a discussion of the history of ideas in the field
of solar dynamics. The authors explain how previous simplistic models of the Sun
were shown to be inadequate and this led to the creation of more complex models.
The explicit use of the word “model” suggests that we are not talking about entities
at all. But the word “inspired” suggests that there was some form of causal relation
between the old and the new models. As I will discuss further in chapter 7, models are
abstract, and not the sorts of things that have causal powers. As abstracta models are
neither created nor destroyed. But models in the sense used here clearly are created.
My preferred interpretation of this case is that we have the concretization of the
old and the new models in the minds of scientists and on the pages of their papers
and textbooks. The concretizations of these models are entities, and each has causal
powers and exists for a period of time. This introduces metaphysical complexities that
I have not discussed above and do not wish to pursue in depth. If this interpretation
of the case fails, then it is one more case from sample B for which I cannot account
as a scientific explanation. Perhaps it is an explanation of some other sort, or not an
explanation at all.
In summary, entities are concrete particulars. They can either be singular or col-
lections of singular entities. Singular entities can be substances, processes, periods
of time, or regions of space. References to entities can be proper names or definite
descriptions, but in the latter case there is often syntactic ambiguity between a refer-
ence to an entity and a reference to a kind. When definite descriptions include words
such as “specimen”, “sample”, or “unit” we have an additional clue that the referent
is an entity.
5.4 Forms of Explanation
When the explanans is an entity there are two possible forms of explanation. The
primary form takes us from an entity to data about that entity. The secondary form
takes us from one entity to another, or perhaps between different qualities of the same
entity.
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5.4.1 Primary: Entity-Data
The primary relations between entities and the data about them are measurement and
observation, supported by chains of singular causation. The singular causal chains
that connect an entity to a measuring device or an observer can be very long and
complex. As Bogen and Woodward point out, we are rarely in a position to offer a
comprehensive explanation of these chains. But our inability to trace these details
need not be an obstacle. If we design our experiments carefully, cross-checking the
reliability of our measurements and observations, then we can be confident that the
details of the causal chains do not matter. What is important in such a case is that
there is the right sort of causal link between the measurement device or observer and
the target entity.
Spelling out the details of what kind of causal link is required is difficult and
beyond the scope of the current project. Instead I will point to Dretske’s analy-
sis, which takes an information-theoretic approach to important general questions in
epistemology (Dretske 1981). An interesting consequence of Dretske’s account is that
information can be transmitted by the lack of a causal link in some situations, for
example when an expected signal does not arrive. Dretske is one author among many
who have considered the relations between causation and epistemology.
There is a significant philosophical literature on the topic of measurement, partic-
ularly on the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. Along with the nature
of sense data, the acquisition of such data has also been an important topic for em-
piricists. Van Fraassen devotes several chapters of Scientific Representation to such
questions (van Fraassen 2008). As the title implies, van Fraassen is centrally interested
in the connections between measurement and “scientific representation”.
For my purposes the key point is that entities and data are different sorts of things,
and acts of measurement or observation mark the transition between the two cate-
gories. By measuring we switch from the realm of entities to the realm of statements
about entities. (There are, of course, sciences such as linguistics where the entities
of interest are statements.) This distinction is also important in the philosophical
literature on representation, especially in the philosophy of mind. Not coincidentally,
Dretske’s information-theoretic approach to epistemology is the platform on which
he builds his theory of mental representation (Dretske 1988).
There are many important open questions about the nature and role of measure-
ment and observation. My main goal is to establish them as counterfactual supporting
relations. This is trivial on a pre-theoretic understanding of measurement and ob-
servation: the result of a measurement or observation process depends on the target
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entity. If the entity were different we expect that the measurement or observation
would have been different. Even taking into account various sorts of error (an impor-
tant topic I must leave aside), this dependence holds. If the dependence fails then
we have a case of misrepresentation – we were mistaken in thinking that they were
measurements or observations of the target entity.
In my samples of the Science data set the evidential data-entity form was about
twice as common as the explanatory entity-data form. I take this to be the more natu-
ral way of phrasing closely related claims: something about the data shows something
about the entity, and something about the entity explains something about the data.
Case B100 has data-entity form. This is not entirely clear, because the quotation
does not mention the details of the data. The authors measured various isotopes in
the sample of carbonate in order to determine the origins of various layers of sediment.
Isotope ratios can provide a “fingerprint” that distinguishes between various sources
of carbon. There is a staggeringly complex causal chain connecting those sources
of carbon to the processes of deposition, the storage, the recovery by scientists, the
sampling process, and the elaborate processes inside a mass spectrometer. But if
the experiment was conducted properly then many of those details do not matter.
The key is that there was the right sort of causal link between the source and the
measuring device. The right kind of link supports counterfactual reasoning about the
sources of carbon and the levels of the sea 445 million years ago.
In short, data are statements of measurements or observations of target entities.
Complex singular causal processes are involved in measurement and observation. But
the key for my account is the transition from the realm of entities into the realm of
statements about entities. Entity-data explanations, and data-entity inferences to
the best explanation, connect the two realms.
5.4.2 Secondary: Entity-Entity
There are many relationships that can hold between two entities or two qualities of
the same entity. Here I will focus on two: parthood and singular causation. The
latter, of course, is very general.
The discussion in the previous section was about measurement and observation,
but neither is possible without chains of singular causation. There must be a causal
link between the target entity and the measuring device or the observer. Even in
Dretske’s cases where information flows without a direct causal link there must always
be some prior causal structure in place that links the target to the observer. But
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singular causal chains are not limited to linking entities to observers and measurement
devices. The world is full of innumerable causal interactions between entities. Some
of these are important for scientific experiments.
Given a particular scientific experiment we can think of any number of singular
causal chains that are relevant. However my samples show that scientists do not often
comment directly on these links. B63 is one case of this sort, where I believe the
authors are referring to a particular process of larval supply and mass flux, and to a
particular current, where changes in the current caused changes in the supply and flux.
B13 is a somewhat peculiar case where there is a singular causal relationship between
concrete instances of models, where one model historically “inspired” another.
There are certainly many cases of causal language used in explanations among
the samples. Not all of these are indicative of entity-entity explanations, since some
may be general causal claims about kinds rather than about singular causes. I discuss
such cases in the following chapters.
The other relation between entities that is critical for understanding the sampled
cases is parthood. There are many ways in which qualities of a whole depend upon
properties of the parts and vice versa. Case A19 provides an example, where prop-
erties of the meteorite samples are explained by changes made to the parent body.
This case shows that the parthood relation is often just part of the story and some
other causal relations will be important.
Scientific experiments are ultimately performed on concrete particular entities.
The focus of scientific reasoning, however, is not on the particulars themselves, but
on the general kinds.
96
Chapter 6
Kinds
Although scientists collect data about particular entities, their goal is usually a more
general understanding about kinds of entities. After discussing some examples in the
context of the long history of philosophical thinking about kinds, I characterize my
“kind” category and present the primary and secondary forms of kind explanations.
6.1 Examples
B68 Although 2 [Mn4CaO2] is insoluble in tetrahydrofuran (THF), addi-
tion of Ca(OTf)2 [OTf is trifluoromethanesulfonate] leads to partial
dissolution of the suspended material, suggesting the formation of a
more soluble Ca-Mn intermediate. (Kanady et al. 2011, p. 733)
Chemical kinds are among the most straightforward examples of kinds. The
authors use the present tense to describe what happens in general when one
mixes Mn4CaO2 with other compounds.
B42 The evidence from Darwinopterus supports this hypothesis [about
sexual dimorphism in pterosaurs]. (J. Lu¨ et al. 2011, p. 323)
Here we have evidence from one species of pterosaur (flying reptiles from the age
of the dinosaurs) used to support a more general claim about many pterosaur
species.
B14 When male and female gene expression profiles were analyzed sep-
arately, the strain effect on males accounted for the differential ex-
pression of 1172 genes (9.3%), whereas only 7 genes (∼0.06%) were
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significant for the strain effect on female gene expression. (Innocenti,
Morrow, and Dowling 2011, p. 846)
Mitochondria are organelles in eukaryotic cells with their own genomes, trans-
mitted from mother to child along with other cellular material. This paper uses
a fruit-fly experiment to show that this creates a strong sex-specific selective
pressure, allowing the accumulation of deleterious male-specific mutations in
the mitochondrial genome.
B52 MH2 [Malapa Hominin 2] shares with other australopiths and Homo
asymmetry of the metacarpal heads that is associated with the human-
like ability of the fingers to accommodate to an object via the metacarpal
phalangeal joints. (Kivell et al. 2011, p. 1413)
Malapa Hominin 2 is a fossil specimen of the wrist and hand of an adult female
Australopithecus sediba, found in Malapa, South Africa and dating to approxi-
mately 2 million years ago. The authors discuss her anatomy in the context of
the evolution of the human hand.
B95 In cuprates [superconductors with a copper anion] the angular de-
pendence of the wave functions is primarily set by the d orbitals of
Cu, which hybridize with properly symmetrized combinations of p
orbitals on nearest-neighbor oxygens. (Sakurai et al. 2011, p. 700)
6.2 Discussion
For Plato knowledge of the Forms of things was true knowledge. While Plato’s Forms
are not my “kinds”, he recognized the importance of finding general truths that could
bring some sense of order to the staggering diversity of particular things. When
scientists classify a group of entities as belonging to the same kind they are saying
that those entities are the same in some important respects, and thus that what we
say for one goes for the others in these respects at least.
The kinds I have in mind are closer in spirit to Aristotle’s revisions of Plato’s
ideas. But Aristotle’s ideas have also been taken up and modified by generations of
philosophers and scientists seeking to understand the world. Philosophers have asked
metaphysical questions about the status of kinds and developed logics for dealing
with the properties and instances of kinds. Scientists following Aristotle have put
these ideas into practise by developing elaborate taxonomies of the kinds of things in
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the world. In everyday language our common nouns name various kinds with which
we classify entities. The ubiquity, centrality, and generality of kinds in our thinking
actually makes them somewhat difficult to discuss.
Plato’s Forms are supposed to be timeless and unchanging. This is still a widely
accepted starting point for thinking about kinds. Plato’s core examples were unchang-
ing Forms such as Justice, but for Aristotle biological species were central examples.
While individual horses come and go, he considered the kind horse to be eternal
and unchanging, outside the temporal and causal order of the world. The modern
understanding of species throws this into question.
Plato and Aristotle distinguished between universals and particulars. Universals
are distinct from particulars because universals have instances while particulars are
instances, and cannot have instances of their own. The ancients raised questions
about the nature of this mysterious instantiation relation. How can acausal univer-
sals influence causal particulars? One solution is to reject the reality of universals.
Perhaps it is only particulars that are real, and when we say that they belong to the
same kind we are really just giving a name to the similarities between them. The
denial of the reality of universals is called “nominalism”, of which there are many
sorts.
Contemporary philosophers are perhaps more likely to invoke a distinction be-
tween types and tokens. The standard example is that the string ‘AAA’ contains
three tokens of one type. In her book Types and Tokens Wetzel discusses examples
from science and notes the ubiquity of type-talk both in science and everyday lan-
guage (Wetzel 2009). While the type/token distinction is more recent and so not as
burdened with philosophical implications as the distinction between universals and
particulars, it is not clear whether types differ from universals or how great those
differences may be (Wetzel 2011).
My account of scientific explanation requires a distinction between particular en-
tities and the kinds to which they belong. Entities are created, cause and undergo
changes, and are destroyed. Kinds are timeless and acausal (even when they are
historically contingent, as I discuss below), and a single kind can have many entities
as its instances. Thus kinds are universals or types of some sort. While philosophers
offer competing accounts, the basic distinction is fundamental, and I believe that my
account of explanation is compatible with a wide range of views including Aristotelean
realism and at least some forms of nominalism.
In philosophy of science it is natural kinds that have seen the most attention. Bird
and Tobin list four characteristics often thought to apply to natural kinds:
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1. Members of a candidate natural kind should have some (natural) properties in
common.
2. Natural kinds should permit inductive inferences.
3. Natural kinds should participate in laws of nature.
4. Members of a natural kind should form a kind. (Bird and Tobin Spring 2009,
§1.1)
Items 2 and 3 are particularly important for scientific reasoning. If a natural
kind permits inductive reasoning, then by performing a well-designed experiment on
a properly chosen sample of a kind we are licensed to make inferences about the kind
itself. Based on the facts discovered about natural kinds we can draw inferences about
the natural laws that govern them. On accounts of explanation such as D-N, where
natural laws are central, natural kinds have a privileged place.
The standard examples of natural kinds were once the biological species. Modern
biology has shown that a simple view of species along these lines is no longer sufficient.
There are several alternative species concepts that biologists work with today, and
on some views species are to be considered as individuals undergoing change rather
than as timeless kinds (Ereshefsky 2010).
In place of biological species, chemical kinds are now considered by many to be
the prototypical natural kinds. Consider the chemical kind Mn4CaO2. Since ev-
ery instance of Mn4CaO2 shares so many properties of interest with every other in-
stance, chemists are happy to talk in the timeless present tense about the behaviour of
Mn4CaO2 in the past and present, as example B68 above shows. While instances are
created and destroyed, the kind Mn4CaO2 is eternal and changeless. Other chemical
kinds, such as “metals”, may be more vague and problematic (Bird and Tobin Spring
2009, §2.2).
Using the present tense to refer in general to kinds allows scientists to include not
only the past and the present but also future and counterfactual behaviours of kinds.
I take this to be part of points 2 and 3 above. Natural kinds support reasoning about
what would have happened if an entity were an instance of a kind. We can imagine
finding a new instance of that kind and just by knowing that it belongs to that kind
we could reason about the properties it would have, or what possible changes it could
undergo. Reasoning counterfactually with kinds is central to scientific argumentation.
Many chemical kinds such as Mn4CaO2 fit the standard criteria for natural kinds.
Not coincidentally, I think, many chemical laws fit the standard criteria for natural
laws. But the traditional criteria for laws and kinds are quite stringent, and the vast
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majority of scientific reasoning does not conform. For instance, there is widespread
doubt that there are natural laws of biology in this strict sense (Smart 1959; Beatty
1995). In fact, laws in the classical sense are hard to find in most of the special
sciences, even in cases where there is strong empirical and predictive success.
Sandra Mitchell’s response is to weaken the notion of a natural law so that it bet-
ter fits scientific practise. Her “pragmatic law” concept does not require exception-
less universality but allows for empirical, contingent generalizations (Mitchell 1997;
Mitchell 2000). Rejecting the forced choice between natural necessity or nothing,
Mitchell allows for nested layers of contingency, showing how biological laws can be
contingent on chemical laws and chemical laws on physical laws (Mitchell 2009, p. 58).
Without committing to all of the details of Mitchell’s view, the notion of kinds
that I have in mind is also one that relaxes the strict constraints of the traditional
natural kind concept. I count chemical elements and kinds of molecules under my
“kinds” category. I also include biological species, which I consider to be contingent
on the history of evolution. Allowing that Homo sapiens might never have existed,
there are properties that hold in sufficient generality across the members of the species
such that it makes sense to use that kind for scientific reasoning. While there were
times when no instances of Homo sapiens existed, and in the future this may happen
again, the kind itself is timeless. There are many other kinds referred to in the Science
data set that meet this more pragmatic standard.
On my view a kind is an abstract universal. Although they may be contingent,
kinds are timeless and acausal. The instances of kinds are the concrete particular en-
tities described in the previous chapter. When we ascribe qualities such as negatively
charged to the kind electron we are asserting that all the entities that are instances
of that kind share that property. As in Mitchell’s account, these assertions may fall
short of universality. There may be exceptions. But the assertion is meant to apply
not only to instances past and present but also future and counterfactual instances.
The support for counterfactual reasoning distinguishes kinds from collections of
entities. If we know that x is a mouse then we know many things: it is a warm-
blooded multicellular organism with a spine, fur, two eyes, etc. If we learn that x is
a member of a collection of mice then we know very little more about x than we did
before. We can also consider the collection of all mice that have ever or will ever live,
and this is still distinct from the counterfactual-supporting kind mouse. Philosophers
have often contrasted natural kinds with arbitrary sets, and a similar contrast holds
here.
The distinction between kinds and collections is clear in theory but in practise it
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can be difficult to tell whether an author intended to refer to the kind in general or
some collection of members of that kind. Syntax alone does not always mark the shift
from the kind Mn4CaO2 to the collection of all the Mn4CaO2 in this test tube at this
time. When we talk about the “average” member of a kind we are often making this
shift from the kind in its generality to the collection of instances of that kind that we
have measured. One key syntactic clue is verb tense. Since kinds are timeless, the
present tense is usually used. Since articles in Science report on research that has
already been conducted, the past tense is usually used for collections.
One last characteristic of kinds on my account is that they often have sub-kinds.
The kinds in a particular area of research often from a hierarchy of sub-kinds, which
can be further connected by other relations between them. Biological taxonomies
demonstrate such a hierarchy, but I think that a great deal of important scientific
work can be described as finding the various sub-kinds of a given kind and articulating
the differences between them. We can also restrict kinds by time or location without
switching the reference to a collection, although this can invite confusion. In general
it makes sense to talk about “kinds of kinds”.
Kinds are the ubiquitous universals that we use to classify the world of particular
things. Whatever their ontological status, knowing that two entities belong to the
same kind tells us that they are similar in some respects, and helps us to predict the
behaviour of the one based on the other. Much of the business of science is discovering
how to group similar things into kinds that explain their similarities and differences,
and then extending those kinds into new territory as the scope and power of science
increases. Mark Wilson’s Wandering Significance is an extended meditation on the
ways in which our concepts grow and stretch as we face new challenges to prior ways
of thinking (Wilson 2006).
6.3 Kinds in Science
The Science data set contains references to many different kinds. There are kinds of
organisms, kinds of molecules, kinds of elements, kinds of proteins, kinds of genes and
gene functions, kinds of viruses, kinds of stars, etc. The examples above demonstrate
just a fraction of this diversity.
In case B68 we have three kinds of molecules (Mn4CaO2, tetrahydrofuran, and
Ca(OTf)2) and the suggestion of a fourth (“a more soluble Ca-Mn intermediate”).
As discussed above, these chemical kinds are prototypical natural kinds, where we
usually care little about the differences between individuals and focus instead on their
102
shared properties. The present tense of the verb “leads” is evidence that the reference
here are to the kinds and not to collections of particular molecules.
Case B42 involves two kinds: the biological species Darwinopterus and the bi-
ological order Pterosauria. Darwinopterus belongs to the genus Wukongopteridae,
which belongs in turn to the order Pterosauria, and so Darwinopterus is a sub-kind
of Pterosauria.
In case B14 we have kinds of mitochondria. They are strains rather than species,
and the differences between the strains result in more differences in the expression
of genes in males than in females. I consider genes and alleles to be kinds that are
instantiated by concrete particular sequences of base pairs.
The entity MH2 in case B52 is an instance of the biological species Australopithecus
sediba. The authors are interested in the kind of ability to grasp and thus in the kinds
of shapes in the bones of homonid hands.
Finally, in case B95 we have a kind of superconductor called a “cuprate” because
of the kind of element in its anion. The d and p orbitals are also kinds, while the
wave function is stranger sort of abstract mathematical object I discuss in the next
chapter.
6.4 Forms of Explanation
When the explanans is a kind we can have kind-kind, kind-entity, and kind-data
explanations. I consider the kind-data form to be a composite of the kind-entity and
entity-data forms. One key difference is that the entity may be implicit, and this is
often the case. Kind-data explanations are significantly more common in the samples
than kind-entity explanations and I propose that this is because the implicit reference
to a sample or specimen is very clear – the key information is in the data. While
the kind-entity form is rare, it is essential to understanding the nature of scientific
explanation. The kind-kind form also gives us insights into models, which is the topic
of the next chapter.
6.4.1 Primary: Kind-Entity
The relationship between kinds and entities is instantiation. Entities are instances of
kinds and kinds are instantiated by entities. As mentioned above, the nature of this
relation has been somewhat mysterious since it was propsed by the ancients. However
both kinds and entities are important for scientific explanation and most explanations
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would not be possible without some link between general kinds and particular entities.
In my analysis of the sampled cases from Science nearly every entity that is men-
tioned is also analyzed as an instance of some kind. These instantiation relations
are usually part of the base of the explanation, the part of the explanatory structure
that the explanans and explanandum share. Despite being present in a large number
of cases, there are very few cases where instantiation is the core relation. While be-
longing to the kind is important for reasoning about entities and data, it is not the
belonging that is the focus of these explanations, but rather something about a model
or theory of the kind.
Case B14 is a rare example of this form where it is the strain of the mitochondria
that explains the differences of the expression of genes in a sample of male fruit-flies.
For particular cells in particular fruit-flies it is their particular mitochondria that
cause the differences in the expression of genes. But the most natural way to read
the explanatory claim is that the instantiation of some strain of mitochondria in the
cells of a particular male fruit-fly explains explains the differences in the expression
of his genes when compared to his cohorts.
Inferences from kinds to entities are central to scientific reasoning and are present
in a large number of the sampled cases. The instantiation relations in the bases of
these explanations makes this clear. But it is rarely the focus of the explanation, and
so instantiation is rarely the core relation that supports the explanatory claim.
6.4.2 Secondary: Kind-Kind
There are many relations that can hold between concrete particulars. For many
of these we can also have a general form that holds between kinds. For instance,
the parthood relation between entities, e.g. this lung is part of this chest, can be
generalized to a claim that holds between the kinds lung and chest (restricted, perhaps,
to humans or some other kind). This information could help us to reason about a
concrete particular instance of a lung. Such general rules can have exceptions, such
as when the lung has been surgically removed, and these complications were noted
by Aristotle in his writing on the relations between kinds and entities. Despite these
exceptions this kind of reasoning can be very useful.
Along these lines, different sorts of singular causal relations between entities can
be generalized to become general causal relations among entities. As I discuss in the
next chapter, we have to be careful when instantiating general causal loops in singular
causal chains (which cannot loop). But this sort of reasoning about general causation
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is useful and fairly common in the Science data set.
However, once we have a general causal relationship between kinds we step away
from the “kinds” category and into the “models” category. In the next chapter
I present models as abstracta that describe the relations between kinds and their
qualities. A kind-kind explanation can be a trivial model or mechanism with just two
kinds and one link between them.
An example of this is case B95. The relationship asserted between the d and p
orbitals is perhaps not causal, but “primarily set by” does indicate a dependence of
the explanandum on the explanans. This relationship is a trivial fragment of the
larger model of the structure of copper atoms in cuprates.
There is a second important relation between kinds that is distinctive of them.
The sub-kind or sub-type relation is essential for reasoning about kinds. Using just
this relation, elaborate taxonomies of kinds can be built. By learning that an entity
belongs to one of the kinds in such a taxonomy we can learn a great deal about its
properties and relationships. When enriched with information about other kind-kind
relations such as general parthood, such a taxonomy becomes an “ontology”. This
sense of ontology is the focus of important current work in bioinformatics.
Case B42 is one where the core relation of the explanation is the sub-kind relation.
Darwinopterus is a kind of Wukongopteridae which is a kind of pterosaur. Claims
about the sexual dimorphism of Darwinopterus are evidence about sexual dimorphism
in pterosaurs more generally, because facts about Darwinopterus depend upon facts
about pterosaurs in general.
Reasoning about kinds is central to science. But when we want to describe complex
relationships between kinds and their qualities the abstract tools that we use are
models.
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Chapter 7
Models
While kinds are often the targets of scientific explanation, the relationships between
them can be complex. Models are abstracta that articulate the relationships between
kinds.
7.1 Examples
B49 Hence, we reject the hypotheses of Brownian walk and composite
Brownian walk and conclude that mussel movement is best described
by a Le´vy walk. (de Jager et al. 2011, p. 1552)
As young mussels search for a place to settle they must balance the protection
of nearby neighbours against the competition for food resources. Mussels form
clustered beds that strike such a balance. The authors of this paper tested
mathematical models of the mussels’ search patterns. The three “walks” are
algorithms for creating a path in discrete steps where the direction and size of
the next step is randomly selected from a certain probability distribution.
A6 Two broad classes of models have been proposed to explain the pat-
terning of the proximal-distal axis of the vertebrate limb (from the
shoulder to the digit tips). . . . One, exemplified by the progress zone
model, posits that progressive distalization of limb pattern is based on
an autonomous clocklike mechanism inherent to the undifferentiated
mesenchymal cells. The second postulates that instructive cues from
surrounding tissues are responsible for specifying the PD segments.
(Cooper et al. 2011, p. 1083)
The topic here is the development of limbs in vertebrates, and specifically how
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cells know where they are with respect to the body or the tip of the limb. The
authors refer to “two broad classes of models” that explain how the proximal-
distal axis is determined. The first class of models uses timing information while
the second uses spatial diffusion of signals.
B45 In his seminal paper, Alan Turing aimed to provide a mechanism for
self-regulated pattern formation in biology by showing that sets of
reaction-diffusion equations with appropriate kinetics and diffusion
coefficients could spontaneously evolve to spatially periodic struc-
tures. (Ba´nsa´gi, Vanag, and Epstein 2011, p. 1309)
The target here is a very broad kind: spatially periodic biological structures.
The class of models is also quite broad: sets of reaction-diffusion equations with
carefully balanced kinetics and diffusion coefficients.
B34 Specifically, we simulated the coupled perturbations of increased N2O
abundance, leading to stratospheric ozone (O3) depletion, altered so-
lar ultraviolet radiation, altered stratosphere-to-troposphere O3 flux,
increased tropospheric hydroxyl radical concentration, and finally lower
concentrations of CH4. (Prather and Hsu 2010, p. 952)
Here we have a complex model of the upper atmosphere implemented in a
computer simulation. The authors describe very briefly a chain of interactions
from the input of interest to the output of interest.
B39 Hair offers a suitable experimental model because hair follicles (HFs)
cycle through phases of growth (anagen) and rest (telogen). (Plikus
et al. 2011, p. 586)
The authors of this paper on general properties of stem cells justify their choice
of a specific experimental model.
7.2 Discussion
For many years the focus of the philosophy of science literature explanation was on
the explanatory power of theories. In recent decades it is models of various sorts that
are usually invoked as explanatory, particularly in the special sciences. Philosophers
of science have discussed a wide range of different models in different contexts and
theories have faded into the background. Margaret Morrison discusses this shift in
her “Where Have All the Theories Gone?” (Morrison 2007).
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Theories were traditionally considered by philosophers of science to be sets of logi-
cal axioms, and preeminent among these were statements of the laws of nature. Start-
ing in the 1960s this “syntactic view” (or “received view”) of theories was challenged
by the “semantic view” of theories (Suppes 1960). The semantic view is explicitly
about models – in one sense of “model”. The claim was that, rather than focusing on
the uninterpreted linguistic theory, we should instead be looking at the models that
provide an interpretation of the theory.
But the sense of “model” here is drawn from the branch of logic called “model the-
ory”. It seems to me (and to Morrison) that the sense of “model” used by scientists
is quite different. In model theory the model and the theory have an exact corre-
spondence: they share the same deductive structure. Shifting emphasis from logical
theories to logical models does not provide much insight into the uses of models in
science. “Because the use and construction of theories/models in scientific contexts
bears little, if any, resemblance to model-theoretic structures, it becomes difficult to
see how the latter aid in understanding the former” (Morrison 2007, pp. 202-203). I
see no evidence of the model-theoretic sense of “model” in my samples of the Science
data set.
Morrison points out that scientific models often contain assumptions, additional
structures, and idealizations that we would not like to call parts of our scientific
theories (Morrison 2007, p. 203). She sees models primarily as applications of theories,
and the added structure is required to connect the generalities of the theory to the
details of the target system. There is a critical distinction to be drawn here but it is
not the distinction between an uninterpreted logical calculus and its interpretations.
The model-theoretic sense of “model” is not what I intend for the “models” cat-
egory of my account of scientific explanation. There is another standard sense of
“model” that is not what I intend: the scale model. A scale model is a replica of
some original where the main change is in size. A scale model of a battleship is much
smaller than the original, while James Watson’s scale model of the double helix of
DNA was very much larger. In both cases one physical system is provided as a rep-
resentation of another (a specific battleship or DNA in general). While I accept that
there are cases where scale models have been used in scientific explanations, and one
can think of many examples from engineering, there is no evidence of scale models
in my samples from the Science data set. I believe that such uses are a vanishing
minority compared the ubiquity of the scientific models I am interested in. Under-
standing how behaviours change as phenomena change in scale is very important for
many branches of science, but this requires a more nuanced concept of “scale model”
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than the standard sense that I am rejecting (Batterman Fall 2007; Wilson 2010).
The models referred to my samples of the Science data set are predominantly
abstract descriptions of the qualities and behaviours of the instances of kinds. Most of
them are mathematical in a broad sense that includes systems of equations, networks,
and algorithms. I will discuss these first before turning to other important varieties.
Physics provides the standard examples of models as equations. Morrison’s exam-
ple in the paper under discussion is the pendulum equation (Morrison 2007, p. 203
ff.). Theories about gravitation, mass, and friction all play a role, but the model is
more than the intersection of the theories. The resulting differential equation relates
various qualities of the pendulum, such as the position and momentum of the bob,
in a systematic way. This sort of model can be considered in input/output terms.
Given an initial position and momentum together with a specified duration as the
input, the output is the position and momentum of the bob at the end of that time.
Differential equations are very commonly used for modelling in mechanics and
other branches of physics, as well as in chemistry, parts of biology, and elsewhere.
Other mathematical formalisms apply to other sorts of models. Example B49 above
involves algorithms for generating random walks, and the three different algorithms
referred to differ in the probability distributions that govern the choices of step di-
rection and length. My sampled cases show a wide range of mathematical modelling
techniques.
Another important class that I include under my “models” category is the mech-
anism. Biologists and neuroscientists frequently invoke mechanisms as explanatory.
Example A6 above is one case in point, as is example A4 in chapter 3. Philosophers
of science have analyzed the mechanism concept used in such cases and shown how
it differs substantially from the traditional notions of “mechanism” from 17th cen-
tury science (Craver and Darden 2005). The most prominent philosophical account
of mechanisms is Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, known as “MDC”. MDC
mechanisms are characterized as “entities and activities organized such that they are
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions”
(Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, p. 3).
In my “Mechanisms, Types, and Abstractions” I argue that MDC mechanisms
are best understood as mathematical graph structures where kinds of substances
are the vertices and kinds of processes are the edges (Overton 2011).1 The key to
my argument is noting that many mechanisms include cycles, which should not be
1In that paper I use the language of types and tokens, but the lessons translate directly into this
discussion of kinds and entities.
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understood as loops in singular causal chains. Instead mechanisms specify general
relations among kinds that are instantiated by various chains of singular causation
(without any loops).
Understood in this way, the key differences between the graph of a mechanism
and the equation of a different sort of model are in the mathematical operations one
can perform. Differential equations are best for relating real-valued magnitudes while
graphs show patterns of causal links. With a differential equation we predict how one
magnitude will affect another and with a graph we predict the cascading effects of
removing or adding links.
What these mathematical models have in common is that they articulate the
relations between qualities of one or more kinds. The pendulum equation relates the
position and momentum of the bob over time. The spatial diffusion mechanism in
A6 relates the diffusion of signals between cells to their developmental trajectories. I
discuss more examples below. For each of these models we can provide a target kind,
the kind that it is a model of, e.g. pendulums, mussel movement, the patterning of
the proximal-distal axis of the vertebrate limb. But each of the models is distinct
from its target kind because of the additional structure in the model that describes
the relationships among qualities of the target kind or its parts.
Before turning to other classes of models, I want to distinguish between mathe-
matical models and simulations. It is increasingly common for scientists to implement
their models in complex computer simulations and run the simulations against a range
of actual and fictional inputs. For predicting the behaviour of complex systems such
as the Earth’s climate, the structure of stars, or the formation of planets, simulations
are often the best tools available. It is worth noting that the use of simulations seems
to have been most prominent in historical sciences, where the simulations are a fea-
sible alternative to impossible experiments. But as the cost of simulations decreases
they may become a viable alternative to a wider range of experiments across the
sciences.
Simulations are implementations of models. One model can have many different
implementations in code and the code can be run many times under different con-
ditions on different computing platforms. Variations such as the size of the floating
point numbers used to represent real-valued magnitudes can make a significant dif-
ference in the output of otherwise identical simulations. In order for the simulation
to run on limited computer hardware in a reasonable amount of time, simplifying
assumptions will often be necessary. And the translation of a mathematical model
into software is rarely straightforward, often involving a number of significant choices
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by the programmer. In short, implementing a mathematical model in a computer
simulation is usually an involved process with many contingencies. The resulting
simulation should be recognized as distinct from the abstract model that it was based
on.
While I have focused on mathematical models so far, there are many other ways to
express systematic relations between kinds. One possibility is an informal narrative
structure where we have a story about the ways in which an instances of a kind
changes over time, or how one kind influences another. The difficulty is distinguishing
narratives as complete but informal models from theories, which I consider to be
incomplete as models. I discuss theories in more detail in the next chapter. With
my method of sampling single sentences I was not able to recognize this difference,
but more detailed case studies could do so. I have classified several possible cases of
narrative models as theory-x forms of explanation.
Another important sort of model, quite different from mathematical models, is the
model organism. The most familiar examples are mice, rats, and monkeys, which are
used in medicine as models of human physiology. But a diversity of model organisms
is used by biologists to study genetics, development, evolution, disease, and so on.
The modelling done by a model organism relies on some sort of analogy between
the model organism and the target organism. The relation could be homology, but
sometimes more distantly related species are more similar in some respect than closer
cousins are. I accept that there are important differences in the relations that support
the pendulum model and the relations that support mouse models of human cancer.
As Ankeny and Leonelli discuss, model organisms are a distinct and interestingly
different sort of scientific model (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011). But modelling with
model organisms still expresses relations between kinds (e.g. the kind mouse liver
and the kind human liver) that support explanations.
Example B39 mentions an “experimental model”. The authors are investigating
stem cells in general, but in order to perform experiments they must chose some spe-
cific population of stem cells as a target. In the quoted sentence they are justifying
their choice of hair follicles as an experimental model on the grounds that they ex-
emplify the growth and rest cycles of stem cells populations in general. This use of
model seems to me to be relevantly similar to the model organism case.
Though diverse, the equations, graphs, narratives, and animal models I have been
discussing are supposed to be similar to the extent that are all models. The relation
between a model and a kind is modelling – the model is a model of the kind. But just
what is the modelling relation?
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Much of the philosophical work on modelling has focused on representation. If
a model represents its target then it says true things about the target, and some of
those true things might be explanatory. The challenge to the representational view of
models is that many models in science contain idealizations. A standard distinction in
the literature is between abstractions, which merely omit irrelevant details, and ideal-
izations, which introduce falsehoods into the model (Jones 2005). On the idealization
side we can distinguish “Galilean” idealizations that can be de-idealized to restore an
accurate representation (McMullin 1985), and ineliminable idealizations that cannot
be removed without undermining the whole explanation (Batterman 2002; Batterman
2009; Bokulich 2009). If idealized models contain falsehoods and these falsehoods can-
not be removed, then how can they tell us truths about their targets? Alternative
non-representational accounts of modelling must provide some other relation between
models and their targets that can support explanation.
It seems to me that much of the philosophical discussion of models focuses on
the relationship between models and concrete particular entities. We ask whether
the pendulum equation is a model of some particular pendulum that we imagine
exists. Does the model make true claims about this entity? Instead I prefer to break
the problem in two. The model is a model of a kind of pendulum and the concrete
particular pendulum on my desk is an instance of a kind of pendulum. The key
question is then whether it is the same kind that is modelled and instantiated –
whether the model applies to the entity in virtue of the shared kind.
It might seem that we now have two problems: what is modelling and what is
instantiation? But the second problem is one that we already had, and one we are
familiar with. We are used to dealing with nested kinds of varying generality, such
as the pattern of species, genus, family, order, class, phylum, and kingdom. We can
describe Fluffy as a member of Animalia or Chordata but we include more information
by describing her as a member of Felis catus. Likewise we get more information
about the pendulum on my desk by describing it using a detailed pendulum equation
including a term for air resistance. And it turns out that we get more information
about the behaviour of breaking drops by describing them as continuous fluids rather
than describing them as clouds of molecules, despite the fact that concrete particular
drops do not belong to the kind continuous fluid (Batterman 2005). This is just a
new twist on the old problem of deciding what kinds an entity belongs to.
Once we shift these problems to the instantiation relation, the modelling rela-
tion becomes (I think) far less mysterious. A model is an abstract description of the
relationships between kinds and their qualities. The model articulates the kind, en-
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riching it with structure that allow us to reason about it in greater depth and detail.
The structure of the model allows us to predict (and retrodict) the behaviours of the
entities that instantiate the kind.
The change of perspective I propose does not solve the problems with idealization,
but I think it shifts the focus of the debate in a valuable way. The problem is not
whether the model accurately represents this or that entity. Instead we should ask
what kind we should pick out of the many available if we want to accurately describe
the entity, and how that choice can be justified. This is a question of the relevant
similarities between the entities that instantiate the kind rather than the similarities
between the model and the entity.
The point of this discussion is that the modelling relation holds between models
and kinds, not directly between models and entities. This makes it easier to answer
the question what is modelling? – I describe it as articulation – but raises a range
of problems with the instantiation relation between kinds and entities. As I noted in
the previous chapter, there are long-standing mysteries about instantiation that lie at
the heart of the debate between realism and nominalism. But rather than having two
deeply problematic relations (modelling and instantiation) I propose that we really
have just one: instantiation.
The distinction between a model and its target kind is that the kind is an un-
differentiated whole while the model has articulated parts. The modelling relation
marks the shift from dealing with kinds to dealing with models of kinds, just as the
measurement relation marks the shift from entities to data about the entities.
References to models in the Science data set are usually indicated by key words
such as the common “mechanism” and “model” or the less common “equation”. But
such indicator words are not always present and sometimes the reference is entirely
implicit.
There are many important topics in the philosophical literature on models that
I have not addressed here, but my goal here has been to establish in a rough way
the distinct category of models that my account of scientific explanation relies upon.
While there is a diversity of opinions among philosophers regarding models, as with
the other categories I think that there is widespread acceptance that models form a
distinct category that is important for understanding scientific practise.
In sum, models are abstracta that articulate the relations between qualities of
one or more kinds. Models come in many forms, from differential equations relating
magnitudes, to mechanisms articulating networks of causal links, to model organisms
offering exemplars for similar processes. Models usually have inputs and outputs,
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allowing them to be used for prediction. For any model we can cite its target kind,
the kind that it models. But a model is always distinct from its target kind because
it has additional structure.
As with kinds, models can have various degrees of generality. Example A6 refers
to broad classes of models while B49 cites quite specific models. But with increasing
generality the distinction between models and theories can become blurred. I discuss
this in the next chapter.
7.3 Models in Science
There are many examples of models in my samples of the Science data set. Here I
discuss the examples given at the beginning of this chapter and some of the others
mentioned in previous chapters.
Case B49 above is included as a straightforward case of mathematical modelling.
The target kind is the movement of mussels. The three models are algorithms for
random walks, differing in the probability distributions that govern the choice of
step direction and length. The authors collected data about the patterns of actual
beds of mussels, then ran simulations using these three models and decided that the
closest match for actual mussel movement is the Le´vy walk. The Le´vy walk is clearly
distinct from the kind mussel movement, but it models that kind in the sense that the
model allowed the prediction of patterns in the movement of actual mussels. Other
straightforward cases of models discussed in previous chapters include the Benfield
geometric model of catalysts in A9 and the mathematical model of the entrainment
of the circadian clocks of cyanobacteria in A4.
In case A6 we have a comparison between two much more general models. The
two broad classes of models are perhaps general enough that they are better called
theories. In any case, more specific models within each class will have in common the
general features that distinguish the classes: they will either use timing information
or spatial diffusion of signals to model the target kind, which is the patterning of
the proximal-distal axis of the vertebrate limb. The specific models will likely take
the form of a mechanism. Case A14 is similar, with two broad classes of model for
monoclonal conversion of populations of epithelial stem cells in intestines.
The generality increases with case B45 where the target kind is spatially periodic
biological structures. Rather than one model we have another broad class of models
involving sets of reaction-diffusion equations with carefully balanced kinetics and
diffusion coefficients. Each of these is a mathematical model.
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The model in case B34 is considerably more complex than the previous cases.
The target kind is the upper atmosphere. The model articulates the target kind
in terms of a number of other kinds: the abundance of N2O, stratospheric ozone,
solar ultraviolet radiation, stratosphere-to-troposphere O3 flux, tropospheric hydroxyl
radical concentration, and CH4 concentration. Presumably, these kinds are linked in
various feedback loops of different strengths that make the relation between input N2O
abundance and output CH4 concentration difficult to infer. The authors implemented
a simulation of their model in order to discover the answer.
Finally, in case B39 we have an “experimental model”. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, I see this case as essentially similar to the model organism case. Ankeny
and Leonelli distinguish model organisms from scale models and I would do the same
here. But these three sorts of model (organism, experimental, and scale) are distinct
from the mathematical descriptions of the relations of kinds that form the bulk of the
models referred to in my samples of the Science data set.
7.4 Forms of Explanation
When a model is the explanans we can have four forms of scientific explanation:
model-model, model-kind, model-entity, and model-data. I consider the latter two
to be composite forms. A model-entity explanation is composed of a model-kind
and a kind-entity explanation, and a model-data explanation is composed of three
parts: model-kind, kind-entity, and entity-data. In these composite cases some of the
middle steps may be implicit. It may not be completely clear what kind the model is
modelling or what entity the data are about.
Model-kind explanation is the prototypical form of scientific explanation. In-
stances are twice as numerous in my samples of the Science data set as the next most
numerous form of explanation, which happens to be kind-kind explanation. As dis-
cussed at the end of the previous chapter, some kind-kind explanations are actually
trivial models.
Model-model explanations, on the other hand, are rare. Only one such case occurs
in my sample. Below I consider that case, and suggest other core relationships that
could link models.
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7.4.1 Primary: Model-Kind
There are many examples of model-kind explanation in my sampled cases. B49 is a
straightforward case of mathematical modelling. Cases A6 and B45 are more general
models of more general kinds, under which a wide range of entities will fall. In each
case the model articulates the target kind. For instance, the Le´vy walk describes the
kind mussel movement in terms of the size and direction of the steps. In A6 it is the
timing or spatial diffusion, and in B45 it is the kinetics and diffusion coefficients that
articulate the target kinds.
Why are model-kind explanations so prevalent in the Science data set, both in
general and as the main claim of the abstracts in sample C? I think that scientists
value this form of explanation because models can provide clear predictions that are
easy to test and can lead to practical applications. Certainly the shift in emphasis
in the philosophical literature from theories to models is supported by the prevalence
and importance of model-kind explanations in science.
7.4.2 Secondary: Model-Model
While there are many possible relationships between models, or between qualities of
a model, model-model explanations are rare in Science articles. I describe the single
such case I sampled and then speculate on other possible core relations.
The one case of model-model explanation I discovered was B34. The authors
performed a complex simulation of the upper atmosphere in order to determine the
relationship between N2O and CH4. Their explanation articulates the kind “gases in
the stratosphere and troposphere” by describing the various gases and the chemical
reactions they undergo. At each step we have general causal relations between kinds,
but the whole model is a complex network of these relations. The target of the
explanation is the model itself, where the explanans is one part of the model and the
explanandum another part of the same model.
Another relation could be a sub-model relation between a parent and child model.
The details depend on the mathematical formalism involved. Given a parent model B,
a sub-model A could be one where certain parameters that were free in B have been
set in A. If we take mechanisms to be graphs, as I propose, then a sub-mechanism
could be a sub-graph (for which I offer a definition in Overton 2011). Both of these
cases support the counterfactual dependence we require, where model A depends on
model B.
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We have seen that models are the focus of much of the explanatory practise
revealed in the Science data set. But in order to understand how models are built,
and what similar models have in common, we should look to theories.
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Chapter 8
Theories
Collecting data and establishing theories are perhaps the two most characteristic sci-
entific practises in the eyes of the layperson. Philosophers have taken many different
approaches to understanding scientific theories but there is no strong consensus on
their nature and their role. In this chapter I provide some examples of the use of
theories from my samples of the Science data set and characterize the “theories”
category for my account of scientific explanation.
8.1 Examples
C8 Catastrophic ecological regime shifts may be announced in advance by
statistical early warning signals such as slowing return rates from per-
turbation and rising variance. The theoretical background for these
indicators is rich, but real-world tests are rare, especially for whole
ecosystems. We tested the hypothesis that these statistics would be
early warning signals for an experimentally induced regime shift in
an aquatic food web. We gradually added top predators to a lake
over 3 years to destabilize its food web. An adjacent lake was moni-
tored simultaneously as a reference ecosystem. Warning signals of a
regime shift were evident in the manipulated lake during reorganiza-
tion of the food web more than a year before the food web transition
was complete, corroborating theory for leading indicators of ecological
regime shifts. (Carpenter et al. 2011, p. 1079)
B78 Particles can create stable flocculated networks in suspensions through
the effects of the van der Waals forces; they are much smaller than
the capillary force between particles considered here. (Koos and Wil-
lenbacher 2011, p. 899)
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The authors of this paper appeal to van der Waals forces to explain one kind
of stable flocculated network of suspended particles. The focus of their interest
in this paper is another kind, where van der Waals forces are not dominant.
A24 Precipitation can also explain the rebrightening observed later in some
places as different areas drain (by overland flow or infiltration) or dry
at different rates. (Turtle et al. 2011, p. 1416)
Observations of Saturn’s moon Titan by the Cassini probe reveal patches of
changing brightness. The authors propose that precipitation of methane can
explain this.
B2 A Fermi gas of atoms with resonant interactions is predicted to obey
universal hydrodynamics, in which the shear viscosity and other trans-
port coefficients are universal functions of the density and tempera-
ture. (Cao et al. 2011, p. 58)
The project in this paper is to experimentally test the mathematical model in
regimes of extreme temperatures. This quotation comes from the first line of
the abstract where the authors describe in general terms how the theory of
universal hydrodynamics is used to build models of Fermi gases.
B54 Despite their great length, the canines were not fragile. These could
have served to manage food items before processing, to deter attacks
from predators, or for intraspecific display and combat, as seen in
extant antlerless water deer (Hydropotes sp.; Fig. 2E) and musk deer
(Moschus sp.) from Asia. (Cisneros et al. 2011, p. 1604)
This paper reports on the skull and teeth of Tiarajudens, a sabre-tooth therapsid
that lived approximately 250 million years ago. The authors appeal to general
principles about the creature’s needs for managing food, defence, and display
in order to explain the size of the canine teeth.
B21 Because changes in chromosomal supercoiling also may have widespread
pleiotropic effects, it seemed likely that interactions with the topA al-
leles specific to the EW [eventual winners] and EL [eventual losers]
backgrounds might explain these epistatic effects. (Khan et al. 2011,
p. 1435)
The topic of this paper is a long-term evolution study in E. coli of “evolvability”
as a second-order trait in populations. Here the authors try to explain how the
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topA allele in the eventual winners could be responsible for a large difference in
the fitness benefit of a second gene, spotT, that was present in both the winners
and the losers. The explanation involves changes in the shape of chromosomes
that in turn cause many changes in gene expression.
8.2 Discussion
Of the five categories that my account of scientific explanation depends upon, char-
acterizing “theories” is the most difficult. The nature and role of scientific theories
has been a focal point of the philosophy of science throughout its history as a sub-
discipline of philosophy and in the various traditions that were its predecessors. Not
only is the literature vast, it is exceedingly diverse. At the core is the received view
of theories mentioned in the previous chapter, where theories are taken to be sets of
logical axioms. But that view has been widely rejected and there is no consensus that
has taken its place. Instead we seem to have a diversity of views about theories and
laws that reflects the diversity of the special sciences. Theories and laws in physics
are handled in one way, distinct from biology, which is distinct from psychology, and
so on. While “theory” and “law” are words shared across scientific disciplines, it is
no longer clear that they refer to the same sorts of things. This problem is part of the
motivation for Morrison’s call to redress the imbalance between models and theories
in the philosophy of science (Morrison 2007).
The breadth, depth, and diversity of philosophical treatments of theories is a
major obstacle. But even within the scheme I propose it can be difficult to distinguish
between theories and models or theories and kinds in certain cases. Finally, there are
few uses of “theory” in the sense I intend among my samples of the Science data set.
As discussed in section 3.3.10, I have had to add implicit claims about theories to
my case analyses, and I expect that these are the additions that readers will find the
most surprising.
For these reasons I have considered collapsing the “theories” category into the
“models” category. This is the closest fit, since models involve the laws, empirical
principles, and formalisms that I wish to include under “theories”. However I have
decided that the distinction between theories and models is well worth keeping. Even
if it may be difficult to recognize at times, and often lies below the surface of the
statements that scientists make when explaining, there is an important difference
between the models that are applied in order to explain the qualities of kinds and the
theories that are the building blocks of models.
120
Laws of nature have traditionally been at the centre of philosophical discussions of
theories. Universal natural laws are central to the D-N account of scientific explana-
tion and important in may other accounts, particularly unification. As we saw in the
chapter on kinds, the notion of a universal natural law is quite strict and not a good
fit for the practises of most of the special sciences. Sandra Mitchell’s “pragmatic
laws” weaken the concept, giving it a much wider range of applicability (Mitchell
1997; Mitchell 2009). Mitchell makes room for different levels of contingency in such
laws and this allows her to include strong empirical generalizations alongside strictly
necessary natural laws. Without committing to all of the details of Mitchell’s account,
it is laws understood in this weaker sense that I wish to include under my “theories”
category.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish laws from models. For example, Newton’s
second law is often expressed as an equation, f = ma. We saw in the previous chapter
that many models are also expressed by equations, such as the pendulum equation.
Models have target kinds, some of which are very general, and this law could be
said to have the target kind physical body or perhaps point particle. The notion of
a minimal model blurs the distinction further. It is very easy to slip from talking
about the law itself to talking about a minimal model of a single particle in empty
space under the influence of disembodied forces. The minimal model is built from
the law together with a small number of innocuous assumptions. It is the addition of
these assumptions that differentiates the minimal model from the law, but they can
be implicit and go unnoticed.
Laws are the most straightforward but not the only things I include under “theo-
ries”. A set of laws does not make a model. In the case of D-N explanations we also
need the rules of first order predicate logic, and on my account some sort of logical
system can also be part of the theory behind a model. In the case of mathematical ex-
planations we need the relevant parts of mathematics. In narrative models we might
have a more general theory of causation supporting our reasoning from one step to
the next. I include systems of inference such as these under my “theories” category.
A model is built by combining various laws, empirical generalizations, explanatory
principles, and assumptions together with systems of inference. In some situations
there are clear “recipes” to follow. For instance, Sheldon Smith and Mark Wilson
describe the “Euler recipe” for building models of planetary motion and solving the
“Kepler problem”:
1. Specify the class of bodies (let them be point particles) whose behavior one is
concerned with.
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2. Specify what types of special force laws hold between these particles (e.g. Grav-
itation and the Coulomb force).
3. Choose a set of Cartesian coordinates along which to decompose the special
forces. That is, specify, say, the force of gravity acting on the first particle from
the second particle acting along the x-axis.
4. For each particle, sum the special forces acting on that particle along a certain
coordinate axis.
5. Set the sum for each particle equal to md
2x
dt2
. (Smith 2002, p. 244)
The result is a differential equation that can be integrated to find the temporal
trajectory of the planet.
The Euler recipe could be considered a very general model or a very specific theory.
Considered as a model of the motion of planets it has many free parameters that must
be specified in particular cases. Considered as a theory, most of the model-building
work has already been done by selecting laws, making assumptions, and establishing
the system of inference. In this way it is similar to the “broad classes of models”
from cases A6 and A14 discussed above. In my opinion the Euler recipe falls into the
“theory” category, but I do not believe that much is at stake here. We can recognize
the ambiguous middle ground of recipes and schemata as lying at the vague boundary
between theories and models without undermining the larger project of accounting
for practises scientific explanation.
If recipes and schemata are near the “models” end of a spectrum of theories,
at the other end there are theories that are much more general and poorly defined.
For example, in case A24 the authors refer to “precipitation” as an explanation for
changes in brightness observed on the surface of Saturn’s moon Titan. “Precipitation”
seems to refer to a very broad kind. But I think that it actually refers in a general
way to a body of theory about the hydrological cycle on Earth and the extension of
that theory to other climate systems with large bodies of liquid, evaporation, clouds,
condensation, rain, and drainage back into the large bodies of liquid. In the case
of Titan the liquid is not water but methane at extremely low temperatures. This
broad theory could be used to build narrative models of such a cycle on Titan or
more formal models of drainage and evaporation based on specifics of the topology
and atmosphere. While “precipitation” could easily refer to the kind, here I believe
it refers to a body of theory about the kind.
A theory alone, without the additional assumptions, idealization, and structure
of a model, can only provide an incomplete explanation of a kind. Phrases such as
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“may explain in part” often indicate that the explanans is a theory, and “in part”
occurs in many of my sampled cases. While scientists prefer to offer models with
robust explanatory and predictive power, sometimes they can only point to a theory
that may turn out to play a role in a complete explanation.
The vague boundaries between kinds and models and theories might be sharper
if I had a more detailed account of scientific theories to offer. I do not have any
individuation conditions to propose for theories, and so I cannot say if there is one
theory of precipitation in general or various theories of precipitation on Earth, Titan,
and other planets. Although I would be happy to have sharp individuation conditions
and rigorous definitions for each of my categories, that has not been my goal. The
characterizations I have given seem to me to be sufficient for the coarse categorizations
I require to support my account of scientific explanation.
In sum, laws, empirical generalizations, explanatory principles, and assumptions,
together with systems of inference such as logical and mathematical formalisms, are
theories that are used for building scientific models. Although the category is dis-
junctive and its boundaries are vague, theories are distinct from the models that they
are used to build and from the kinds that they are theories of.
8.3 Theories in Science
The first example that I introduced of a theory from the Science data set was case A10
and the theory of luminance of the star HIP 13044. In that case the authors were not
presenting a theory, but rather appealing to the possibility that further developments
in the theory of the luminance of stars similar to HIP 13044 could explain the odd
length of the signals that they observed. They do not have a particular theory in
mind, nor a particular model, but instead are looking to general principles used in
modelling stars to account for an unexpected feature of their data.
Many appeals to theories in my samples were similar. Where possible, scientists
seem to prefer to offer models. Articles in Science may not be the best place to look
for discussions of theory. It may be that textbooks and other genres of scientific
writing are more explicitly focused on the articulation and application of theories,
while articles focus more on data, entities, kinds, and models.
In case C8 we have a fascinating example where a body of theory about ecological
changes has been tested by experimentally manipulating the ecosystem of a lake and
comparing it to a control. The authors tracked expected warning signs of major shifts
in the ecology and were able to corroborate the theoretical predictions. In this case
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the “theory” referred to in the final sentence might encompass a large portion of all
the theories in the field of ecology.
Case B78 mentions van der Waals forces. While van der Waals forces are also
a broad kind, here I think the reference is to the theory of those forces. This use
of “van der Waals forces” is similar to the use of “precipitation” in case A24. In
both cases the named kind is just the most relevant kind to which the theory applies:
precipitation also involves evaporation, and van der Waals forces are just one way in
which particles interact.
In B2 we have a reference to the theory of universal hydrodynamics applied to the
kind “Fermi gas of atoms with resonant interactions”. Also important are some of
the parts of the theory, including “shear viscosity and other transport coefficients”.
Universal hydrodynamics is the kind of broad physical theory that philosophers have
often sought to understand as a set of axioms, but the reference here is quite elliptical.
In case B54 we have three theories of the function of the sabre-teeth: managing
food, deterring attacks from members of other species, and display and combat with
members of the same species. These are functional explanations that focus on the need
of an organism to perform these tasks as a reason that it would have the appropriate
tools. A5 is a similar case.
B21 is especially complicated. The explanation involves the interaction of multiple
alleles, some of which were present in both the eventual winners and eventual losers,
and some of which differed. The authors are interested in “evolvability” as a second-
order trait, by which they mean the ability of populations to adapt quickly and
successfully to changes in their environments. The key to this explanation is that
an interaction of just two genes can change the way in which chromosomes coil and
thus influence the expression of a large number of other genes. Quick changes in the
expression of large numbers of genes may not always be a benefit for a population,
but can allow for greater “evolvability”. I consider the authors’ discussion to be
theoretical because the claims being made are quite general. While they can offer an
explanation after the fact, they are not proposing a model robust enough to make
strong predictions.
8.4 Forms of Explanation
When the explanans is a theory we can have five forms of explanation: theory-theory,
theory-model, theory-kind, theory-entity, and theory-data. The latter three I con-
sider composites, built from chains of primary forms of explanation. The other two
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forms, theory-theory and theory-model, are rare in my samples, but still important
for understanding the structure of scientific explanation.
8.4.1 Primary: Theory-Model
The relation between theories and models is model building or justification of models.
As philosophers have often discussed in the context of D-N explanation, scientists
have to justify their models by reference to something even more general that is
shared between models. I gave the example of the Euler recipe as one case in point.
Despite the importance of model building there are very few theory-model expla-
nations in my samples. Case B2 is one of them. The quoted sentence comes from the
beginning of the abstract where the authors are setting the context of their paper.
Their project is to test the standard theory empirically at extreme temperatures.
This requires building specific models based on the shared general theory.
Because theory-model explanations are so rare, the question arises again whether
this counts as “explanation”. Philosophers have not always considered the arguments
that model building involves to be explanations. But I think that D-N explanation
sets a precedent here, and philosophers concerned with explanation have often looked
at the relations between theory and models. As before, the structure of these expla-
nations is essentially the same as the other forms of explanation on my account, and
I think that they deserve to be included in a general account of scientific explanation.
8.4.2 Secondary: Theory-Theory
Philosophers have considered many ways in which theories may be related. Logical
relations such as deduction have been important examples and so have mathemati-
cal relations. Batterman’s work on cases such as breaking droplets, shock-fronts in
gases, the rainbow, and renormalization are detailed studies of the ways in which
theories can be justified. The key to these cases is the peculiar nature of the justi-
fication. While the phenomena are made up of discrete and finite components, our
best models of these phenomena require taking infinite limits, such as the continuum
limit, the thermodynamic limit, or the semi-classical limit. These interesting cases
of theoretical justification raise important philosophical problems about idealization
and explanation. But it is not surprising that my sampling did not reveal any cases
of this type in Science.
A more familiar relation between theories is unification, as proposed by Friedman
and Kitcher. The core idea here is that theories are more explanatory when they
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unify disparate phenomena under one explanatory schema. While unification may be
a core relation in some theory-theory explanations, I did not find any examples of it
in my samples of Science.
The one example I did find of theory-theory explanation is B21. While the details
are complex, the heart of the explanation is a justification of a theoretical assumption
on the basis of another more general theory. The authors propose that an interaction
of genes explains the differences in fitness benefits that they observed and justify their
proposal on the basis that supercoiling of chromosomes can cause widespread changes
in gene expression. The justification relation here is similar to (and might be the same
as) the justification relation in theory-model explanations, but the explanandum is a
general theory rather than a specific model. The vagueness at the boundary between
models and theories might be at play in this case, or it may be that the core relation
for theory-theory and theory-model explanations is sometimes the same.
“Theories” is the most general of the five categories and “data” the most spe-
cific. With the characterizations of these five categories I have filled out my general
philosophical account of scientific explanation and shown examples the primary and
secondary forms of explanation that my account requires.
126
Chapter 9
Conclusions
In these last five chapters I have laid out five coarse categories that are sufficient to
capture a wide range of cases sampled from Science. I have provided characterizations
of each and the means to distinguish members of one from members of another. Each
of the five categories is widely recognized by philosophers. But for each there are
outstanding philosophical problems concerning the nature and the role they play in
science. I have tried to point to these problems and locate my position in the wider
literature. To address and try to resolve all of these philosophical problems would
be a very ambitious undertaking. But the resolution of all of these philosophical
problems is not a necessary precondition for the useful application of my account of
scientific explanation. My characterizations of the five categories allow me to answer
the question what is a scientific explanation?
A scientific explanation is the triple of an explain-relation, an explanans, and an
explanandum. The explain-relation expresses the dependence of the explanandum
qualities on the explanans qualities. A core relation between the explanans and
explanandum supports the explain-relation and our counterfactual reasoning about
it. There are many core relations that can support the explain-relation. We can
classify them by looking at the categories of the explanans and explanandum in a
given case. The five categories range from the very specific to the very general:
data, entities, kinds, models, and theories. Between theories and data there are four
primary forms of explanation, representing shifts from general theories to specific
models, from models to the kinds they are models of, from universal kinds to particular
entities, and from entities to the data about them. The five secondary forms of
explanation apply when the explanans and explanandum share the same category,
and each of these forms allows for multiple core relations. The rest of the forms of
explanation are composites of the primary and the secondary forms.
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In chapter 3 I have laid out the general structure of scientific explanations on my
account. A wide range of cases support the account and show that the various forms
of explanation are actually used by scientists.
The results of chapters 2 and 3 allow me to answer the three main questions
about scientific explanation that I raised in the introduction. Scientific explanation
is important: explanations and inferences to the best explanation are ubiquitous in
Science and (I infer) in science more generally. We cannot understand science without
understanding scientific explanation. Explanation is also general, and explanations
occur in articles across a wide range of disciplines sampled from Science. While the
core relations differ, the explain-relation remains the same. And explanation is a goal
of science. The main claims of all the abstracts in sample C are either explanations or
inferences to the best explanation, expressing the explanatory claims that the authors
have tried to establish by their research.
My general philosophical account also addresses the problem of fragmentation.
Several of the philosophical accounts of scientific explanation that I surveyed can be
understood to be specific cases of my general account, focused on one or a few of
the forms of scientific explanation. The striking diversity of the accounts corresponds
to the actual diversity of forms in scientific practise. But my general account and
the evidence I have collected do rule out several other philosophical views. Scientific
explanations are diverse, but not just anything goes.
In the two appendices that follow I present the details of my analysis and the
programs I used to perform it. The interested reader is welcome to check them. But
I expect that many of the objections to my account will not be in these details that
I have included but rather in the details I have omitted. How does inference to the
best explanation work, on this account? How can we distinguish between good and
bad explanations? How do the core relations of measurement, instantiation, mod-
elling, and model building work? How should we understand idealized explanations
or explanations involving fictions? These are just some of the questions I would like
to have full answers to.
I consider explanation to be a core topic in the philosophy of science. By bet-
ter understanding scientific explanation we begin to better understand many other
important topics in the field. Although the account I have given does not answer
these important questions, it brings them together in interesting ways. If some of
the answers I give are right, then we can see that questions about modelling and
instantiation are connected; that there is a place for some idealizations and fictions
among the counterfactual instances of kinds; that there are many forms of inference
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to the best explanation that will differ according to the form of the explanation they
propose; that good and bad explanations are distinguished in part by the sorts of
counterfactual reasoning they support. I leave these important questions to future
research.
Philosophical analysis can provide insight into scientific explanation, but so can
psychology, computer science, and the wisdom of practising scientists. By better
understanding these aspects of scientific explanation we can develop better scientific
practises and, ultimately, better science.
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Appendix A
Appendix A: Case Studies
As described in chapter 3, I have randomly selected three samples from the Science
data set to help develop and test my account of scientific explanation. For each of the
sampled cases I provide the relevant quotation and citation. For the short quotations
in samples A and B I provide a brief paragraph with some context for the quotation,
but for the abstracts in sample C this was not necessary. When my account does not
apply to the case, I provide a note giving the reasons.
When my account of scientific explanation does apply to the quotation, I provide
a list of the relevant explanations and inferences to the best explanation (IBEs). For
sample A these are just the explanations involving “explain” words. For sample B
these are all the relevant explanations and IBEs in the quotation. For sample C these
are the explanations and IBEs made in the main claim of the abstract.
For each explanation and IBE I provide a gloss and a table. While the information
contained in each is essentially the same, the gloss is easier to read while the table
emphasizes the structure. The parts of the structure that I see as explicit in the
quotation are in normal roman type. The parts that I see as implicit in the quotation
are in italic type. The parts that mark data, entities, models, or theories are in bold
type (even when they are also implicit). In the table items are sometimes indented
to indicate nested clauses. Finally, in the gloss the explanatory or evidential phrase
is set in small caps.
130
A.1 Index of Cases by Form
data data B71.1 B71.2
data entity B9.1 B25.1 B25.2 B25.3 B70.1 B100.1 B100.2 C7.1 C20.1 C20.2 C23.1
data kind B23.1 B66.1
data model B11.1
data theory B1.1 B5.1 C5.1 C8.1 C15.1 C16.1 C18.1
entity data A15.1 A15.2 B15.1 B16.1 B16.2 B59.1 B80.1
entity entity A3.2 A19.1 A22.1 B13.1 B32.1 B38.1 B63.1 B63.2 B77.1 B81.1
entity kind B44.1 B48.1 B60.1
entity model B4.1
entity theory C22.1
kind data A12.1 B56.1 B56.2 B56.3 B58.1 C24.2
kind entity A3.1 B14.1 C19.1
kind kind A18.1 A20.1 A21.1 B31.1 B42.1 B83.1 B95.1 C9.1 C14.1 C17.1 C24.1
kind model B6.1 B62.1 B76.1 C1.1
kind theory B68.1 B75.1 C3.1
model data A4.1 A7.1 A9.1 A11.1 A17.1 B3.1
model entity A1.1 B79.1
model kind A5.1 A5.2 A5.4 A6.1 A6.2 A13.1 A14.1 A14.2 A23.1 B45.1 B49.1 B49.2
B49.3 B52.1 C4.1 C6.1 C10.1 C11.1 C12.1 C12.2 C12.3 C12.4 C13.1
C25.1
model model B34.1
model theory B51.1
theory data A10.1 A24.1 B84.1
theory entity A8.1 B21.2 C2.1
theory kind A5.3 B36.1 B36.2 B53.1 B54.1 B54.2 B54.3 B78.1 C21.1
theory model B2.1 B39.1
theory theory B21.1
failures A2 A16 A25 B7 B8 B10 B12 B17 B18 B19 B20 B22 B24 B26 B27 B28
B29 B30 B33 B35 B37 B40 B41 B43 B46 B47 B50 B55 B57 B61 B64
B65 B67 B69 B72 B73 B74 B82 B85 B86 B87 B88 B89 B90 B91 B92
B93 B94 B96 B97 B98 B99
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A.2 Sample A
Case A1
Note that the wetting layer of ILE [ionic liquid-based electrolyte] on the
nanowire surface is so thin (less than 10 nm) that the flux of Li+ trans-
ported by this layer is outmatched by the flux from solid-state diffusion
in the amorphous Li2O reaction product. This explains why the reaction
occurred along the longitudinal direction rather than along the radial di-
rection. (Huang et al. 2010, p. 1519)
This paper describes the behaviour of a nanowire under a transmission electron mi-
croscope. Here the authors give a reason for the direction of the reaction front that
they observed. There is a three step explanation here, but I focus on the second and
third steps. (The second sentences was selected, and the first is included as containing
the referent of “this”.)
1. Explanation: model – entity
The relative strength of the flux of solid-state diffusion in the amorphous Li2O
product of the oxidation reaction of lithium in a model of the wetting layer
of ILE on the surface of the nanowire explains the radial direction of the
oxidation reaction of lithium in the nanowire.
explains
The relative strength the radial direction
of the flux
of solid-state diffusion
in the amorphous Li2O product
of the oxidation reaction
of lithium
in a model
of the wetting layer
of ILE
on the surface
of the oxidation reaction
of lithium
of the nanowire in the nanowire.
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Case A2
For each value of Tc, we compute [equation 4] where the errors in the
experimental and lattice QCD [quantum chromodynamics] quantities are
obtained as explained above. (S. Gupta et al. 2011, p. 1527)
This use of “explain” in this physics paper amounts to a description of how a calcu-
lation was performed.
Failure: description
Case A3
Furthermore, coexistence of substantial south polar ice sheets with tropi-
cal SSTs [sea surface temperatures] regionally in excess of 30◦C implies a
steeper meridional temperature gradient than during other major glacial
episodes. . . . Both of these observations could plausibly be explained by
nonlinear changes in the intensity of oceanic meridional overturning cir-
culation, similar to those previously invoked to explain changes in the
behavior of the Hirnantian carbon cycle. (Finnegan et al. 2011, p. 906)
This paper on pre-historic climate change discusses ocean temperatures and conti-
nental ice volumes. Here the authors propose an explanation that resolves a tension
between two sets of observations, and which has been invoked in another related con-
text. (The second sentence was selected, and the first was included to provide the
referent for “both of these observations”. See also case B100.)
1. Explanation: kind – entity
The nonlinearity of changes in the intensity of meridional overturning in the
circulation of oceans could plausibly explain the coexistence of substantial
south polar ice sheets with tropical SSTs regionally in excess of 30◦C in the
oceans of Earth which are oceans.
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could plausibly explain
The nonlinearity the coexistence
of changes
in the intensity
of meridional overturning
in the circulation
of substantial south polar ice
sheets
with tropical SSTs regionally in
excess of 30◦C
in the oceans
of Earth
of oceans which are oceans.
2. Explanation: entity – entity
The nonlinearity of changes in the intensity of meridional overturning in the
circulation of oceans of Earth in the Hirnantian era was previously in-
voked to explain changes in the behaviour of the carbon cycle of Earth in
the Hirnantian era.
was previously invoked to explain
The nonlinearity changes
of changes
in the intensity
of meridional overturning
in the circulation
of oceans
in the behaviour
of the carbon cycle
of Earth
in the Hirnantian era
of Earth
in the Hirnantian era.
Case A4
Physiological concentrations of ADP [adenosine diphosphate] inhibit ki-
nase activity in the oscillator, and a mathematical model constrained by
data shows that this effect is sufficient to quantitatively explain entrain-
ment of the cyanobacterial circadian clock. (Rust, Golden, and O’Shea
2011, p. 220)
This is the last sentence of the abstract of a paper on the cyanobacterial circadian
clock. It expresses the main explanatory claim that their model explains the entrain-
ment (i.e. synchronization) of that clock.
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1. Explanation: model – data
The physiological concentration of ADP in the mathematical model of the
activity of kinase in circadian clocks of cyanobacteria is sufficient to quan-
titatively explain the rate of entrainment in the measurements of the
circadian clocks in a sample of cyanobacteria.
is sufficient to quantitatively explain
The physiological concentration the rate
of ADP
in the mathematical model
of the activity
of kinase
in circadian clocks
of entrainment
in the measurements
of the circadian clocks
in a sample
of cyanobacteria of cyanobacteria.
Case A5
This use of lean mass can be explained by a variety of factors, including (i)
a beneficial reduction in mass in order to minimize energy costs and to in-
crease flight range, (ii) the requirement for gluconeogenesis and anaplerosis
of Kreb’s cycle intermediates, (iii) endogenous protein turnover, and (iv)
the production and liberation of endogenous water for the maintenance of
water balance. (Gerson and Guglielmo 2011, p. 1434)
This is an interesting case from a paper on the metabolism of migratory birds in
conditions of low ambient humidity. Here are four explanations with the same ex-
planandum. Each of the four is expressed in terms of a benefit to the organism, but
they work on four different scales: molecular, cellular, organismal, and biomechanical.
1. Explanation: model – kind
The benefits of minimized energy costs and of increased flight range of the
reduction of mass in a model of the dynamics of the flight of migratory birds
during migration can explain the use of lean mass in conditions of low ambient
humidity in the metabolism of migratory birds during migration.
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can explain
The benefits the use
of minimized energy costs
and of increased flight range
of the reduction
of mass
in a model
of the dynamics
of the flight
of lean mass
in conditions of low ambient
humidity
in the metabolism
of migratory birds
during migration
of migratory birds
during migration.
2. Explanation: model – kind
The requirement of gluconeogenesis and of anaplerosis of Kreb’s cycle interme-
diates in a model of Kreb’s cycle in the metabolism of migratory birds during
migration can explain the occurrence of catabolism of proteins in the use of
lean mass in conditions of low ambient humidity in the metabolism of migratory
birds during migration.
can explain
The requirement the occurrence
of gluconeogenesis
and of anaplerosis
of Kreb’s cycle intermediates
in a model
of Kreb’s cycle
of catabolism
of proteins
in the use
of lean mass
in conditions of low ambient
humidity
in the metabolism
of migratory birds
during migration
in the metabolism
of migratory birds
during migration.
3. Explanation: theory – kind
The requirement for endogenous turnover of proteins in the theory of protein
synthesis and protein degradation in models of the metabolism of migratory
birds during migration can explain the occurrence of catabolism of proteins
in the use of lean mass in conditions of low ambient humidity in the metabolism
of migratory birds during migration.
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can explain
The requirement the occurrence
for endogenous turnover
of proteins
in the theory
of protein synthesis and protein
degradation
in models
of catabolism
of proteins
in the use
of lean mass
in conditions of low ambient
humidity
of the metabolism
of migratory birds
during migration
in the metabolism
of migratory birds
during migration.
4. Explanation: model – kind
The requirement for production and liberation of endogenous water in a model
of the maintenance of water balance in the metabolism of migratory birds during
migration can explain the use of lean mass in conditions of low ambient
humidity in the metabolism of migratory birds during migration.
can explain
The requirement the use
for production and liberation
of endogenous water
in a model
of the maintenance
of water balance
of lean mass
in conditions of low ambient
humidity
in the metabolism
of migratory birds
during migration
in the metabolism
of migratory birds
during migration.
Case A6
Two broad classes of models have been proposed to explain the patterning
of the proximal-distal axis of the vertebrate limb (from the shoulder to
the digit tips). . . . One, exemplified by the progress zone model, posits
that progressive distalization of limb pattern is based on an autonomous
clocklike mechanism inherent to the undifferentiated mesenchymal cells.
The second postulates that instructive cues from surrounding tissues are
responsible for specifying the PD [proximal-distal] segments. (Cooper et
al. 2011, p. 1083)
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The topic of this paper is the mechanism by which developing vertebrate limbs are
organized into their proximate and distal parts. The qualified assertion here is that
models from the two classes can explain the phenomenon. These “broad classes of
models” are in the middle ground between models and theories. (The first sentence
was selected, and the other two included for context.)
1. Explanation: model – kind
The timing of signals of an autonomous clocklike mechanism of undifferenti-
ated mesenchymal cells during the development of the limbs of vertebrates is
proposed to explain the progression of the distalization of the limb pattern
during the development of the limbs of vertebrates.
is proposed to explain
The timing the progression
of signals
of an autonomous clocklike
mechanism
of undifferentiated mesenchymal
cells
of the distalization
of the limb pattern
during the development
of the limbs
of vertebrates
during the development
of the limbs
of vertebrates.
2. Explanation: model – kind
The spatial diffusion of signals in a model of communication with surrounding
tissues during the development of the limbs of vertebrates is proposed to
explain the progression of the distalization of the limb pattern during the
development of the limbs of vertebrates.
is proposed to explain
The spatial diffusion the progression
of signals
in a model
of communication with
surrounding tissues
of the distalization
of the limb pattern
during the development
of the limbs
of vertebrates
during the development
of the limbs
of vertebrates.
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Case A7
As above, the cooperative species responded to C [carbon] rewards with
a reciprocal P [phosphorus] increase, whereas the less-cooperative species
stored P in the host-inaccessible form of long-chained polyphosphates.
Finally, we compared the ratio of C costs to P transferred in both species,
confirming that colonization by the less-cooperative species resulted in
significantly higher host costs. These results support our whole plant
SIP [stable isotope probing] experiments and explain why the plant host
consistently allocated more C to the cooperative species when given a
choice. (Kiers et al. 2011, p. 882)
The complex relations between plant root systems and symbiotic fungi are the topic of
this paper. Here the authors state one of their main conclusions, that a cost-benefit
analysis of reciprocal rewards explains the allocation of resources in such systems.
(The final sentence was selected and the other two are included for context.)
1. Explanation: model – data
The reciprocity of rewards in a model of the allocation of resources to symbionts
by plant hosts explains the consistently greater size of the measurements of
the allocation of carbon to cooperative species in a sample of the allocation
of carbon to symbionts by plant hosts.
explains
The reciprocity the consistently greater size
of rewards
in a model
of the measurements
of the allocation
of carbon to cooperative species
in a sample
of the allocation
of resources to symbionts
by plant hosts
of the allocation
of carbon to symbionts
by plant hosts.
Case A8
Genetic interactions that reduce the benefit of certain regulatory muta-
tions in the eventual losers appear to explain, at least in part, why they
were outcompeted. (Khan et al. 2011, p. 1193)
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This is the final sentence of the abstract of a paper reporting on second-order selection
for greater “evolvability” in a large population of E. coli. The authors state their main
conclusion that regulatory mutations that reduced second-order “evolvability” were
responsible for the loss of that population in a competition. (See also case B21.)
1. Explanation: theory – entity
The reduction by the interactions of genes of the benefit of certain mutations
in the theory of regulatory genes in models of the losing lineages of E. coli
appears to explain, at least in part the failure in the evolutionary
competition of the losing lineages of E. coli.
appears to explain, at least in part
The reduction the failure
by the interactions
of genes
of the benefit
of certain mutations
in the theory
of regulatory genes
in models
in the evolutionary competition
of the losing lineages
of E. coli
of the losing lineages
of E. coli.
Case A9
The exact origin of the size dependence activity is not yet known, and our
measurements cannot be explained by the change in coordination number
based on the Benfield geometric model. (Tedsree et al. 2011, pp. 226-227)
The authors describe a new technique for measuring adsorption energy when screening
for catalysts. Here they block a possible alternative explanation.
1. Explanation: model – data
Changes of coordination number in the Benfield geometric model of the atomic
structure of catalysts cannot explain the occurrence of a size dependence
effect in chemical shift in the measurements of the adsorption energy of a
sample of a catalyst.
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cannot explain
Changes the occurrence
of coordination number
in the Benfield geometric model
of the atomic structure
of a size dependence effect
in chemical shift
in the measurements
of the adsorption energy
of a sample
of catalysts of a catalyst.
Case A10
No clear theoretical predictions for a star with parameters similar to those
for HIP 13044 exist, hence it is possible that some high-order oscillations
can explain the 1.4- or 3.5-day signal. (Setiawan et al. 2010, p. 1643)
This paper reports on the discovery of a large planet around a star based on pho-
tometric data. Here the authors try to account for two unexplained signals in their
data.
1. Explanation: theory – data
The high-order of oscillations of luminance in the theory of stellar dynamics
in models of stars can possibly explain the length of the measurements
of the oscillations of luminance of HIP 13044 which is a star.
can possibly explain
The high-order the length
of oscillations
of luminance
in the theory
of stellar dynamics
in models
of the measurements
of the oscillations
of luminance
of HIP 13044
of stars which is a star.
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Case A11
Averaging this cross-validation from all three subsets, the model explained
over 61% of the variance in the abundance of the community members . . .
(Faith et al. 2011, p. 102)
A mouse model of the microflora in the human gut was investigated across a range
of diets. Here the authors claim that their mathematical model of diet can account
for 61% of the variance observed in the abundance of species of gut flora.
1. Explanation: model – data
The diet parameters in a mathematical model of the abundance of species
of flora in the guts of mice explained a 61% portion of the variance in the
measurements of the abundance in samples of species of flora in the guts of
mice.
explained
The diet parameters a 61% portion
in a mathematical model
of the abundance
of the variance
in the measurements
of the abundance
in samples
of species
of flora
in the guts
of mice
of species
of flora
in the guts
of mice.
Case A12
In summary, changes in water mass formation processes are not necessarily
required to explain the high GNAIW [Glacial North Atlantic Intermediate
Water] end-member δ13C values. (Olsen and Ninnemann 2010, p. 659)
The authors show how the Industrial Revolution modified δ13C isotope values in the
North Atlantic. This accounts for some of the differences between the modern ocean
and prehistoric glacial oceans, and so those differences no longer need be explained.
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1. Explanation: kind – data
Changes in the processes of formation of water masses are not necessar-
ily required to explain the large size of measurements of δ13C in end-
members of GNAIW which is a water mass.
are not necessarily required to explain
Changes the large size
in the processes
of formation
of measurements
of δ13C
in end-members
of GNAIW
of water masses which is a water mass.
Case A13
To explain the observed deletion pattern, it was suggested that the Top1-
generated ends are processed into a gap corresponding in size to that of
the ensuing deletion. (Kim et al. 2011, pp. 1561-1562)
This paper reports on the mechanism of the Top1 topoisomerase in relaxing supercoils
of DNA in yeast, and the role this may have in mutation and human disease. The
explanation here is of one small part of the mechanism.
1. Explanation: model – kind
The correspondence in size to the ensuing deletion of a gap in a model of the
processing of Top1-generated ends in the formation of ribonucleoside monophos-
phates explains the pattern of deletions of base pairs in the formation of
ribonucleoside monophosphates.
explains
The correspondence the pattern
in size
to the ensuing deletion
of a gap
in a model
of the processing
of Top1-generated ends
of deletions
of base pairs
in the formation
of ribonucleoside monophosphates
in the formation
of ribonucleoside monophosphates.
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Case A14
Monoclonal conversion rules out a simple model of tissue maintenance
that originates from a population of long-lived stem cells following a strict
pattern of asymmetric division, and can be explained by two classes of
behavior. First, crypts could be maintained by a hierarchy in which a
single stem cell generates, through a sequence of asymmetric divisions,
stem cells with a more limited proliferative potential. Second, tissue could
be maintained by an equipotent stem cell population, in which stem cell
loss is perfectly compensated by the multiplication of others. (Lopez-
Garcia et al. 2010, p. 822)
Intestinal epithelial tissues are maintained by populations of stem cells. This paper
discusses the mechanism by which those stem cell populations coordinate. Mono-
clonal conversion is the eventual complete domination of crypts by cells sharing a
single (recent) common ancestor. Here the authors mention three possible models
for monoclonal conversion, the first of which they dismiss. (The first sentence was
selected and the others included as the referents of “two classes of behavior”.)
1. Explanation: model – kind
The hierarchy of proliferative potential in a model of asymmetric divisions of
crypts of stem cells in the maintenance of epithelial tissue of intestines can
explain the occurrence of monoclonal conversion in crypts of stem cells in the
maintenance of epithelial tissue of intestines.
can explain
The hierarchy the occurrence
of proliferative potential
in a model
of asymmetric divisions
of monoclonal conversion
of crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines
in crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines.
2. Explanation: model – kind
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The balance of the population in a model of perfect compensation in the mul-
tiplication of equipotent stem cells by crypts of stem cells in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue of intestines can explain the eventual occurrence of mon-
oclonal conversion in crypts of stem cells in the maintenance of epithelial tissue
of intestines.
can explain
The balance the eventual occurrence
of the population
in a model
of perfect compensation
in the multiplication
of equipotent stem cells
of monoclonal conversion
by crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines
in crypts
of stem cells
in the maintenance
of epithelial tissue
of intestines.
Case A15
Thus, the main sources of CO [carbon monoxide] able to explain our
signals are biomass burning and NMHC [nonmethane hydrocarbon] oxi-
dation. (Z. Wang et al. 2010, p. 1663)
The authors used ice core data about atmospheric carbon monoxide to draw conclu-
sions about biomass burning. Here they conclude that only two sources are available
to explain their data. (See also case B10.)
1. Explanation: entity – data
Patterns in the generation of CO by burning of biomass in the atmosphere of
the Earth can explain patterns in the measurements of ratios of isotopes
of CO in samples of the atmosphere of the Earth.
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can explain
Patterns patterns
in the generation
of CO
by burning
of biomass
in the measurements
of ratios
of isotopes
of CO
in samples
in the atmosphere
of the Earth
of the atmosphere
of the Earth.
2. Explanation: entity – data
Patterns in the generation of CO by oxidation of nonmethane hydrocarbons in
the atmosphere of the Earth can explain patterns in the measurements of
ratios of isotopes of CO in samples of the atmosphere of the Earth.
can explain
Patterns patterns
in the generation
of CO
by oxidation
of nonmethane hydrocarbons
in the measurements
of ratios
of isotopes
of CO
in samples
in the atmosphere
of the Earth
of the atmosphere
of the Earth.
Case A16
Thus, these results provide direct structural information that explains
the previous mutagenesis study, illustrating the power of 2D-IR [two-
dimensional infrared spectroscopy] as a structural tool. (Remorino et al.
2011, p. 1209)
The authors applied a new technique to determine the structure of a protein. Here
they compare their results to another study. This use of “explain” is beyond the
scope of my account.
Failure: justifying a result from a previous study
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Case A17
These compound potentials had nonmonotonic falling phases, explained
by an additional indirect inhibitory component . . . (Papadopoulou et al.
2011, p. 724)
This sentence is from a study of how odour information is encoded in insect brains.
The authors propose an additional component of the neural network to explain the
behaviour of the observed neurons.
1. Explanation: model – data
The inhibition by an additional indirect component of GGN neurons in the
model of the network of synapses in the olfactory system of locusts explains
the nonmonotonicity of the measurements of the falling phases of the com-
pound potentials of the specimens of GGN neurons in the network of synapses
in the olfactory system of locusts.
explains
The inhibition the nonmonotonicity
by an additional indirect
component
of GGN neurons
in the model
of the measurements
of the falling phases
of the compound potentials
of the specimens
of GGN neurons
of the network
of synapses
in the olfactory system
of locusts
in the network
of synapses
in the olfactory system
of locusts.
Case A18
In this additional experiment, we show that cognitive load also increases
the need for structure and that load-based stereotyping effects may best
be explained in terms of changes in structure striving. (Stapel and Lin-
denberg 2011, p. 253)
In this paper the authors associate behaviours of discrimination and stereotyping
with disordered contexts. Note: D. A. Stapel, one of the authors of this paper, has
147
admitted to widespread scientific misconduct. In this dissertation I am primarily
concerned with the structure of explanatory claims, not their truth, and so I have
decided not to remove this case.
1. Explanation: kind – kind
Changes in structure striving in the psychology of humans in disordered con-
texts may best explain occurrence of load-based stereotyping effects in the
psychology of humans in disordered contexts.
may best explain
Changes occurrence
in structure striving of load-based stereotyping effects
in the psychology
of humans
in disordered contexts
in the psychology
of humans
in disordered contexts.
Case A19
The differences in MCAs [monocarboxylic acids] among the Tagish Lake
specimens may be explained by differing degrees of parent body modifi-
cation. (Herd et al. 2011, p. 1305)
The Tagish Lake specimens are meteorite fragments that the authors discuss in the
context of the origins of life. Here the authors try to account for chemical differences
between the specimens in terms of the chemical modifications that the parent asteroid
underwent.
1. Explanation: entity – entity
The differences in the degree of the modification of the parent body of the
Tagish Lake specimens of meteorites may explain the differences in MCAs
of the Tagish Lake specimens of meteorites.
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may explain
The differences the differences
in the degree
of the modification
of the parent body
in MCAs
of the Tagish Lake specimens
of meteorites
of the Tagish Lake specimens
of meteorites.
Case A20
The apparent plant host and habitat specificity demonstrated by many
OTUs [operational taxonomic units, roughly equivalent to species] is not
necessarily explained by specificity toward the plant, but may instead
reflect an association with other root-associated fungi. (Rosling et al.
2011, p. 879)
In this paper the authors try to find the location of a little known but ubiquitous soil
fungus in the fungal tree of life. Here they propose that it is the fungal community
and not the plant that explains the specificity observed among root-associated fungi.
Here we have two explanations, the first negative and the second positive, but only
the first uses the word “explain”.
1. Explanation: kind – kind
The specificity of the association with the plant itself of root-associated fungi
does not necessarily explain the specificity of the association with the
plant hosts and habitats of root-associated fungi.
does not necessarily explain
The specificity the specificity
of the association
with the plant itself
of the association
with the plant hosts and habitats
of root-associated fungi of root-associated fungi.
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Case A21
The relative increase in C. quinquefasciatus gene number is explained
in part by the presence of substantially more expanded gene families,
including olfactory and gustatory receptors, immune-related genes, and
genes with possible xenobiotic detoxification functions . . . (Bartholomay
et al. 2010, p. 87)
This paper reports on the sequencing of the genome of Culex quinquefasciatus, the
southern house mosquito, which is an important disease vector. The authors found
that the genome is substantially larger than other genera of mosquitos, and here they
offer an explanation in terms of gene families. There are more genes in this genus
than related genera because there are more families of genes in this genus, associated
with different groups of functions.
1. Explanation: kind – kind
The relative increase in the number and size of families of genes in Culex quin-
quefasciatus explains in part the relative increase in the number of genes in
Culex quinquefasciatus.
explains in part
The relative increase the relative increase
in the number and size
of families
in the number
of genes
in Culex quinquefasciatus
of genes
in Culex quinquefasciatus.
Case A22
Differences in weight loss in response to the tumors were not explained by
variable food intake because it was similar in all animals during the initial
phase of the experiment and decreased uniformly in all tumor-carrying
mice during the final 2 to 4 days. (Das et al. 2011, p. 234)
A mouse model was used to better understand the genetic basis of cachexia, a wasting
disease that occurs in human cancer patients. Here the authors block an alternative
explanation for weight loss among the mice that would undermine their experimental
design.
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1. Explanation: entity – entity
Variations in the intake of food by the sample of tumor-carrying mice do not
explain the differences in the loss of weight by the sample of tumor-carrying
mice.
do not explain
Variations the differences
in the intake
of food
in the loss
of weight
by the sample
of tumor-carrying mice
by the sample
of tumor-carrying mice.
Case A23
We found that tonic release of the major inhibitory transmitter, GABA
[γ-aminobutyric acid], is due to direct permeation of GABA through the
anion channel, Best1, and that this release originates predominantly from
glial cells. Our proposed mechanism can account for each of these prop-
erties: (i) the nonvesicular nature of tonic GABA release is consistent
with a channel-mediated mechanism; (ii) the independence from neuronal
activity can be explained by the glial origins of tonic inhibition; and (iii)
the apparent lack of dependence on external Ca2+ arises from substantial
activation of Best1 at resting levels of intracellular Ca2+ . . . (S. Lee et al.
2010, p. 795)
This paper describes the mechanism for the release of the GABA neurotransmitter.
Here the authors state the three main explananda that their proposed mechanism can
explain. Since “explain” is used only under item (ii), I have included only that ex-
planation in my analysis. (The second sentence was selected, and the first is included
for context. See also case C11.)
1. Explanation: model – kind
The origins in glial cells of tonic inhibition in the proposed mechanism of
GABA/Best1 inhibition of the major inhibitory transmitter GABA can ex-
plain the independence from neural activity of tonic release of the major in-
hibitory transmitter GABA.
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can explain
The origins the independence
in glial cells
of tonic inhibition
in the proposed mechanism
of GABA/Best1 inhibition
from neural activity
of tonic release
of the major inhibitory transmitter
GABA
of the major inhibitory transmitter
GABA.
Case A24
Precipitation can also explain the rebrightening observed later in some
places as different areas drain (by overland flow or infiltration) or dry at
different rates. (Turtle et al. 2011, p. 1416)
The Cassini probe has observed rapid and extensive changes on the surface of Saturn’s
moon Titan. Here the authors propose that methane rainfall explains this data.
1. Explanation: theory – data
The differences in the rates in draining and drying of fluid in the theory of
precipitation in models on the surface of Titan can explain the differences
over time of the observations of the brightness of the surface of Titan.
can explain
The differences the differences over time
in the rates
in draining and drying
of fluid
in the theory
of precipitation
in models
of the observations
of the brightness
on the surface
of Titan
of the surface
of Titan.
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Case A25
As explained in the SOM [supporting online materials], the limited force
available (400 N) and response time of the drive system (inertial effects)
make the present setup most suitable for measuring viscosities in the range
from 104 to 107 Pa·s. (W. L. Johnson et al. 2011, p. 832)
The authors used novel methods to observe the crystallization of metal alloy glasses.
The use of “explained” here is synonymous with “described”, and outside the scope
of my account of explanation.
Failure: description
A.3 Sample B
Case B1
Surface-layer Mn, however, showed little if any shift (0.008 ± 0.008 V),
again suggesting that such impurities do not respond to TIBB [tip-induced
band bending]. (D. H. Lee and J. A. Gupta 2010, p. 1808)
This paper is about manipulation of electromagnetic fields of single atoms in doped
semiconductors. TIBB is a change in the semiconductor bands caused by the tip of
the scanning tunnelling microscope. I classify TIBB as a theory because it is only
one factor in a model of semiconductor band behaviour. Here the authors state that
TIBB does not change the magnetic field of Mn atoms, in contrast to Zn atoms where
it plays a role. This is a case of negative explanation: lack of one property explains
the lack of another property. TIBB is not required to model the semiconductor bands.
1. Evidence: data – theory
The small size or absence of a shift in the measurements of the voltage of the
resonance peaks in a sample of the Mn atoms on the surface layer of doped
semiconductors suggests the lack of a response in the theory of TIBB in
models of the semiconductor bands of Mn atoms on the surface-layer of doped
semiconductors.
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suggests
The small size or absence the lack
of a shift
in the measurements
of the voltage
of the resonance peaks
in a sample
of a response
in the theory
of TIBB
in models
of the semiconductor bands
of the Mn atoms
on the surface layer
of doped semiconductors
of Mn atoms
on the surface-layer
of doped semiconductors.
Case B2
A Fermi gas of atoms with resonant interactions is predicted to obey
universal hydrodynamics, in which the shear viscosity and other transport
coefficients are universal functions of the density and temperature. (Cao
et al. 2011, p. 58)
The project in this paper is to experimentally test the mathematical model at extreme
temperatures. This quotation comes from the first line of the abstract where the
authors describe in general terms how the theory of universal hydrodynamics is used
to build models of Fermi gases.
1. Explanation: theory – model
Multiple qualities of the universal functions of density and temperature in the
theory of universal hydrodynamics explain the values of the shear viscos-
ity and other transport coefficients in a model of a Fermi gas of atoms with
resonant interactions which is a hydrodynamic system.
explain
Multiple qualities the values
of the universal functions
of density and temperature
in the theory
of the shear viscosity and other
transport coefficients
in a model
of a Fermi gas
of atoms with resonant interactions
of universal hydrodynamics which is a hydrodynamic system.
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Case B3
Finally, between the two Arnold tongues (Tf = 24 min), the rate of phase
drift was even faster and almost uniform because the phases of most os-
cillators did not lock to the arabinose signal. (Mondrago´n-Palomino et al.
2011, p. 1317)
The authors measured the response of a large number of synthetic genetic oscillators
to a single stimulus (the arabinose signal) and compared them to models of biological
oscillators (“biological clocks”). The Arnold tongues are regions in phase space where
the natural period of the oscillator and the period of the stimulus match or are
resonant and the oscillator is expected to become “entrained” to the stimulus. Here
the authors describe the phase drift of the oscillators outside of those regions.
1. Explanation: model – data
The failure of the phases to lock to the arabinose signal in the Arnold tongues
of the model of the entrainment of biological oscillators explains the fast and
uniform speed of the rate in the measurements of the drift of the phase of
the sample of synthetic genetic oscillators which are biological oscillators.
explains
The failure the fast and uniform speed
of the phases
to lock
to the arabinose signal
in the Arnold tongues
of the model
of the entrainment
of the rate
in the measurements
of the drift
of the phase
of the sample
of synthetic genetic oscillators
of biological oscillators which are biological oscillators.
Case B4
The fit to P2 [a degree-2 Legendre polynomial] is excellent in all cases
(correlation coefficient R2 > 0.93), and two additional observations allow
us to confirm that the terrain is indeed described by P2. (Garrick-Bethell,
Nimmo, and Wieczorek 2010, p. 949)
155
The farside highlands of the Moon have a distinct topology and crust structure for
which the authors propose a mathematical model. The mathematical model is a good
fit with the data and allows prediction of the terrain shape.
1. Evidence: entity – model
The high quality of the fit of the P2 polynomial to the shape of the terrain of the
farside highlands of the Moon allows us to confirm that the shape of the
P2 polynomial is a model of the shape of the terrain of the farside highlands
of the Moon.
allows us to confirm that
The high quality the shape
of the fit
of the P2 polynomial
of the P2 polynomial
is a model
to the shape
of the terrain
of the farside highlands
of the Moon
of the shape
of the terrain
of the farside highlands
of the Moon.
Case B5
Pollen data from Erazo reveal two major types of vegetation association.
(Ca´rdenas et al. 2011, p. 1055)
Ecological responses to prehistoric climate change are explored here using pollen
samples. Differences in the pollen found at different strata are evidence that the region
around Erazo changed from grassland to forest and back to grassland. Conversely, the
association of grassland species and forest species explain (in part) the stratification
of pollen.
1. Evidence: data – theory
The stratification of the pollen in the observations of the samples of soil from
Erazo reveal a division of two major types in the theory of associations in
models of the vegetation in Erazo.
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reveal
The stratification a division
of the pollen
in the observations
of the samples
of soil
of two major types
in the theory
of associations
in models
of the vegetation
from Erazo in Erazo.
Case B6
Taken together, our data suggest that CR8020 [a human monoclonal an-
tibody] blocks fusion by sequestering the fusion peptide and preventing
its release at low pH. (Ekiert et al. 2011, p. 849)
CR8020 is a human antibody that acts against group 2 influenza viruses. Here the
authors propose a mechanism by which the antibody may disable the virus. (See also
cases B32 and B44 from the same paper.)
1. Evidence: kind – model
Multiple qualities of the blocking of fusion by CR8020 suggest the sequestering
and prevention of release at low pH of fusion peptide in a model of the activity
of CR8020.
suggest
Multiple qualities the sequestering and prevention of
release at low pH
of the blocking
of fusion
of fusion peptide
in a model
of the activity
by CR8020 of CR8020.
Case B7
Understanding how comets work – what drives their activity – is crucial
to the use of comets in studying the early solar system. (A’Hearn et al.
2011, p. 1396)
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This is the first sentence of the abstract of a paper describing robotic probe observa-
tions of comet 103P/Hartley 2. The authors are perhaps explaining their motivation,
but not anything about comets.
Failure: motivation
Case B8
Using an automated detection code, we found 2434 RBEs [rapid blueshifted
events] occurring in the active-region plage footpoints of coronal loops dur-
ing a 1-hour-long time series on 25 April 2010. (De Pontieu et al. 2011,
p. 55)
Computers were used to detect movements of hot plasma in the solar corona. Here
the authors describe their method and results, but do not explain them. (See also
case C15.)
Failure: method and results
Case B9
In nectin-3 KO [gene knock-out] mice, two or three hair cells aberrantly
attached to each other, as revealed by staining for F-actin and the tight-
junction marker ZO-1. (Togashi et al. 2011, p. 1145)
The paper examines the function of nectin-1 and -3 molecules using a gene knock-out
method. Here the authors describe a phenotype with aberrant hair cell attachment in
the auditory epithelia (inner-ear skin), implying (but not stating) that one function
of nectin-3 is attachment of hair cells. What we do have is data about a number of
hair cells, where a property of the cells explains features of the data.
1. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple qualities of observations from staining for F-actin and the tight-
junction marker ZO-1 of samples from nectin-3 KO mice reveal the abberant
attachment of hair cells in a sample of nectin-3 KO mice.
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reveal
Multiple qualities the abberant attachment
of observations
from staining for F-actin and the
tight-junction marker ZO-1
of hair cells
of samples
from nectin-3 KO mice
in a sample
of nectin-3 KO mice.
Case B10
This is contrary to the observations. (Z. Wang et al. 2010, p. 1664)
The authors use ice core data about atmospheric carbon monoxide to draw conclusions
about biomass burning. With this statement they block appeal to an alternative
source for the CO other than burning. (See also case A15.)
Failure: statement
Case B11
Although the concordant effects of prior manipulations and therapies on
canonical and noncanonical TGFβ [transforming growth factor-β] signal-
ing made it impossible to dissect their relative contributions, the differen-
tial effects of enalapril treatment suggest that TGFβ-mediated ERK1/2
[extracellular signal-regulated kinase] activation is the predominant driver
of aneurysm progression in MFS [Marfan syndrome]. (Habashi et al. 2011,
p. 364)
Marfan syndrome is a genetic disease that weakens connective tissue, especially in
heart muscles. Using a mouse model of MFS the authors tested the effects of TGFβ
for preventing aneurysms in the aorta and propose a mechanism for its operation.
The proposed mechanism explains the data collected.
1. Evidence: data – model
The differential effects in the observations of enalapril treatment in the sam-
ple of mice with Marfan syndrome suggest the predominance the mecha-
nism of the mediation by TGFβ of the activation of ERK1/2 in the progression
of aneurysms in organisms with Marfan syndrome.
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suggest
The differential effects the predominance
in the observations
of enalapril treatment
in the sample
of mice
the mechanism
of the mediation
by TGFβ
of the activation
of ERK1/2
in the progression
of aneurysms
in organisms
with Marfan syndrome with Marfan syndrome.
Case B12
Notably, the solid-state structure of guanidinium nitrate is isomorphous
with the hexagonal guanidinium-sulfonate network, and the separation
between guanidinium hydrogen bond donors along each edge of a hexago-
nal [G3NO3]
2+ unit (dG...G ∼ 7.5A˚) is comparable to the distance between
sulfonate hydrogen bond acceptors on each edge of the HSPB6− (the av-
erage distance between substituents on neighboring phenyl rings of 39
derivatives of hexaphenylbenzene suggests that dS...S ∼ 7.5A˚. . . ). (Liu
et al. 2011, p. 437)
In this paper the authors describe a technique for reliably building nano-structure
“cages”. In this sentence they describe and compare the structure of several molecules.
Failure: description
Case B13
Seismic analysis of the Sun has already shown that merely reproducing the
luminosity and temperature of a star will not guarantee that the internal
structure, and hence the underlying physics, is correct. This inspired the
inclusion of additional physics, such as the settling over time of chemical
elements because of gravity, in stellar models. (Chaplin et al. 2011, p. 215)
Data from the NASA Kepler mission about stellar masses, radii, and ages undermine
predictions of stellar evolution. Here the authors mention the history of increasing
complexity in stellar models. This is an interesting and unusual case. The earlier
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and later seismic analyses of the Sun are particular historical events that fall under
my “entity” classification. So here we have a singular causal claim about one thing
leading to another. (See also case B93.)
1. Explanation: entity – entity
The failure of previous analyses to capture internal structure and physics
with simpler stellar models of the luminosity and temperature of the Sun
inspired the inclusion in later analyses of additional physics in more complex
stellar models of the Sun.
inspired
The failure the inclusion
of previous analyses
to capture internal structure and
physics
with simpler stellar models
of the luminosity and temperature
in later analyses
of additional physics
in more complex stellar models
of the Sun of the Sun.
Case B14
When male and female gene expression profiles were analyzed separately,
the strain effect on males accounted for the differential expression of 1172
genes (9.3%), whereas only 7 genes (∼0.06%) were significant for the strain
effect on female gene expression. (Innocenti, Morrow, and Dowling 2011,
p. 846)
Mitochondria are organelles in eukaryotic cells that are transmitted from mother to
child along with other cellular material. Mitochondria have their own genomes. This
paper uses a fruit-fly model to show that maternal transmission creates a strong
sex-specific selective pressure, allowing the accumulation of deleterious male-specific
mutations in the mitochondrial genome. This sentence summarizes one of the main
experimental results: the effect of the strain of mitochondria on the expression of
genes in the nucleus of the cell is much greater in males. (See also case C1.)
1. Explanation: kind – entity
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The sex-selectivity of the effect of the strain of mitochondria on the expression
of genes in fruit-flies accounts for the differential expression of 1172 genes
in males in a sample of fruit-flies.
accounts for
The sex-selectivity the differential expression
of the effect
of the strain
of mitochondria
on the expression
of genes
of 1172 genes
in males
in a sample
in fruit-flies of fruit-flies.
Case B15
Moreover, 30 µM of ruthenium red and gadolinium, which are known
blockers of many cationic MA [mechanically activated] currents, blocked
74.6 ± 2.5% (n = 6 cells) and 84.3 ± 3.8% (n = 5 cells) of Piezo1-induced
MA current, respectively. (Coste et al. 2010, p. 58)
In this paper the authors establish the importance of Piezo1 genes for mechanically
activated cation channels, required for neural cells that detect touch and pain. Here
we have a causal claim that some amount of ruthenium red and gadolinium blocked
some portion of these particular MA currents. (See also case B87.)
1. Explanation: entity – data
The amount (30 µM) of ruthenium red and gadolinium in the sample of neural
cells caused the blocking of the portion of the measurements of Piezo1-
induced MA currents in the sample of neural cells.
caused
The amount (30 µM) the blocking
of ruthenium red and gadolinium of the portion
of the measurements
of Piezo1-induced MA currents
in the sample
of neural cells
in the sample
of neural cells.
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Case B16
Ectopic expression of wild-type TDG [thymine-DNA glycosylase] dimin-
ished the amount of 5caC [5-carboxylcytosine] generated by cotransfected
Tet2 [ten eleven translocation dioxyegnase 2] but did not significantly re-
duce 5hmC [5-hydroxymethylcytosine]. (He et al. 2011, p. 1306)
The availability of portions of DNA for transcription is controlled in part by its
methylation, i.e. the presence of a methyl group at the site. 5caC and 5hmC are
molecules that result from demethylation, which the Tet proteins may cause. In this
sentence the authors assert that TDG in Tet2 acts on 5caC but not on 5hmC.
1. Explanation: entity – data
The ectopic expression of wild-type TDG in the sample of cells caused the
reduction in the measurements of the amount of 5caC generated by cotrans-
fected Tet2 in the sample of cells.
caused
The ectopic expression the reduction
of wild-type TDG in the measurements
of the amount
of 5caC generated by cotransfected
Tet2
in the sample
of cells
in the sample
of cells.
2. Explanation: entity – data
The ectopic expression of wild-type TDG in the sample of cells did not
cause the lack of a significant reduction in the measurements in the amount
of 5hmC generated by cotransfected Tet2 in the sample of cells.
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did not cause
The ectopic expression the lack
of wild-type TDG of a significant reduction
in the measurements
in the amount
of 5hmC generated by
cotransfected Tet2
in the sample
of cells
in the sample
of cells.
Case B17
Buttermilk Creek Complex biface technology includes three trajectories
– preform, chopper/adze, and discoidal core production. (Waters et al.
2011, p. 1601)
The Buttermilk Creek Complex is a collection of archaeological artifacts collected in
Texas and dating to between 13 and 15.5 thousand years ago. This sentence states
a distinction between three “trajectories” in the production of stone tool artifacts.
Although classification systems can play a role in explanation, there is no explicit
explanation here.
Failure: statement of classification
Case B18
A puckered D2d structure and its valence isomer, tetrasilatetrahedrane,
were calculated to be local energy minima; a planar rectangular D2h struc-
ture with two Si=Si double bonds and a planar rhombic C2h structure
emerged as saddle point structures. (Suzuki et al. 2011, p. 1307)
This paper describes the peculiar structure of cyclobutadiene (C4H4) molecules. This
sentence is part of the description of a molecule with related structure called tetrasi-
lacyclobutadiene (SiH4).
Failure: description, prediction
164
Case B19
We estimate that the actual genome size is ∼120 Mb, corresponding to
140-fold coverage of the Blumeria genome. (Spanu et al. 2010, p. 1543)
Blumeria is a family of powdery mildews distinguished by their extreme parasitism.
The authors sequenced the Blumeria genome and discuss how extreme parasitism has
affected genome size and gene loss. Here they provide their estimate of the actual
genome size based on their sequencing methods.
Failure: calculation, estimate
Case B20
In a second approach, we analyzed the phylogenies of genes known to
function in Arabidopsis development. (Banks et al. 2011, p. 962)
This paper reports on the sequencing of the genome of Selaginella moellendorffii, a
nonseed vascular plant, and compares its evolution to other lineages. In this sentence
the authors describe one of their methods. (See also case B31.)
Failure: method
Case B21
Because changes in chromosomal supercoiling also may have widespread
pleiotropic effects, it seemed likely that interactions with the topA alleles
specific to the EW [eventual winners] and EL [eventual losers] backgrounds
might explain these epistatic effects. (Khan et al. 2011, p. 1435)
The authors studied second-order selection for greater “evolvability” in a large popu-
lation of E. coli. One of the significant differences observed was the topA allele, which
alters chromosomal supercoiling, and which in turn changes the transcription of many
genes. Another was that the spotT allele confers a large fitness benefit to the EW
group but not the EL group. In this sentence the authors propose the hypothesis that
an interaction of topA and spoT explains the fitness benefit of spoT. (This sample B
quotation happens to include the word “explain”. See also case A8.)
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1. Evidence: theory – theory
The breadth of pleiotropic effects in the theory of supercoiling of chromosomes
in the transcription of genes suggests the possibility of epigenetic interactions
in the theory of the interactions of topA and spoT alleles on the transcription
of genes.
suggests
The breadth the possibility
of pleiotropic effects
in the theory
of supercoiling
of chromosomes
of epigenetic interactions
in the theory
of the interactions
of topA and spoT alleles
in the transcription
of genes
on the transcription
of genes.
2. Explanation: theory – entity
The possibility of epigenetic interactions in the theory of the interactions of
topA and spoT alleles on the transcription of genes in models of the evolution
of populations might explain the differences the fitness benefit of the spoT
allele in EW and EL which are populations.
might explain
The possibility the differences
of epigenetic interactions
in the theory
of the interactions
of topA and spoT alleles
on the transcription
of genes
in models
of the evolution
the fitness benefit
of the spoT allele
in EW and EL
of populations which are populations.
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Case B22
An alternative way of viewing these comparisons would be in terms of the
total quantities of occupation material generated per 1000-year interval
in each demographic period, for which an appropriate mathematical for-
mula would involve the total numbers of recorded sites, multiplied by the
average densities of occupation residues documented in the sites, multi-
plied by the average recorded areas of the occupation deposits in the sites.
(Mellars and French 2011, p. 626)
The authors describe a tenfold increase in modern human populations of Western
Europe circa 40 000 years ago, and propose that simple numerical supremacy may
explain the replacement of Neandertals by modern humans. Here they say how they
built one of their mathematical models for comparing populations over time. The
sense of “explain” that might apply here is synonymous with “describe in detail”,
and that is not the sense I am concerned with in this dissertation.
Failure: model building
Case B23
Cryo-electron microscopy (cryo-EM) images of these crystals revealed no-
table ring-shaped (or, less likely, spiral-shaped) assemblies. (van Breugel
et al. 2011, p. 1198)
Using x-ray microscopy methods the authors determined the structure of the SAS-
6 protein, which forms the centriole structure required to build cilia and flagella.
Circular patterns in the cryo-electron microscopy images reveal rings or spirals, and
conversely the ring or spiral structure explains the patterns in the images.
1. Evidence: data – kind
The circularity of the patterns in the cryo-electron microscopy images of the
crystals of the SAS-6 protein reveal the ring- or spiral-shapes of the assemblies
of the oligomers of the SAS-6 protein.
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reveal
The circularity the ring- or spiral-shapes
of the patterns
in the cryo-electron microscopy
images
of the crystals
of the assemblies
of the oligomers
of the SAS-6 protein of the SAS-6 protein.
Case B24
Instead, the monkey received a reward for directing a saccade to the search
target (an oriented bar) if it was present at any location, or for maintaining
fixation if no target was present. (Schafer and Moore 2011, p. 1570)
The topic of this paper is voluntary attention, studied in a portion of rhesus monkey
prefrontal cortex that is associated with eye-muscle control. Here the authors describe
part of one of their experimental methods.
Failure: method
Case B25
Histological and quantitative analysis of whole ankle joints demonstrated a
significant increase in synovitis, pannus formation, and destruction of bone
and cartilage in Grn−/− [gene knock-out] mice, compared with controls.
(Tang et al. 2011, p. 479)
A mouse model of arthritis was used to study the effects of the growth factor progran-
ulin (PGRN). The experimental group of mice was genetically modified to knockout
the Grn gene and make the mice PGRN deficient. Here we have a statement that the
histological and quantitative analysis demonstrated various increases in symptoms of
arthritis. The implication is that PGRN deficiency explains these effects, but that is
not stated here.
1. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple properties of the observations in the histological and quantitative
analysis of the whole ankle joints of the specimens of Grn−/− mice demon-
168
strate a significant increase compared to controls in synovitis in the whole
ankle joints of the specimens of Grn−/− mice.
demonstrate
Multiple properties a significant increase compared to
controls
of the observations
in the histological and quantitative
analysis
of the whole ankle joints
in synovitis
in the whole ankle joints
of the specimens
of Grn−/− mice
of the specimens
of Grn−/− mice.
2. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple properties of the observations in the histological and quantitative
analysis of the whole ankle joints of the specimens of Grn−/− mice demon-
strate a significant increase compared to controls in the formation of pannus
in the whole ankle joints of the specimens of Grn−/− mice.
demonstrate
Multiple properties a significant increase compared to
controls
of the observations
in the histological and quantitative
analysis
of the whole ankle joints
in the formation
of pannus
in the whole ankle joints
of the specimens
of Grn−/− mice
of the specimens
of Grn−/− mice.
3. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple properties of the observations in the histological and quantitative
analysis of the whole ankle joints of the specimens of Grn−/− mice demon-
strate a significant increase compared to controls in the destruction of bone
and cartilage in the whole ankle joints of the specimens of Grn−/− mice.
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demonstrate
Multiple properties a significant increase compared to
controls
of the observations
in the histological and quantitative
analysis
of the whole ankle joints
in the destruction
of bone and cartilage
in the whole ankle joints
of the specimens
of Grn−/− mice
of the specimens
of Grn−/− mice.
Case B26
Further characteristics of PB mobilization in vivo are shown in fig. S4.
(Rad et al. 2010, p. 1106)
This sentence is case of “shown” in reference to a figure, and is not an explanation.
Failure: reference to figure
Case B27
Furthermore, the deuterium effect documented for C3H6 in the small-
scale V nitrogenase reaction was duplicated for α-C4H8 and n-C4H10 in
the scaled-up Mo nitrogenase reaction. (Hu, C. C. Lee, and Ribbe 2011,
p. 1106)
The topic of the paper is the building of hydrocarbons out of carbon monoxide using
various biological catalysts. Here the authors state that they duplicated one of their
results at larger scale.
Failure: duplication of results
Case B28
These experiments, which revealed no substantial change in the compound
I decay rate, suggested that CYP119-I could be prepared at millimolar
concentrations by use of freeze-quench techniques. (Rittle and Green 2010,
p. 934)
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This paper discusses the pharmaco-kinetics of cytochrome P450 enzymes. Here the
authors describe part of the process by which their methods were developed.
Failure: method development
Case B29
Clostridia became prominent after weaning and persisted in the adult an-
imals, in contrast to Lactobacillus or Enterobacteriaceae, which were more
abundant during the neonatal period and declined thereafter. (Atarashi
et al. 2011, p. 339)
Here the authors describe the progression of populations of bacteria in their experi-
ments on microfauna in the colons of mice.
Failure: description
Case B30
Cells with visible YFP [yellow fluorescent protein] expression had >70%
reduced CaV1.2-mediated Sr
2+ [strontium] entry, and almost all mutant
STIM1 was within clearly discernible junctions. (Y. Wang et al. 2010,
p. 108)
This paper describes the STIM proteins that detect and regulate calcium within cells.
This sentence describes the association observed between mutant STIM1 proteins and
reduced activity in voltage operated calcium channels. The explanation that mutant
STIM1 reduces CaV1.2-mediated Sr
2+ entry is implied here but not stated. (See also
case B81.)
Failure: description
Case B31
The 27 vascular plant-specific orthologous groups likely represent genes
associated with developmental innovations of vascular plants. (Banks et
al. 2011, p. 962)
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This paper reports on the sequencing of the genome of Selaginella moellendorffii, a
nonseed vascular plant, and compares its evolution to other lineages. The authors
show that families of vascular and non-vascular land-plants share a large number of
genes. Here they speculate that the differences between vascular land-plant groups
lie mainly in the genes that regulate development. (See also case B20.)
1. Evidence: kind – kind
The occurrence of orthologous groups of specific genes of vascularity in plants
likely represents the occurrence of associations of genes for innovations in
the development of vascularity in plants.
likely represents
The occurrence the occurrence
of orthologous groups
of specific genes
of associations
of genes
for innovations
in the development
of vascularity
in plants
of vascularity
in plants.
Case B32
Prophylaxis using 3 mg/kg CR8020 protected mice against challenge with
a high, lethal dose of either mouse-adapted H3N2 or H7N7 virus. (Ekiert
et al. 2011, p. 845)
CR8020 is a human antibody that acts against group 2 influenza viruses. Here the
authors state the causal capacity of CR8020 to block against influenza in mice. (See
also cases B6 and B44 from the same paper.)
1. Explanation: entity – entity
The use of prophylaxis with 3 mg/kg of CR8020 on the sample of mice caused
the protection against challenge with a high, lethal dose of mouse-adapted H3N2
or H7N7 virus in the sample of mice.
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caused
The use the protection
of prophylaxis
with 3 mg/kg
of CR8020
against challenge with a high,
lethal dose
of mouse-adapted H3N2 or H7N7
virus
on the sample
of mice
in the sample
of mice.
Case B33
At 25◦C the majority (66%) of spindles in tub4-S360D large-budded mi-
totic cells had not extended past metaphase length [∼1.5 µm], whereas
WT [wild type] cells (91%) had normal elongated anaphase spindles [6 to
10 µm]. (Keck et al. 2011, p. 1561)
This paper discusses the structure of the yeast centrosome, a cellular structure critical
for mitosis. Here they contrast the mitotic spindles in tub4-S360D genetic variations
with wild-type yeast. Emphasizing tub4-S360D as the difference-maker implies a
causal explanation for the differences, but no explanation is stated in this sentence.
Failure: statement of correlation, only implying an explanation
Case B34
Specifically, we simulated the coupled perturbations of increased N2O
abundance, leading to stratospheric ozone (O3) depletion, altered solar ul-
traviolet radiation, altered stratosphere-to-troposphere O3 flux, increased
tropospheric hydroxyl radical concentration, and finally lower concentra-
tions of CH4. (Prather and Hsu 2010, p. 952)
This quotation is from the abstract of a simulation study on the relation between
nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH4) as greenhouse gases. The authors provide
a telegraphic list of a sequence of factors in their model, ultimately linking increased
N2O to reduced CH4.
1. Explanation: model – model
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The increase in abundance of N2O in the model of the gases in the stratosphere
and troposphere explains the decrease in concentrations of CH4 in the model
of the gases in the stratosphere and troposphere.
explains
The increase the decrease
in abundance
of N2O
in concentrations
of CH4
in the model
of the gases
in the stratosphere and troposphere
in the model
of the gases
in the stratosphere and
troposphere.
Case B35
Our study indicates that fire ants have been introduced on no fewer than
nine separate occasions to California, Asia, and Australia from the south-
ern United States, where S. invicta populations previously were confined
for decades. (Ascunce et al. 2011, p. 1068)
Solenopsis invicta – the fire ant – is an invasive species originally from South America.
The authors of this paper use genetics to trace the global history of invasions. Here
they restate their conclusion. One could read “indicates” to mean that the study
explains the conclusions, but that usage falls outside my model of explanation.
Failure: statement of conclusion
Case B36
An alternative view, however, suggests that memory loss after brain dam-
age may be better understood, not in terms of loss of a system dedicated to
a specific type of memory – for example, long- versus short-term memory,
or memory processes such as encoding, storage/consolidation, or retrieval
– but in terms of the stimulus representations that the different regions
contain. (McTighe et al. 2010, p. 1409)
This quotation comes from a study of object recognition after brain damage in rats.
Here the authors propose a new approach that better accounts for their data than
the received view in the field. Their proposal falls short of a model, but highlights a
new theoretical factor.
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1. Explanation: theory – kind
The differences in the representations of stimuli among regions in the theory
of the brain in models of the loss of memory after brain damage may explain
the differences in the loss of memory after brain damage.
may explain
The differences the differences
in the representations
of stimuli
among regions
in the theory
of the brain
in models
of the loss
of memory
after brain damage
in the loss
of memory
after brain damage.
2. Explanation: theory – kind
The loss of a dedicated system for a specific type of memory in the theory
of the brain in models of the loss of memory after brain damage may not
explain the differences in the loss of memory after brain damage.
may not explain
The loss the differences
of a dedicated system
for a specific type
of memory
in the theory
of the brain
in models
of the loss
of memory
after brain damage
in the loss
of memory
after brain damage.
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Case B37
Taken together, the total surface area buried between Ffh [a protein] and
the 4.5S RNA is 780 A˚2, which is similar to the extent of interaction
between FtsY and the distal portion of the 4.5S RNA. (Ataide et al.
2011, p. 882)
This paper describes the 3D structure of the signal recognition particle ribonucleopro-
tein complex together with it signal receptor. This quotation contains a comparison
of the size of two structures.
Failure: comparison, description
Case B38
Alternatively, thermal metamorphism of subsurface organic-rich strata,
associated with sill intrusions and flood basalt emplacement, was pro-
posed as a major source of 13C-depleted thermogenic methane to the end-
Permian, Rhaetian, Toarcian, and Eocene atmosphere. (Ruhl et al. 2011,
p. 431)
The authors used carbon isotope measurements as evidence that intensive volcanism
caused major carbon-cycle disruptions at the end of the Triassic period, and in turn
the end-Triassic mass extinction. Here they present one proposed mechanism as part
of the explanation.
1. Explanation: entity – entity
The occurrence of thermal morphism of subsurface organic-rich strata of the
Earth in the end-Permian, Rhaetian, Toarcian, and Eocene eras was pro-
posed to explain the presence of the majority of 13C-depleted thermogenic
methane in the atmosphere of the Earth in the end-Permian, Rhaetian, Toar-
cian, and Eocene eras.
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was proposed to explain
The occurrence the presence
of thermal morphism
of subsurface organic-rich strata
of the majority
of 13C-depleted thermogenic
methane
in the atmosphere
of the Earth
in the end-Permian, Rhaetian,
Toarcian, and Eocene eras
of the Earth
in the end-Permian, Rhaetian,
Toarcian, and Eocene eras.
Case B39
Hair offers a suitable experimental model because hair follicles (HFs) cycle
through phases of growth (anagen) and rest (telogen). (Plikus et al. 2011,
p. 586)
The topic of this paper is coordination in stem cell populations, and the empirical
test case is hair follicle stem cells. Here the authors are justifying their choice of test
case.
1. Explanation: theory – model
The occurrence of cycles of phases of growth (anagen) and rest (telogen) in the
theory of hair follicles which are stem cells explains The suitability of hair
as the experimental model for stem cells.
explains
The occurrence The suitability
of cycles
of phases
of growth (anagen) and rest
(telogen)
in the theory
of hair follicles
of hair
as the experimental model
which are stem cells for stem cells.
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Case B40
Formate in the periplasm can still cross the membrane to reach a vestibule
that is sealed off from the cytoplasm only by the N-terminal helix. (W.
Lu¨ et al. 2011, p. 354)
This paper describes the molecular structure of the FocA formate channel in Salmonella
typhimurium. Here the authors state a causal capacity of formate but nothing is being
explained.
Failure: statement of causal capacity
Case B41
Using this technique, we have created imbalanced systems with fidelities
similar to those in the balanced case. (Serwane et al. 2011, p. 337)
The authors describe a method for highly-controlled preparation and manipulation
of physical systems consisting of a small number of fermions [e.g. electrons, protons,
and neutrons]. Here they state a special capability of their technique.
Failure: statement of a technical capability
Case B42
The evidence from Darwinopterus supports this hypothesis [about sexual
dimorphism in pterosaurs]. (J. Lu¨ et al. 2011, p. 323)
The authors use evidence from new fossil finds to draw conclusions about the sexual
dimorphism, egg structure, and reproductive behaviour of a species of pterosaur. Here
they state that their evidence from Darwinopterus supports broader hypotheses about
sexual dimorphism in pterosaurs. Conversely, we can infer that sexual dimorphism
in pterosaurs generally explains sexual dimorphism in this species specifically.
1. Evidence: kind – kind
The occurrence of a large female pelvis and large male crests in Darwinopterus
which is a pterosaur supports the occurrence of a large female pelvis and large
male crests in pterosaurs.
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supports
The occurrence the occurrence
of a large female pelvis and large
male crests
in Darwinopterus
of a large female pelvis and large
male crests
which is a pterosaur in pterosaurs.
Case B43
We simulated the cross correlation result using Eq. 1 [omitted] where a0
is the amplitude of EI(t), and bn, φbn, and φceb are the amplitudes and the
relative phases of the nth component and the CEP of Eb(t). (Chan et al.
2011, p. 1167)
The authors present techniques for fine control of light fields. Here they explain the
meaning of variables in an equation used for modelling cross correlation. The sense
of “explain” in “explain the meaning” is similar to “define” and outside the scope of
my account of explanation.
Failure: description of a model
Case B44
Crystal structures of CR6261 in complex with H1 and H5 HAs [hemagglu-
tinin] revealed a highly conserved epitope in the HA stalk. (Ekiert et al.
2011, p. 844)
CR8020 is a human antibody that acts against group 2 influenza viruses. Here the
authors refer to previous work in which they described how the CR6261 antibody
binds to hemagglutinin (the major glycoprotein in the envelopes of influenza A viruses,
which most antibodies target) in H1 and H5 families of influenza. Although the
phrasing here is evidential, we can infer the converse explanatory relation: the highly
conserved epitope explains the crystal structures. (See also cases B6 and B32 from
the same paper.)
1. Evidence: entity – kind
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The structures of the crystals of the samples of CR6261 in complex with H1
and H5 HAs which are HAs revealed the occurrence of a highly conserved
epitope in the stalk of HAs.
revealed
The structures the occurrence
of the crystals
of the samples
of CR6261
in complex
with H1 and H5 HAs
of a highly conserved epitope
in the stalk
which are HAs of HAs.
Case B45
In his seminal paper, Alan Turing aimed to provide a mechanism for self-
regulated pattern formation in biology by showing that sets of reaction-
diffusion equations with appropriate kinetics and diffusion coefficients
could spontaneously evolve to spatially periodic structures. (Ba´nsa´gi,
Vanag, and Epstein 2011, p. 1309)
This paper describes 3D structures in liquid systems in terms of patterns first de-
scribed mathematically by Alan Turing. In this first sentence of the paper the authors
refer to a class of mathematical models of spatially periodic structures that Turing
first proposed.
1. Explanation: model – kind
The appropriate choices of kinetics and diffusion coefficients for sets of reaction-
diffusion equations in models of the structure of biological systems explain
the possibility of the spatial periodicity of the structures of biological systems.
explain
The appropriate choices the possibility
of kinetics and diffusion coefficients
for sets
of reaction-diffusion equations
in models
of the spatial periodicity
of the structure
of biological systems
of the structures
of biological systems.
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Case B46
A recording with a narrower-resolution bandwidth in the low-frequency
region is shown in the inset of Fig. 3B, illustrating a detection limit of
20prms/
√
Hz and 10prms/
√
Hz at 50 mHz and 200 mHz, respectively.
(Gagliardi et al. 2010, p. 1083)
This paper describes advances in fibre-optic strain sensors. Here we have a description
of some of the contents of a figure.
Failure: description of figure
Case B47
Regardless, it is clear that Ir[iridium]-depleted metals are present in the
returned Itokawa samples. (Ebihara et al. 2011, p. 1121)
This paper reports on a chemical analysis of a sample from the asteroid Itokawa. After
considering whether the iridium they detected was internal or external to grains in
the sample, they reassert that iridium was present in the sample.
Failure: assertion about data
Case B48
Most researchers conclude that the 3.6-million-year-old footprints in the
Upper Laetolil Beds at Laetoli, Tanzania, evince a medial longitudinal
arch. (Ward, Kimbel, and Johanson 2011, p. 752)
The authors present a bone from the foot of an Australopithecus afarensis and discuss
its structure in the context of the evolution of bipedalism. Here they refer to a set
of preserved footprints and state the consensus view that they were made by a foot
that had a medial longitudinal arch.
1. Evidence: entity – kind
The shapes of the prints of a specimen of the feet of an Australopithecus
afarensis evince the occurrence of a medial longitudinal arch in the feet of
Australopithecus afarensis.
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evince
The shapes the occurrence
of the prints
of a specimen
of a medial longitudinal arch
of the feet
of an Australopithecus afarensis
in the feet
of Australopithecus afarensis.
Case B49
Hence, we reject the hypotheses of Brownian walk and composite Brown-
ian walk and conclude that mussel movement is best described by a Le´vy
walk. (de Jager et al. 2011, p. 1552)
The topic of this paper is the movement of mussels as they create their beds, consid-
ered in the context of the interaction with complex environments and the effects on
selection. Here the authors assert their conclusion that the mathematical model of
Le´vy walks describes mussel movements while the alternatives do not. Despite the
use of the word “description”, this seems to be a clear case of model-kind explanation.
1. Explanation: model – kind
The shapes of the paths in the Le´vy walk model of the movement of mussels
best explain the shapes of the paths of the movement of mussels.
best explain
The shapes the shapes
of the paths
in the Le´vy walk model
of the paths
of the movement
of mussels
of the movement
of mussels.
2. Explanation: model – kind
The shapes of the paths in the Brownian walk model of the movement of
mussels do not explain the shapes of the paths of the movement of mussels.
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do not explain
The shapes the shapes
of the paths
in the Brownian walk model
of the paths
of the movement
of mussels
of the movement
of mussels.
3. Explanation: model – kind
The shapes of the paths in the composite Brownian walk model of the movement
of mussels do not explain the shapes of the paths of the movement of mussels.
do not explain
The shapes the shapes
of the paths
in the composite Brownian walk
model
of the paths
of the movement
of mussels
of the movement
of mussels.
Case B50
A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) WP-3D
research aircraft made airborne measurements of the gaseous and aerosol
composition of air over the Deepwater Horizon (DWH) oil spill in the Gulf
of Mexico that occurred from April to August 2010. (Gouw et al. 2011,
p. 1295)
This paper discusses the formation of organic aerosols in the wake of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. Here the authors describe their main method of data collection.
Failure: description of method
Case B51
Yet given that the methylated CTD [carboxy-terminal domain] is a sub-
strate for subsequent phosphorylation and that phosphorylated RNAPII
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[RNA polymerase II] exhibits this methylation state, it is highly probable
that R1810me is preserved on the transcribing polymerase, not having a
major impact on CTD phosphorylation. (Sims et al. 2011, p. 101)
The authors provide details of the mechanism whereby the CTD section of the com-
mon RSNAPII enzyme is modified after its transcription and before it becomes ac-
tive. Here they provide a speculative explanation for two of their discoveries (note
the present tense).
1. Evidence: model – theory
The conjunction of the role of methylated CTD as substrate for subsequent
phosphorylation with the methylation state in the model of phosphorylated
RNAPII suggests the preservation of R1810me on the transcribing polymerase
in the theory of the methylation of CTD on phosphorylated RNAPII.
suggests
The conjunction the preservation
of the role
of methylated CTD
as substrate
for subsequent phosphorylation
with the methylation state
in the model
of R1810me
on the transcribing polymerase
in the theory
of the methylation
of CTD
of phosphorylated RNAPII on phosphorylated RNAPII.
Case B52
MH2 [Malapa Hominin 2] shares with other australopiths and Homo asym-
metry of the metacarpal heads that is associated with the human-like
ability of the fingers to accommodate to an object via the metacarpal
phalangeal joints. (Kivell et al. 2011, p. 1413)
Malapa Hominin 2 is a fossil specimen of the wrist and hand of an adult female
Australopithecus sediba, found in Malapa, South Africa and dating to approximately
2 million years ago. The authors discuss the structure of this hand in the context
of the evolution of hands among hominids. Here they have an implicit model of the
kinetics of the hand in mind when they attribute the shape of some bones to the
manipulation of objects. Despite the use of the word “associated” to mean a mere
correlation, I believe that this is a case of scientific explanation.
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1. Explanation: model – kind
The human-like ability to accommodate to an object via the joints between the
bones of the metacarpus and the phalanges in a model of the kinematics of
the hands of homonids explains the asymmetry of the heads of the bones of
the metacarpus of the hands of homonids.
explains
The human-like ability the asymmetry
to accommodate
to an object
via the joints
between the bones
of the metacarpus and the
phalanges
in a model
of the kinematics
of the heads
of the bones
of the metacarpus
of the hands
of homonids
of the hands
of homonids.
Case B53
The encoding of CTA [conditioned taste aversion] in the IC [insular cortex]
was reported to be distributed, and specific associations are estimated to
engage plastic changes in about 25% of the neurons, suggesting that the
level of overexpression that we obtained in the IC in the present study
could affect multiple behaviorally relevant representations. (Shema et al.
2011, pp. 1209-1210)
An experiment in rats shows how long-term memory can be enhanced or disrupted by
the over-expression of proteins, including the protein kinase C isozyme protein kinase
Mζ (PKMζ).
1. Explanation: theory – kind
The level of the overexpression in the theory of PKMζ in IC in models of
long-term memory could affect multiple qualities of multiple behaviorally
relevant representations in long-term memory.
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could affect
The level multiple qualities
of the overexpression
in the theory
of PKMζ
in IC
in models
of multiple behaviorally relevant
representations
of long-term memory in long-term memory.
Case B54
Despite their great length, the canines were not fragile. These could have
served to manage food items before processing, to deter attacks from
predators, or for intraspecific display and combat, as seen in extant antler-
less water deer (Hydropotes sp.; Fig. 2E) and musk deer (Moschus sp.)
from Asia. (Cisneros et al. 2011, p. 1604)
The authors discuss the scull and teeth of Tiarajudens – a newly described sabre-tooth
therapsid. Therapsids belong to a group of reptile ancestors of mammals from the
mid-Permian (around 250 million years ago). Here the authors offer (in abbreviated
and speculative form) several functional explanations for the size of the canine teeth.
The explanans in each case is the need or benefit of the function for the individual.
(The second sentence was selected and the first is included for context.)
1. Explanation: theory – kind
The need for the management of items in the theory of the processing of food
in models of the behaviour of Tiarajudens could explain the length and
strength of the canine teeth of Tiarajudens.
could explain
The need the length and strength
for the management
of items
in the theory
of the processing
of food
in models
of the behaviour
of the canine teeth
of Tiarajudens of Tiarajudens.
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2. Explanation: theory – kind
The need to deter attacks from predators in the theory of defence in models
of the behaviour of Tiarajudens could explain the length and strength of the
canine teeth of Tiarajudens.
could explain
The need the length and strength
to deter attacks
from predators
in the theory
of defence
in models
of the behaviour
of the canine teeth
of Tiarajudens of Tiarajudens.
3. Explanation: theory – kind
The need for display and combat in the theory of intraspecific behaviour
in models of the behaviour of Tiarajudens could explain the length and
strength of the canine teeth of Tiarajudens.
could explain
The need the length and strength
for display and combat
in the theory
of intraspecific behaviour
in models
of the behaviour
of the canine teeth
of Tiarajudens of Tiarajudens.
Case B55
To investigate this coupling experimentally, we measured the time evo-
lution of the center-of-mass mean square displacements (MSDs) parallel
(∆s2) and perpendicular (∆n2) to the orientation of the reptation tube,
averaged over the same time window. (Fakhri et al. 2010, p. 1806)
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This paper describes the behaviour of single-walled carbon nanotubes in crowded
environments as a model of, for example, the creation of the cytoskeleton of a cell.
Here they describe one of their methods.
Failure: method
Case B56
As predicted by the size-based model, larger aggregates appeared with
Sup35-GFP [Sup35 prion tagged with green fluorescent protein] overex-
pression, and this size shift induced a ∼50% decrease in propagons, a
decrease in phenotypic stability by a factor of 70, and a ∼50% decrease
in Sup35-GFP transmission. (Derdowski et al. 2010, p. 681)
Prions are misfolded proteins that can replicate by causing other proteins to misfold,
sometimes resulting in aggregate plaques that cause diseases such as Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease. This paper discusses how size and not abundance affects the behaviour
of prions in yeast, including heritable prions (propagons). Here they state one horn
of their argument, that a shift in size explains three sorts of data they collected.
1. Explanation: kind – data
The shift in size of the Sup35-GFP propagon caused the ∼50% decrease in the
measurements of the number in a sample of Sup35-GFP propagons.
caused
The shift the ∼50% decrease
in size in the measurements
of the number
in a sample
of the Sup35-GFP propagon of Sup35-GFP propagons.
2. Explanation: kind – data
The shift in size of the Sup35-GFP propagon caused the factor of 70 decrease in
the measurements of the stability of phenotypes in a sample of Sup35-GFP
propagons.
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caused
The shift the factor of 70 decrease
in size in the measurements
of the stability
of phenotypes
in a sample
of the Sup35-GFP propagon of Sup35-GFP propagons.
3. Explanation: kind – data
The shift in size of the Sup35-GFP propagon caused the ∼50% decrease in
the measurements of hereditary transmission in a sample of Sup35-GFP
propagons.
caused
The shift the ∼50% decrease
in size in the measurements
of hereditary transmission
in a sample
of the Sup35-GFP propagon of Sup35-GFP propagons.
Case B57
Such reactivity offers the opportunity to develop triazoles as mechanically
labile protecting groups or for use in readily accessible materials that
respond to mechanical force. (Brantley, Wiggins, and Bielawski 2011,
p. 1606)
This quotation from the end of the paper’s abstract gestures at a technological ap-
plication of triazoles (a small chemical compound), which the body of the paper
describes in detail.
Failure: application
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Case B58
The severity of the Fog phenotype in +/fem-1(Df) heterozygotes depended
not only on the identity of the deficiency but also on the history of the
fem-1(+) allele. (C. L. Johnson and Spence 2011, p. 1314)
This paper describes an experiment on the role of RNA in the genetics of C. el-
egans nematode worms. C. elegans worms are usually either male or self-fertile
hermaphrodites, both of which require the fem-1 gene for development. Here they
discuss their finding that not only the presence of the fem-1 gene, but also the history
of the allele among ancestors was significant. This is evidence of a heritable epigenetic
effect.
1. Explanation: kind – data
The presence and history of the fem-1(+) allele in +/fem-1(Df) heterozygotes
of C. elegans explains the severity of the Fog phenotype in observations of
specimens of +/fem-1(Df) heterozygotes of C. elegans.
explains
The presence and history the severity
of the fem-1(+) allele of the Fog phenotype
in observations
of specimens
in +/fem-1(Df) heterozygotes
of C. elegans
of +/fem-1(Df) heterozygotes
of C. elegans.
Case B59
In addition, because teachers selected their focal class in the post-intervention
year (albeit with clear guidance to select their most challenging course),
it remains possible that this selection in some unmeasured way biased
results of the study. (Allen et al. 2011, p. 1036)
The authors describe a randomized control trial on secondary school teaching, report-
ing significant student test score improvement. Here they raise the possibility that
there was some source of selection bias.
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1. Explanation: entity – data
The selection by teachers of the focal class in the post-intervention year of the
study explains the possibility of unmeasured bias in the results of the study.
explains
The selection the possibility
by teachers
of the focal class
in the post-intervention year
of unmeasured bias
in the results
of the study of the study.
Case B60
Although the absolute delay τ , corresponding to a group velocity of v =
1600 m/s, is small in the present system because of the relatively small
optical depth N , the observation nonetheless establishes experimentally
that a vacuum input control field can delay a probe pulse. (Tanji-Suzuki
et al. 2011, p. 1268)
The authors describe a technique for varying the rate of interactions between photons
passing through an optical cavity. Here they reassert their conclusions in the face of
a possible objection.
1. Evidence: entity – kind
The occurrence of a delay in a sample of a pulse of a probe of photons in a
vacuum input control field establishes experimentally the possibility of a
delay of a pulse of a probe of photons in a vacuum input control field.
establishes experimentally
The occurrence the possibility
of a delay
in a sample
of a delay
of a pulse
of a probe
of photons
in a vacuum input control field
of a pulse
of a probe
of photons
in a vacuum input control field.
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Case B61
Interestingly, though the (3,8) species is a minor product in the mixture
of SWNTs used in our experiments, HexCoil-Ala and HexCoil-Gly show
a dominant peak corresponding to this chirality. (Grigoryan et al. 2011,
p. 1074)
This paper describes a computational design system for engineering nano-structures.
Here we have a statement of a surprising piece of data. It raises the expectation of
an explanation.
Failure: remarking on some surprising data
Case B62
Broad regions of low seismic velocity detected under ridges imply that the
mantle is relatively impermeable with a porosity of ∼0.02. (Zhu et al.
2011, p. 88)
In order to better understand the geology of the Earth’s mantle the authors stud-
ied the geochemical properties of small samples of molten rock. They studied their
samples with porosity near 0.02, and here they state the reason: because that is
the porosity value the mantle is believed to have based on seismic evidence. As in
other cases we can reverse the evidential relation to get an explanatory relation: the
porosity of 0.02 explains the low seismic velocity detected under ridges.
1. Evidence: kind – model
The breadth of the regions of low seismic activity in the mantle is evidence
for the value of ∼0.02 of the parameter for porosity in models of the mantle.
is evidence for
The breadth the value
of the regions
of low seismic activity
of ∼0.02
of the parameter
for porosity
in models
in the mantle of the mantle.
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Case B63
The concurrent decreases in larval supply and mass flux were most likely
due to hydrodynamic transport away from the ridge rather than changes
in source production. (Adams et al. 2011, p. 580)
This paper describes how large-scale ocean eddies caused by atmospheric events such
as El Nin˜o can change deep-ocean currents and affect the ecologies of hydrother-
mal vents. Here the authors propose that these transporting currents better explain
the changes they observed than would changes at the source. I have analyzed the
contrastive explanation as the pair of a positive and a negative explanation.
1. Evidence: entity – entity
The concurrency of the decreases in larval supply and mass flux in the ridge
was most likely due to the direction of the hydrodynamic transport away
from the ridge.
was most likely due to
The concurrency the direction
of the decreases
in larval supply and mass flux
of the hydrodynamic transport
in the ridge away from the ridge.
2. Evidence: entity – entity
The concurrency of the decreases in larval supply and mass flux in the ridge
was most likely not due to changes in the source of the production of
larval supply and mass flux in the ridge.
was most likely not due to
The concurrency changes
of the decreases
in larval supply and mass flux
in the source
of the production
of larval supply and mass flux
in the ridge in the ridge.
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Case B64
We present benthic foraminiferal isotopes with Mg/Ca [magnesium/cal-
cium] data from two North American Atlantic continental slope locations
. . . with well-preserved foraminifera and excellent age control . . . , provid-
ing a continuous record from the late middle Eocene to early Miocene:
(i) Ocean Drilling Program (ODP) Site 1053 (Blake Nose, 1629 m present
depth, ∼1500 to 1750 m paleodepth); and (ii) Atlantic Slope Project core-
hole 5 (ASP-5; 250 m present depth, 600 m paleodepth, North Carolina
slope) . . . . (Katz et al. 2011, p. 1077)
Here the authors describe the sources of their data about the structure of the Antartic
Circumpolar Current in the distant past.
Failure: description of data sources
Case B65
Nontrivial planarization and strategic doping were used to overcome the
issues arising from this roughness. (McCarthy et al. 2011, p. 571)
The authors describe an improved method for building organic light-emitting transis-
tors. Here they state two methods that were used to overcome a particular difficulty
that they faced. While the difficulties could count as an explanation of their reasons
for using these methods, that usage is beyond the scope of my model.
Failure: justifying methods
Case B66
This process [blue-shifted gas clouds absorbing light] might be evident
in our observations of CC SNe [core-collapse supernovae], which show an
excess of strong (and even saturated) absorption compared to the SNe Ia
[type Ia supernovae]. (Sternberg et al. 2011, p. 859)
Type Ia supernovae are “standard candles” used for measuring distance in astron-
omy and this paper investigates the mechanisms behind those stupendous explosions.
Here the authors distinguish between core-collapse and type Ia supernovae. Blue-
shifted gas clouds near core-collapse supernovae explain an excess of strong sodium
absorption compared to type Ia supernovae.
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1. Evidence: data – kind
The excess of strength in the absorption of the spectra of sodium in the obser-
vations of the light in a sample of CC SNe is evidence of the absorption
of light by blue-shifted gas clouds around CC SNe.
is evidence of
The excess the absorption
of strength
in the absorption
of the spectra
of sodium
in the observations
of the light
in a sample
of light
by blue-shifted gas clouds
of CC SNe around CC SNe.
Case B67
Children who made a correct prediction (green box) and gave a sensible
explanation were scored as correct. (Perner, Mauer, and Hildenbrand
2011, p. 475)
In this cognitive science paper the author report on a study using false-belief tasks
to ascertain links between concepts of sense, reference, belief, and identity. Despite
the use of “explanation” in this sentence, here we have a description of a method.
Failure: method
Case B68
Although 2 [Mn4CaO2] is insoluble in tetrahydrofuran (THF), addition of
Ca(OTf)2 [OTf is trifluoromethanesulfonate] leads to partial dissolution
of the suspended material, suggesting the formation of a more soluble
Ca-Mn intermediate. (Kanady et al. 2011, p. 733)
This paper discusses the chemistry of Mn4CaOn compounds and their role in pho-
tosynthesis. Here the authors provide one piece of evidence and one step in their
argument that Mn4CaO2 has a certain structure.
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1. Evidence: kind – theory
The partial dissolution with the addition of Ca(OTf)2 in THF of 2 suggests
the formation of a more soluble intermediate of Ca-Mn in the theory of the
reaction in models of 2.
suggests
The partial dissolution the formation
with the addition
of Ca(OTf)2
in THF
of a more soluble intermediate
of Ca-Mn
in the theory
of the reaction
in models
of 2 of 2.
Case B69
Consider an edge dislocation formed by the removal of two planes of atoms
. . . viewed along [1100] and [0001], respectively, or the similarly formed 30◦
dislocation . . . (Heuer, Jia, and Lagerlo¨f 2010, p. 1230)
The topic of this paper is the structure of deformed sapphire crystals. The quoted
sentence is the first step in the description of a model of the core structure, but does
not include an explanation.
Failure: description
Case B70
The STM [scanning tunnelling microscope] topographic images . . . revealed
atomically flat and defect-free Se-terminated [selenium-terminated] (001)
surfaces with large terraces. (Song et al. 2011, p. 1411)
Observations of molecular structures of an iron-selenide superconductor are described
in this paper. Here we have a reference to a set of scanning tunnelling microscope
topographic images that reveal a structure. Conversely the structure explains patterns
in the images.
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1. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple qualities of the images from the STM of the topography of the surfaces
of a sample of films of stoichiometric FeSe single-crystals revealed the large-
terraced, atomically flat and defect-free qualities of the surfaces of a sample
of films of stoichiometric FeSe single-crystals.
revealed
Multiple qualities the large-terraced, atomically flat
and defect-free qualities
of the images
from the STM
of the topography
of the surfaces
of a sample
of films
of stoichiometric FeSe
single-crystals
of the surfaces
of a sample
of films
of stoichiometric FeSe
single-crystals.
Case B71
Using 10-min sliding window calculations, we found a clear similarity in
the time course between theta power and gridness . . . and a consistent rela-
tionship between the power of theta and the gridness score . . . . (Brandon
et al. 2011, p. 597)
This paper describes an association between theta oscillations and the periods of
“grid” and “head” cells in the brains of rats. These cells are thought to track spatial
location and head movement. Here the authors state some of the details of the asso-
ciation the observed. Although phrased in terms of “similarity” and “consistency”,
I believe that the authors are making modal, explanatory claims. However they are
restricting their claims to associations in the data.
1. Explanation: data – data
The patterns in the time course of the theta power in the data in a sample of
the medial cortex of rats explain the patterns in the time course of the gridness
[spiking rate of grid cells] in the data in a sample of the medial cortex of rats.
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explain
The patterns the patterns
in the time course
of the theta power
in the time course
of the gridness [spiking rate of grid
cells]
in the data
in a sample
of the medial cortex
of rats
in the data
in a sample
of the medial cortex
of rats.
2. Explanation: data – data
The patterns in the time course of the theta power in the data in a sample of
the medial cortex of rats explain the patterns in the time course of gridness
score in the data in a sample of the medial cortex of rats.
explain
The patterns the patterns
in the time course
of the theta power
in the time course
of gridness score
in the data
in a sample
of the medial cortex
of rats
in the data
in a sample
of the medial cortex
of rats.
Case B72
Thus, FM2 [frequency-modulation harmonic 2] is weaker than FM1 [frequency-
modulation harmonic 2] in echoes from objects located off the central axis
or at greater distances. (Bates, Simmons, and Zorikov 2011, p. 628)
Here the authors distinguish some of the characteristics of two types of sound Eptesi-
cus fuscus bats use in echolocation.
Failure: distinction
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Case B73
In all of these cases, the perturbation index shows high peaks only for a
narrow time interval of the pre-emergence phase, but it stays very low after
the start of emergence . . . (Ilonidis, Zhao, and Kosovichev 2011, p. 994)
The authors describe a pattern in their observations of emerging sunspot regions,
without offering an explanation for the pattern in this quotation or saying what this
is evidence of.
Failure: pattern in the data
Case B74
The helical axis of the complex is nearly straight through the transitions
between the triple helix and the flanking ENE stems. (Mitton-Fry et al.
2010, p. 1246)
This paper describes the mechanism by which part of a herpes virus prevents RNA
decay in another part of the virus. Here we have a description of the structure of one
of the parts.
Failure: description
Case B75
The findings that none of the three types of SLF [S-locus F-box] genes
of either S7 or S11 haplotype caused competitive interaction in S5 pollen
suggest that some other type(s) of SLF in S7 and S11 haplotypes mediate
detoxification of S5-RNase, allowing them to be compatible with S5 styles.
(Kubo et al. 2010, p. 798)
Flowering plants are able to recognize their own pollen in order to prevent inbreeding.
This paper describes how this done, which involves the S-locus F-box gene and its
various Sn alleles. Here the authors propose that an unknown factor is at play.
1. Evidence: kind – theory
The lack of competition in the interaction with S5 styles of S7 and S11 haplotypes
suggests the mediation of detoxification of S5 pollen in the theory of SLF in
models of S7 and S11 haplotypes.
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suggests
The lack the mediation
of competition
in the interaction
with S5 styles
of detoxification
of S5 pollen
in the theory
of SLF
in models
of S7 and S11 haplotypes of S7 and S11 haplotypes.
Case B76
Simple calculations imply that 10-fold contrasts in e˙ along valley profiles
. . . most likely correspond to a parameter r value in the range ∼1 to ∼3.
(Shuster et al. 2011, p. 88)
In this study of changes in the geophysics of alpine landscapes by erosion and glacia-
tion the authors propose a mathematical model of the topology with key parameters
of e˙ and r.
1. Evidence: kind – model
The 10-fold contrasts in the values of e˙ along the profiles of valleys are ev-
idence for a range of ∼1 to ∼3 for the values of the parameter r in the
mathematical model of the topology of the valleys.
are evidence for
The 10-fold contrasts a range of ∼1 to ∼3
in the values
of e˙
along the profiles
for the values
of the parameter r
in the mathematical model
of the topology
of valleys of the valleys.
Case B77
Second, RNA interference-mediated depletion of the key pathway molecules,
PGRP-LC, Imd, and REL2, did not rescue P. falciparum oocyst develop-
ment in the presence of Esp Z. (Cirimotich et al. 2011, p. 856)
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The malaria parasite Plasmodium falciparum goes through several stages in its life-
cycle, some of which take place in the lumen of the midgut of mosquitos. This paper
reports on a bacterium Esp Z that lives in the midgut of some mosquitoes and that
interferes with the parasite’s development. This quotation is from an argument that
the mosquito’s immune deficiency innate immune pathway is not how Esp Z acts on
the parasite.
1. Explanation: entity – entity
The depletion by RNA interference of the key pathway molecules of the immune
deficiency innate immune pathway in a sample of mosquitoes did not cause
the rescue of the development of the oocyst of P. falciparum in the presence of
Esp Z in a sample of mosquitoes.
did not cause
The depletion the rescue
by RNA interference
of the key pathway molecules
of the immune deficiency innate
immune pathway
of the development
of the oocyst
of P. falciparum
in the presence
of Esp Z
in a sample
of mosquitoes
in a sample
of mosquitoes.
Case B78
Particles can create stable flocculated networks in suspensions through
the effects of the van der Waals forces; they are much smaller than the
capillary force between particles considered here. (Koos and Willenbacher
2011, p. 899)
This paper describes a model of the interactions of solid particles dispersed in a fluid
and a method to control those interactions. Here we have a very general explanation
of one type of such a system that the authors distinguish from their own topic of
interest.
1. Explanation: theory – kind
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The effects of van der Waals forces in the theory of particle interactions in
models of particles in liquid suspensions can cause the creation and stability
of flocculated networks of particles in liquid suspensions.
can cause
The effects the creation and stability
of van der Waals forces
in the theory
of particle interactions
in models
of flocculated networks
of particles
in liquid suspensions
of particles
in liquid suspensions.
Case B79
Due to the finite contact angles of gold on anorthite and sapphire, during
thermal annealing the gold film broke up into small particles dispersed on
the substrate . . . (Luo et al. 2011, p. 1730)
This paper reports on the discovery of nanometer-thick films in equilibrium states.
Here we have an explanation for the break-up of a thicker gold film during the creation
of the thin gold film.
1. Explanation: model – entity
The finite values of the contact angles in a model of the structure on anorthite
and saffire of gold explain the break-up into small particles and dispersal onto
the substrate during thermal annealing of samples of films of gold.
explain
The finite values the break-up into small particles
of the contact angles
in a model
of the structure
on anorthite and saffire
and dispersal onto the substrate
during thermal annealing
of samples
of films
of gold of gold.
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Case B80
The dish-shaped leaf showed the same X-shaped pattern . . . originating
from its left and right edges . . . , but, in addition, it had two higher-
amplitude peaks from within its cavity – a single reflection from its center
and a double reflection bouncing off both sides . . . . (Simon et al. 2011,
pp. 631-632)
As this paper describes, some flowers have dish-shaped leaves to better reflect echoes
and attract bat-pollinators. Here we have an explanation of the two acoustic peaks
observed.
1. Explanation: entity – data
The position at the center and both sides of a single reflection and a double
reflection of sound in the specimen from the dish-shaped leaf caused the
position of the peaks in the observations of high-amplitude sound in the
specimen of the dish-shaped leaf.
caused
The position the position
at the center and both sides
of a single reflection and a double
reflection
of sound
of the peaks
in the observations
of high-amplitude sound
in the specimen
from the dish-shaped leaf
in the specimen
of the dish-shaped leaf.
Case B81
Ionomycin-mediated store depletion for 5 min induced mCherry-STIM1
to move into clearly defined ER-PM junctional areas . . . . (Y. Wang et al.
2010, p. 108)
This paper describes the STIM proteins that detect and regulate calcium within cells.
Here the authors state a result of their high-resolution imaging study examining the
distribution of mCherry-tagged STIM1 proteins within cells. When calcium stores
were depleted using ionomycin, the STIM moved into distinct locations. (See also
case B30.)
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1. Explanation: entity – entity
The depletion with Ionomycin for 5 minutes of stores of Ca2+ in the sample of
cells induced the movement into clearly defined ER-PM junctional areas by
Ca2+ in the sample of cells.
induced
The depletion the movement
with Ionomycin
for 5 minutes
of stores
into clearly defined ER-PM
junctional areas
of Ca2+
in the sample
of cells
by Ca2+
in the sample
of cells.
Case B82
The oldest fossils that can be more confidently assigned to H. habilis
and/or H. rudolfensis, in this case relatively intact or complete cranial
remains, date to approximately the same age as H. erectus at ∼1.88 to
1.90 Ma at Koobi Fora. (Pickering et al. 2011, p. 1421)
Here the authors make an assertion about the state of evidence about classification
of specimens at the origins of the Homo genus. (See also case C7.)
Failure: description
Case B83
The overall reaction sequence is complicated owing to the presence of
many reaction steps (more than a hundred reactions). (Sutton et al. 2011,
p. 1428)
This paper describes a chemical reaction with potential for use in hydrogen fuel cells.
This quotation is taken from a section describing calculations of the reaction sequence,
and explains part of the difficulty of building a model.
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1. Explanation: kind – kind
The presence of a large number of steps in the reaction explains the overall
complexity of the sequence of the reaction.
explains
The presence the overall complexity
of a large number
of steps
of the sequence
in the reaction of the reaction.
Case B84
The suppression in the NCRIF [non-classical rotation inertial frequency]
became noticeable when the rotation speed exceeded 1 mm/s, which is
much greater than the ac critical velocity of 10 µm/s. One reasonable
way to explain this difference is that dc [continuous] rotation results in a
different mechanism for the suppression of NCRIF than does ac oscillation.
(Choi et al. 2010, p. 1514)
A strange property of solid helium-4 is “supersolidity” – a special quantum state with
a zero-viscosity flow. The paper establishes this property of helium experimentally.
Here the authors note a difference between two experimental conditions and propose
two different mechanisms. (The second sentence was randomly sampled and the first
sentence is included to provide context.)
1. Explanation: theory – data
The differences between dc rotation and ac oscillation in the theory of quantum
mechanics in the mechanisms of suppression of NCRIF explains the differ-
ences in the velocities of the observations of the suppression in the NCRIF.
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explains
The differences the differences
between dc rotation and ac
oscillation
in the theory
of quantum mechanics
in the mechanisms
in the velocities
of the observations
of suppression
of NCRIF
of the suppression
in the NCRIF.
Case B85
Remarkably, 7 of the 15 hubs of degrees greater than 50 (hubs50) in AI-
1MAIN were targeted by effectors from both pathogens (P = 6.5 × 10−13)
. . . , and 14 of the 15 hubs50 were targeted by effectors from at least one
pathogen (P = 6.9 × 10−18) . . . , consistent with observations of human-
virus infection systems. (Mukhtar et al. 2011, p. 597)
This quotation describes the relations between pathogen proteins (effectors) and hubs
in plant immune systems, noting their similarity to human-virus relations.
Failure: description
Case B86
In much of this region, snowpack declined since the 1950s, and continued
reductions are expected throughout the 21st century and beyond. (Ped-
erson et al. 2011, p. 332)
The authors of this study used tree-ring data from areas of runoff to measure the melts
from mountain snowpacks in North America. This quotation from the beginning of
their paper sets the context for the paper.
Failure: statement of observations and predictions
Case B87
The current-pressure relationship is characterized by maximal opening at
-60 mmHg, with a pressure for half-maximal activation (P50) of -28.0 ±
1.8 mmHg . . . . (Coste et al. 2010, p. 56)
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In this paper the authors establish the importance of Piezo1 genes for mechanically
activated cation channels, required for neural cells that detect touch and pain. Here
they state two of the parameters for one of their mathematical models. (See also case
B15.)
Failure: model parameters
Case B88
The derived dust mass is about 103 times as large as and about 20 times
as cold as that measured at mid-infrared wavelengths around 600 days
after the explosion was observed, soon after it first condensed out of the
ejecta. (Matsuura et al. 2011, p. 1261)
Here we have a description of the differences in size and temperature over time of
dust ejected from supernova 1987A.
Failure: description
Case B89
If e1 is always chosen, then the process simply adds a uniformly random
edge at each step. (Riordan and Warnke 2011, p. 323)
This mathematics paper studies a network phase-change effect called “explosive per-
colation”. Here the authors describe a small part of their model of an Achlioptas
process, a much-studied class of models.
Failure: method
Case B90
For comparison, we also generated a MG [metallic glass] without LRO
[long-range structural order] by quenching a melt directly from 1500 K to
300 K without the fcc [face-centered cubic crystal structure] constraining
step, . . . (Zeng et al. 2011, p. 1406)
Glass has amorphous rather than crystalline structure, but this paper shows one kind
of cesium-aluminum metallic glass transitions from amorphous to crystalline structure
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when put under high pressures. Here the authors describe their method for generating
a sample with contrasting properties.
Failure: method
Case B91
This result is especially noteworthy because the seed-sowing plots were
all placed within a few meters of adult R. solandri plants, where natural
seed rain should already be at a maximum, but were not necessarily near
adult M. ramiflorus or G. ligustrifolium. (Anderson et al. 2011, p. 1070)
This ecology paper describes the cascading effects that sharp reduction in bird pop-
ulations have on pollination and the density of plant populations. Here the authors
highlight a particular piece of data as being noteworthy, and provide some reasons
for this, without forming a complete explanation.
Failure: highlighting a piece of data
Case B92
To further illustrate how the time series approach can provide new insights
from manipulative immunological experiments, we calculated surfaces of
immune efficacy for control mice and for mice treated with antibodies to
interleukin-10 receptor (anti-IL-10R) . . . (Metcalf et al. 2011, p. 987)
The authors of this paper studied the relationships between rodent malaria parasite
growth and immune system resource limitations. Here they describe one step in their
methodology.
Failure: method
Case B93
Figure 2 shows all the stars on a conventional Hertzsprung-Russell dia-
gram, which plots the luminosities of stars against Teff [effective temper-
ature of the star]. (Chaplin et al. 2011, p. 213)
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Data from the NASA Kepler mission about stellar masses, radii, and ages undermine
predictions of stellar evolution. This sentence simply describes a figure. (See also
case B13.)
Failure: description of a figure
Case B94
The most heavily targeted genes are associated with increased pleiotropy
[multiple influences on phenotype], as measured by the number of distinct
functional processes and tissues with which they are associated. (Roy et
al. 2010, p. 1793)
This paper reports on a large functional genomics project studying fruit flies: Drosophila
model organism Encyclopedia of DNA Elements (modENCODE). Here the authors
make a general observation about their data set: the genes that are the targets of the
largest numbers of transcription factors are associated with pleiotropy. This some-
what implies but falls short of an explanation for either pleiotropy or being heavily
targeted.
Failure: general observation
Case B95
In cuprates [superconductors with a copper anion] the angular dependence
of the wave functions is primarily set by the d orbitals of Cu, which hy-
bridize with properly symmetrized combinations of p orbitals on nearest-
neighbor oxygens. (Sakurai et al. 2011, p. 700)
In this quotation one quality of the kind cuprate explains another quality of that kind.
1. Explanation: kind – kind
The hybridization of d orbitals of Cu in cuprates explains the angular depen-
dence of the wave functions of cuprates.
explains
The hybridization the angular dependence
of d orbitals
of Cu
of the wave functions
in cuprates of cuprates.
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Case B96
Preserved samples of whiteflies from several sites in Arizona, New Mexico,
and California show that the frequency of infection rose from 1% in 2000
to 51% in 2003 and to 97% in 2006 . . . . (Himler et al. 2011, p. 254)
This paper describes the infection of a population of sweet potato whiteflies (an
invasive agricultural pest) with a inheritable bacterial symbiont. Here the authors
say what they measured and what their results were.
Failure: method
Case B97
In all cases, the alkylation reaction predictably and selectively afforded
the coupling products without any additives or formation of wasteful by-
products. (D.-H. Lee, Kwon, and Yi 2011, p. 1614)
Here we have a summary of an experiment demonstrating an efficient chemical reac-
tion. The authors state that the reaction generated the products. While this involves
some sort of causal relation, nothing is being explained.
Failure: causation without explanation
Case B98
Rasgrf1 is imprinted in mice and rats but not in other rodent species.
(Watanabe et al. 2011, p. 851)
Here we have a statement of the prevalence of a particular gene in the context of an
epigenetic study of rodent DNA.
Failure: statement
Case B99
Previous global simulations have been able to capture observed features
of geomagnetic storms, isolated substorms, and other events. (Brambles
et al. 2011, p. 1183)
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This paper provides a formal model of Earth’s magnetosphere. Here the authors
describe the explanatory power of previous models, but do not say what it is about
them that is explanatory.
Failure: description of explanatory power
Case B100
This Hirnantian-aged unit [a sample of carbonate] records a major drop in
sea level and a large positive carbon isotope excursion; both are recognized
globally in other sedimentary successions. (Finnegan et al. 2011, p. 904)
The topics of this paper are historical ocean temperatures and surface ice volumes.
The sample of carbonate they refer to provides evidence of a sea level drop and
a change in the sources of atmospheric carbon. Conversely, the drop in sea level
explains properties of the sample. (See also case A3.)
1. Evidence: data – entity
The values of the measurements of the isotopes in the Hirnantian-aged
unit from the sea in the Hirnantian era are evidence of a major drop in
the level of the sea in the Hirnantian era.
are evidence of
The values a major drop
of the measurements
of the isotopes
in the Hirnantian-aged unit
in the level
from the sea
in the Hirnantian era
of the sea
in the Hirnantian era.
2. Evidence: data – entity
The values of the measurements of the isotopes in the Hirnantian-aged
unit from the sea in the Hirnantian era are evidence of the large size
and positive direction of an excursion of isotopes of carbon in the Hirnantian
era.
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are evidence of
The values the large size and positive direction
of the measurements
of the isotopes
in the Hirnantian-aged unit
from the sea
of an excursion
of isotopes
of carbon
in the Hirnantian era in the Hirnantian era.
A.4 Sample C
Case C1
Mitochondria are maternally transmitted; hence, their genome can only
make a direct and adaptive response to selection through females, whereas
males represent an evolutionary dead end. In theory, this creates a sex-
specific selective sieve, enabling deleterious mutations to accumulate in
mitochondrial genomes if they exert male-specific effects. We tested this
hypothesis, expressing five mitochondrial variants alongside a standard
nuclear genome in Drosophila melanogaster, and found striking sexual
asymmetry in patterns of nuclear gene expression. Mitochondrial poly-
morphism had few effects on nuclear gene expression in females but major
effects in males, modifying nearly 10% of transcripts. These were mostly
male-biased in expression, with enrichment hotspots in the testes and
accessory glands. Our results suggest an evolutionary mechanism that
results in mitochondrial genomes harboring male-specific mutation loads.
(Innocenti, Morrow, and Dowling 2011, p. 845)
(See also case B14.)
1. Evidence: kind – model
The male-specificity of mutation loads in the genomes of mitochondra in Drosophila
melanogaster suggest the sex-selectivity of a mechanism of evolution in
Drosophila melanogaster.
suggest
The male-specificity the sex-selectivity
of mutation loads
in the genomes
of mitochondra
of a mechanism
of evolution
in Drosophila melanogaster in Drosophila melanogaster.
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Case C2
Deepwater formation in the North Atlantic by open-ocean convection is an
essential component of the overturning circulation of the Atlantic Ocean,
which helps regulate global climate. We use water-column radiocarbon
reconstructions to examine changes in northeast Atlantic convection since
the Last Glacial Maximum. During cold intervals, we infer a reduction
in open-ocean convection and an associated incursion of an extremely
radiocarbon (14C)-depleted water mass, interpreted to be Antarctic Inter-
mediate Water. Comparing the timing of deep convection changes in the
northeast and northwest Atlantic, we suggest that, despite a strong con-
trol on Greenland temperature by northeast Atlantic convection, reduced
open-ocean convection in both the northwest and northeast Atlantic is
necessary to account for contemporaneous perturbations in atmospheric
circulation. (Thornalley et al. 2011, p. 202)
1. Explanation: theory – entity
The reduction of the convection in the theory of the open-ocean of the north-
west and northeast of the Atlantic in models of the climate of the Earth is
necessary to account for the contemporaneity of the perturbations in the
circulation of the atmosphere of the Earth.
is necessary to account for
The reduction the contemporaneity
of the convection
in the theory
of the open-ocean
of the northwest and northeast
of the Atlantic
in models
of the climate
of the perturbations
in the circulation
of the atmosphere
of the Earth of the Earth.
Case C3
Transcription by eukaryotic RNA polymerases (Pols) II and III and ar-
chaeal Pol requires structurally related general transcription factors TFIIB,
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Brf1, and TFB, respectively, which are essential for polymerase recruit-
ment and initiation events. A TFIIB-like protein was not evident in the
Pol I basal transcription machinery. We report that TAF1B, a subunit
of human Pol I basal transcription factor SL1, is structurally related to
TFIIB/TFIIB-like proteins, through predicted amino-terminal zinc rib-
bon and cyclin-like fold domains. SL1, essential for Pol I recruitment
to the ribosomal RNA gene promoter, also has an essential postpoly-
merase recruitment role, operating through TAF1B. Therefore, a TFIIB-
related protein is implicated in preinitiation complex assembly and post-
polymerase recruitment events in Pol I transcription, underscoring the
parallels between eukaryotic Pol I, II, and III and archaeal transcription
machineries. (Naidu et al. 2011, p. 1640)
1. Evidence: kind – theory
The presence of a TFIIB-related protein in the Pol I of eukaryotes is further
evidence of the breadth of the parallels between eukaryotic Pol I, II, III, and
archaeal Pol in the theory of the machinery of transcription in models of Pol
I in eukaryotes.
is further evidence of
The presence the breadth
of a TFIIB-related protein of the parallels
between eukaryotic Pol I, II, III,
and archaeal Pol
in the theory
of the machinery
of transcription
in models
in the Pol I
of eukaryotes
of Pol I
in eukaryotes.
Case C4
During protein synthesis, the ribosome controls the movement of tRNA
and mRNA by means of large-scale structural rearrangements. We de-
scribe structures of the intact bacterial ribosome from Escherichia coli
that reveal how the ribosome binds tRNA in two functionally distinct
states, determined to a resolution of ∼3.2 angstroms by means of x-ray
crystallography. One state positions tRNA in the peptidyl-tRNA binding
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site. The second, a fully rotated state, is stabilized by ribosome recy-
cling factor and binds tRNA in a highly bent conformation in a hybrid
peptidyl/exit site. The structures help to explain how the ratchet-like
motion of the two ribosomal subunits contributes to the mechanisms of
translocation, termination, and ribosome recycling. (Dunkle et al. 2011,
p. 981)
1. Explanation: model – kind
The ratchet-like quality of the motion in models of the structures of the sub-
units of the ribosome explains in part multiple qualities of the translocation,
termination, and recycling of the ribosome.
explains in part
The ratchet-like quality multiple qualities
of the motion
in models
of the structures
of the subunits
of the translocation, termination,
and recycling
of the ribosome of the ribosome.
Case C5
The role of electrical synapses in synchronizing neuronal assemblies in the
adult mammalian brain is well documented. However, their role in learn-
ing and memory processes remains unclear. By combining Pavlovian fear
conditioning, activity-dependent immediate early gene expression, and in
vivo electrophysiology, we discovered that blocking neuronal gap junctions
within the dorsal hippocampus impaired context-dependent fear learning,
memory, and extinction. Theta rhythms in freely moving rats were also
disrupted. Our results show that gap junction-mediated neuronal trans-
mission is a prominent feature underlying emotional memories. (Bissiere
et al. 2011, p. 87)
1. Evidence: data – theory
Multiple qualities of the results of the study of emotional memories show the
prominence of gap junction-mediation in the theory of neuronal transmission
in models of emotional memories.
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show
Multiple qualities the prominence
of the results
of the study
of gap junction-mediation
in the theory
of neuronal transmission
in models
of emotional memories of emotional memories.
Case C6
Voltage- and store-operated calcium (Ca2+) channels are the major routes
of Ca2+ entry in mammalian cells, but little is known about how cells coor-
dinate the activity of these channels to generate coherent calcium signals.
We found that STIM1 (stromal interaction molecule 1), the main activa-
tor of store-operated Ca2+ channels, directly suppresses depolarization-
induced opening of the voltage-gated Ca2+ channel CaV1.2. STIM1 binds
to the C terminus of CaV1.2 through its Ca
2+ release-activated Ca2+ ac-
tivation domain, acutely inhibits gating, and causes long-term internal-
ization of the channel from the membrane. This establishes a previously
unknown function for STIM1 and provides a molecular mechanism to
explain the reciprocal regulation of these two channels in cells. (Park,
Shcheglovitov, and Dolmetsch 2010, p. 101)
1. Explanation: model – kind
Multiple qualities of the molecular mechanism of STIM1 in Ca2+ channels
explain the reciprocity of the regulation of voltage- and store-operated Ca2+
channels which are Ca2+ channels.
explain
Multiple qualities the reciprocity
of the molecular mechanism
of STIM1
of the regulation
of voltage- and store-operated
Ca2+ channels
in Ca2+ channels which are Ca2+ channels.
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Case C7
Newly exposed cave sediments at the Malapa site include a flowstone layer
capping the sedimentary unit containing the Australopithecus sediba fos-
sils. Uranium-lead dating of the flowstone, combined with paleomagnetic
and stratigraphic analysis of the flowstone and underlying sediments, pro-
vides a tightly constrained date of 1.977 ± 0.002 million years ago (Ma)
for these fossils. This refined dating suggests that Au. sediba from Malapa
predates the earliest uncontested evidence for Homo in Africa. (Pickering
et al. 2011, p. 1421)
(See also case B82.)
1. Evidence: data – entity
The earliness of the refined dates in the measurements of the fossils of Aus-
tralopithecus sediba in Africa suggests the predating of Homo by Australop-
ithecus sediba in Africa.
suggests
The earliness the predating
of the refined dates
in the measurements
of the fossils
of Homo
of Australopithecus sediba
in Africa
by Australopithecus sediba
in Africa.
Case C8
Catastrophic ecological regime shifts may be announced in advance by
statistical early warning signals such as slowing return rates from pertur-
bation and rising variance. The theoretical background for these indica-
tors is rich, but real-world tests are rare, especially for whole ecosystems.
We tested the hypothesis that these statistics would be early warning sig-
nals for an experimentally induced regime shift in an aquatic food web.
We gradually added top predators to a lake over 3 years to destabilize its
food web. An adjacent lake was monitored simultaneously as a reference
ecosystem. Warning signals of a regime shift were evident in the manipu-
lated lake during reorganization of the food web more than a year before
the food web transition was complete, corroborating theory for leading
indicators of ecological regime shifts. (Carpenter et al. 2011, p. 1079)
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1. Evidence: data – theory
The presence of warning signals of shifts in ecological regime in the observa-
tions of the manipulated lake which is an ecosystem corroborate multiple
qualities of the leading indicators in the theory of the shifts of ecological regimes
in models of ecosystems.
corroborate
The presence multiple qualities
of warning signals
of shifts
in ecological regime
in the observations
of the manipulated lake
of the leading indicators
in the theory
of the shifts
of ecological regimes
in models
which is an ecosystem of ecosystems.
Case C9
The Tammar wallaby (Macropus eugenii) harbors unique gut bacteria and
produces only one-fifth the amount of methane produced by ruminants per
unit of digestible energy intake. We have isolated a dominant bacterial
species (WG-1) from the wallaby microbiota affiliated with the family Suc-
cinivibrionaceae and implicated in lower methane emissions from starch-
containing diets. This was achieved by using a partial reconstruction
of the bacterium’s metabolism from binned metagenomic data (nitrogen
and carbohydrate utilization pathways and antibiotic resistance) to devise
cultivation-based strategies that produced axenic WG-1 cultures. Pure-
culture studies confirm that the bacterium is capnophilic and produces
succinate, further explaining a microbiological basis for lower methane
emissions from macropodids. This knowledge also provides new strategic
targets for redirecting fermentation and reducing methane production in
livestock. (Pope et al. 2011, p. 646)
1. Explanation: kind – kind
The capnophilic and succinate-producing qualities of the metabolism of the
Succinivibrionaceae bacterium WG-1 in Macropus eugenii which is a macropodid
explains the microbiological basis for lower methane emissions in macropodids.
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explains
The capnophilic and
succinate-producing qualities
the microbiological basis
of the metabolism
of the Succinivibrionaceae
bacterium WG-1
in Macropus eugenii
for lower methane emissions
which is a macropodid in macropodids.
Case C10
Cultivated beets (Beta vulgaris ssp.vulgaris) are unable to form reproduc-
tive shoots during the first year of their life cycle. Flowering only occurs
if plants get vernalized, that is, pass through the winter, and are subse-
quently exposed to an increasing day length (photoperiod) in spring. Here,
we show that the regulation of flowering time in beets is controlled by the
interplay of two paralogs of the FLOWERING LOCUS T (FT) gene in
Arabidopsis that have evolved antagonistic functions. BvFT2 is function-
ally conserved with FT and essential for flowering. In contrast, BvFT1
represses flowering and its down-regulation is crucial for the vernalization
response in beets. These data suggest that the beet has evolved a different
strategy relative to Arabidopsis and cereals to regulate vernalization. (Pin
et al. 2010, p. 1397)
The final sentence makes a “suggest” evidential claim, but I believe that the main
claim in the abstract is about the mechanism for vernalization in beets.
1. Explanation: model – kind
The repression of flowering in a model of the function of the BvFT1 gene in the
vernalization of Beta vulgaris explains multiple qualities of the vernalization
of Beta vulgaris.
explains
The repression multiple qualities
of flowering
in a model
of the function
of the BvFT1 gene
in the vernalization
of Beta vulgaris
of the vernalization
of Beta vulgaris.
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Case C11
Synaptic inhibition is based on both tonic and phasic release of the in-
hibitory transmitter γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA). Although phasic GABA
release arises from Ca2+-dependent exocytosis from neurons, the mecha-
nism of tonic GABA release is unclear. Here we report that tonic inhibi-
tion in the cerebellum is due to GABA being released from glial cells by
permeation through the Bestrophin 1 (Best1) anion channel. We demon-
strate that GABA directly permeates through Best1 to yield GABA re-
lease and that tonic inhibition is eliminated by silencing of Best1. Glial
cells express both GABA and Best1, and selective expression of Best1 in
glial cells, after preventing general expression of Best1, fully rescues tonic
inhibition. Our results identify a molecular mechanism for tonic inhibition
and establish a role for interactions between glia and neurons in mediating
tonic inhibition. (S. Lee et al. 2010, p. 790)
I believe that the main claim in this abstract is about the mechanism they describe,
made most clearly in the third sentence. (See also case A23.)
1. Explanation: model – kind
The release of GABA through the Best1 anion channel in a model of glial
cells in the cerebellum explains multiple qualities of tonic inhibition in the
cerebellum.
explains
The release multiple qualities
of GABA
through the Best1 anion channel
in a model
of glial cells
of tonic inhibition
in the cerebellum in the cerebellum.
Case C12
An International Polar Year aerogeophysical investigation of the high in-
terior of East Antarctica reveals widespread freeze-on that drives sub-
stantial mass redistribution at the bottom of the ice sheet. Although the
surface accumulation of snow remains the primary mechanism for ice sheet
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growth, beneath Dome A, 24% of the base by area is frozen-on ice. In
some places, up to half of the ice thickness has been added from below.
These ice packages result from the conductive cooling of water ponded
near the Gamburtsev Subglacial Mountain ridges and the supercooling of
water forced up steep valley walls. Persistent freeze-on thickens the ice
column, alters basal ice rheology and fabric, and upwarps the overlying ice
sheet, including the oldest atmospheric climate archive, and drives flow
behavior not captured in present models. (Bell et al. 2011, p. 1592)
1. Explanation: model – kind
The persistence of freeze-on in a model of ice columns causes the increase in
the thickness of the ice column.
causes
The persistence the increase
of freeze-on
in a model
in the thickness
of ice columns of the ice column.
2. Explanation: model – kind
The persistence of freeze-on in a model of ice columns causes alterations in
the rheology of the basal ice of the ice column.
causes
The persistence alterations
of freeze-on
in a model
in the rheology
of the basal ice
of ice columns of the ice column.
3. Explanation: model – kind
The persistence of freeze-on in a model of ice columns causes the upwarping
of the overlying ice sheet of the ice column.
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causes
The persistence the upwarping
of freeze-on
in a model
of the overlying ice sheet
of ice columns of the ice column.
4. Explanation: model – kind
The persistence of freeze-on in a model of ice columns explains multiple
qualities of the flow behaviour of the ice column.
explains
The persistence multiple qualities
of freeze-on
in a model
of the flow behaviour
of ice columns of the ice column.
Case C13
Circadian rhythms in mammals are generated by a feedback loop in which
the three PERIOD (PER) proteins, acting in a large complex, inhibit the
transcriptional activity of the CLOCK-BMAL1 dimer, which represses
their own expression. Although fundamental, the mechanism of negative
feedback in the mammalian clock, or any eukaryotic clock, is unknown. We
analyzed protein constituents of PER complexes purified from mouse tis-
sues and identified PSF (polypyrimidine tract-binding protein-associated
splicing factor). Our analysis indicates that PSF within the PER com-
plex recruits SIN3A, a scaffold for assembly of transcriptional inhibitory
complexes and that the PER complex thereby rhythmically delivers his-
tone deacetylases to the Per1 promoter, which repress Per1 transcription.
These findings provide a function for the PER complex and a molecu-
lar mechanism for circadian clock negative feedback. (Duong et al. 2011,
p. 1436)
1. Explanation: model – kind
Multiple qualities of the molecular mechanism of the PER protein complex
in the circadian clocks of mammals explain multiple qualities of the negative
feedback in the circadian clocks of mammals.
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explain
Multiple qualities multiple qualities
of the molecular mechanism
of the PER protein complex
of the negative feedback
in the circadian clocks
of mammals
in the circadian clocks
of mammals.
Case C14
Two laboratory and two randomized field experiments tested a psycho-
logical intervention designed to improve students’ scores on high-stakes
exams and to increase our understanding of why pressure-filled exam sit-
uations undermine some students’ performance. We expected that sitting
for an important exam leads to worries about the situation and its con-
sequences that undermine test performance. We tested whether having
students write down their thoughts about an upcoming test could improve
test performance. The intervention, a brief expressive writing assignment
that occurred immediately before taking an important test, significantly
improved students’ exam scores, especially for students habitually anxious
about test taking. Simply writing about one’s worries before a high-stakes
exam can boost test scores. (Ramirez and Beilock 2011, p. 211)
1. Explanation: kind – kind
The occurrence of writing about exam worries by students can cause a boost
in exam test scores for students.
can cause
The occurrence a boost
of writing about exam worries in exam test scores
by students for students.
Case C15
The Sun’s outer atmosphere, or corona, is heated to millions of degrees,
considerably hotter than its surface or photosphere. Explanations for this
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enigma typically invoke the deposition in the corona of nonthermal energy
generated by magnetoconvection. However, the coronal heating mecha-
nism remains unknown. We used observations from the Solar Dynamics
Observatory and the Hinode solar physics mission to reveal a ubiquitous
coronal mass supply in which chromospheric plasma in fountainlike jets or
spicules is accelerated upward into the corona, with much of the plasma
heated to temperatures between ∼0.02 and 0.1 million kelvin (MK) and
a small but sufficient fraction to temperatures above 1 MK. These ob-
servations provide constraints on the coronal heating mechanism(s) and
highlight the importance of the interface region between photosphere and
corona. (De Pontieu et al. 2011, p. 55)
(See also case B8.)
1. Evidence: data – theory
The range of values in the measurements of the temperature of chromospheric
plasma in the corona of the Sun provide constraints on the theory of the
heating in models of the corona of the Sun.
provide
The range constraints
of values
in the measurements
of the temperature
of chromospheric plasma
on the theory
of the heating
in models
in the corona
of the Sun
of the corona
of the Sun.
Case C16
The effects of a large igneous province on the concentration of atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide (PCO2) are mostly unknown. In this study, we esti-
mate PCO2 from stable isotopic values of pedogenic carbonates interbedded
with volcanics of the Central Atlantic Magmatic Province (CAMP) in the
Newark Basin, eastern North America. We find pre-CAMP PCO2 values
of ∼2000 parts per million (ppm), increasing to ∼4400 ppm immediately
after the first volcanic unit, followed by a steady decrease toward pre-
eruptive levels over the subsequent 300 thousand years, a pattern that is
repeated after the second and third flow units. We interpret each PCO2
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increase as a direct response to magmatic activity (primary outgassing
or contact metamorphism). The systematic decreases in PCO2 after each
magmatic episode probably reflect consumption of atmospheric CO2 by
weathering of silicates, stimulated by fresh CAMP volcanics. (Schaller,
Wright, and Kent 2011, p. 1404)
1. Evidence: data – theory
The systematic decreases in the measurements of PCO2 after episodes of vol-
canism in samples of the atmosphere of the Earth probably reflect the
consumption of CO2 in the theory of the weathering of silicates in models of
the effects of volcanism in the atmosphere of the Earth.
probably reflect
The systematic decreases the consumption
in the measurements
of PCO2
after episodes
of volcanism
in samples
of CO2
in the theory
of the weathering
of silicates
in models
of the effects
of volcanism
of the atmosphere
of the Earth
in the atmosphere
of the Earth.
Case C17
Nano-grained (NG) metals are believed to be strong but intrinsically brit-
tle: Free-standing NG metals usually exhibit a tensile uniform elongation
of a few percent. When a NG copper film is confined by a coarse-grained
(CG) copper substrate with a gradient grain-size transition, tensile plastic-
ity can be achieved in the NG film where strain localization is suppressed.
The gradient NG film exhibits a 10 times higher yield strength and a
tensile plasticity comparable to that of the CG substrate and can sustain
a tensile true strain exceeding 100% without cracking. A mechanically
driven grain boundary migration process with a substantial concomitant
grain growth dominates plastic deformation of the gradient NG structure.
The extraordinary intrinsic plasticity of gradient NG structures offers their
potential for use as advanced coatings of bulk materials. (Fang et al. 2011,
p. 1587)
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1. Explanation: kind – kind
The migration and growth of the boundary of the grain of the gradient NG
film explains in large part the plastic deformation of the structures of the
gradient NG film.
explains in large part
The migration and growth the plastic deformation
of the boundary
of the grain
of the structures
of the gradient NG film of the gradient NG film.
Case C18
One of the most intriguing features of some high-temperature cuprate
superconductors is the interplay between one-dimensional “striped” spin
order and charge order, and superconductivity. We used mid-infrared
femtosecond pulses to transform one such stripe-ordered compound, non-
superconducting La1.675Eu0.2Sr0.125CuO4, into a transient three-dimensional
superconductor. The emergence of coherent interlayer transport was evi-
denced by the prompt appearance of a Josephson plasma resonance in the
c-axis optical properties. An upper limit for the time scale needed to form
the superconducting phase is estimated to be 1 to 2 picoseconds, which is
significantly faster than expected. This places stringent new constraints
on our understanding of stripe order and its relation to superconductivity.
(Fausti et al. 2011, p. 189)
1. Evidence: data – theory
Multiple qualities of the measurements of the cuprate superconductor pro-
vide constraints on the order of the stripes in the theory of spin and charge
order in models of the cuprate superconductor.
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provide
Multiple qualities constraints
of the measurements on the order
of the stripes
in the theory
of spin and charge order
in models
of the cuprate superconductor of the cuprate superconductor.
Case C19
Transition metal complexes catalyze many important reactions that are
employed in medicine, materials science, and energy production. Al-
though high-throughput methods for the discovery of catalysts that would
mirror related approaches for the discovery of medicinally active com-
pounds have been the focus of much attention, these methods have not
been sufficiently general or accessible to typical synthetic laboratories to
be adopted widely. We report a method to evaluate a broad range of cat-
alysts for potential coupling reactions with the use of simple laboratory
equipment. Specifically, we screen an array of catalysts and ligands with a
diverse mixture of substrates and then use mass spectrometry to identify
reaction products that, by design, exceed the mass of any single substrate.
With this method, we discovered a copper-catalyzed alkyne hydroamina-
tion and two nickel-catalyzed hydroarylation reactions, each of which dis-
plays excellent functional-group tolerance. (Robbins and Hartwig 2011,
p. 1423)
1. Explanation: kind – entity
The effectiveness of the experimental method for the discovery of catalytic reac-
tions explains the ease of the discovery of copper-catalyzed alkyne hydroam-
ination and two nickel-catalyzed hydroarylation reactions which are catalytic
reactions.
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explains
The effectiveness the ease
of the experimental method
for the discovery
of the discovery
of copper-catalyzed alkyne
hydroamination and two
nickel-catalyzed
hydroarylation reactions
of catalytic reactions which are catalytic reactions.
Case C20
Deep-ocean carbonate ion concentrations ([CO 2−3 ]) and carbon isotopic
ratios (δ13C) place important constraints on past redistributions of carbon
in the ocean-land-atmosphere system and hence provide clues to the causes
of atmospheric CO2 concentration changes. However, existing deep-sea
[CO 2−3 ] reconstructions conflict with one another, complicating paleo-
ceanographic interpretations. Here, we present deep-sea [CO 2−3 ] for five
cores from the three major oceans quantified using benthic foraminiferal
boron/calcium ratios since the last glacial period. Combined benthic δ13C
and [CO 2−3 ] results indicate that deep-sea-released CO2 during the early
deglacial period (17.5 to 14.5 thousand years ago) was preferentially stored
in the atmosphere, whereas during the late deglacial period (14 to 10 thou-
sand years ago), besides contributing to the contemporary atmospheric
CO2 rise, a substantial portion of CO2 released from oceans was absorbed
by the terrestrial biosphere. (Yu et al. 2010, p. 1084)
1. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple qualities of the measurements of δ13C and [CO 2−3 ] in samples from
the deep-sea of the atmosphere in the early deglacial period of the Earth in-
dicate the preferential storage of deep-sea-released CO2 in the atmosphere in
the early deglacial period of the Earth.
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indicate
Multiple qualities the preferential storage
of the measurements
of δ13C and [CO 2−3 ]
in samples
from the deep-sea
of deep-sea-released CO2
of the atmosphere
in the early deglacial period
of the Earth
in the atmosphere
in the early deglacial period
of the Earth.
2. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple qualities of the measurements of δ13C and [CO 2−3 ] in samples from
the deep-sea of the atmosphere in the late deglacial period of the Earth indi-
cate the absorption of a substantial portion of deep-sea-released CO2 in the
terrestrial biosphere in the late deglacial period of the Earth.
indicate
Multiple qualities the absorption
of the measurements
of δ13C and [CO 2−3 ]
in samples
from the deep-sea
of the atmosphere
of a substantial portion
of deep-sea-released CO2
in the terrestrial biosphere
in the late deglacial period
of the Earth
in the late deglacial period
of the Earth.
Case C21
Chronic mucocutaneous candidiasis disease (CMCD) is characterized by
recurrent or persistent infections of the skin, nails, and oral and genital
mucosae caused by Candida albicans and, to a lesser extent, Staphylococ-
cus aureus, in patients with no other infectious or autoimmune manifesta-
tions. We report two genetic etiologies of CMCD: autosomal recessive de-
ficiency in the cytokine receptor, interleukin-17 receptor A (IL-17RA), and
autosomal dominant deficiency of the cytokine interleukin-17F (IL-17F).
IL-17RA deficiency is complete, abolishing cellular responses to IL-17A
and IL-17F homo- and heterodimers. By contrast, IL-17F deficiency is
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partial, with mutant IL-17F-containing homo- and heterodimers display-
ing impaired, but not abolished, activity. These experiments of nature
indicate that human IL-17A and IL-17F are essential for mucocutaneous
immunity against C. albicans, but otherwise largely redundant. (Puel et
al. 2011, p. 65)
The main explanatory claim here is about the two genetic etiologies for CMCD.
1. Explanation: theory – kind
The autosomal recessive deficiency of the cytokine receptor, interleukin-17 re-
ceptor A in the theory of cellular responses to IL-17A and IL-17F homo- and
heterodimers in models of chronic mucocutaneous candidiasis disease causes
the occurrence of infections in chronic mucocutaneous candidiasis disease.
causes
The autosomal recessive deficiency the occurrence
of the cytokine receptor,
interleukin-17 receptor A
in the theory
of cellular responses
to IL-17A and IL-17F homo- and
heterodimers
in models
of infections
of chronic mucocutaneous
candidiasis disease
in chronic mucocutaneous
candidiasis disease.
Case C22
We present a high-resolution magnesium/calcium proxy record of Holocene
sea surface temperature (SST) from off the west coast of Baja California
Sur, Mexico, a region where interannual SST variability is dominated
today by the influence of the El Nin˜o-Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Tem-
peratures were lowest during the early to middle Holocene, consistent with
documented eastern equatorial Pacific cooling and numerical model simu-
lations of orbital forcing into a La Nin˜a-like state at that time. The early
Holocene SSTs were also characterized by millennial-scale fluctuations
that correlate with cosmogenic nuclide proxies of solar variability, with
inferred solar minima corresponding to El Nin˜o-like (warm) conditions, in
apparent agreement with the theoretical “ocean dynamical thermostat”
response of ENSO to exogenous radiative forcing. (Marchitto et al. 2010,
p. 1378)
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1. Evidence: entity – theory
The millennial-scale and correlations with solar variability of the fluctuations
of the temperatures of the surfaces of the seas off Baja California Sur, Mexico
in the Holocene era which is a sea are in apparent agreement with
multiple qualities of the theory of the “ocean dynamical thermostat” response
of ENSO to exogenous radiative forcing in models of the fluctuations of the
temperatures of the surfaces of seas.
are in apparent agreement with
The millennial-scale and
correlations with solar
variability
multiple qualities
of the fluctuations
of the temperatures
of the surfaces
of the seas
off Baja California Sur, Mexico
in the Holocene era
of the theory
of the “ocean dynamical
thermostat” response
of ENSO
to exogenous radiative forcing
in models
of the fluctuations
of the temperatures
of the surfaces
which is a sea of seas.
Case C23
Large earthquakes produce crustal deformation that can be quantified by
geodetic measurements, allowing for the determination of the slip distri-
bution on the fault. We used data from Global Positioning System (GPS)
networks in Central Chile to infer the static deformation and the kine-
matics of the 2010 moment magnitude (Mw) 8.8 Maule megathrust earth-
quake. From elastic modeling, we found a total rupture length of ∼500
kilometers where slip (up to 15 meters) concentrated on two main asperi-
ties situated on both sides of the epicenter. We found that rupture reached
shallow depths, probably extending up to the trench. Resolvable afterslip
occurred in regions of low coseismic slip. The low-frequency hypocenter
is relocated 40 kilometers southwest of initial estimates. Rupture prop-
agated bilaterally at about 3.1 kilometers per second, with possible but
not fully resolved velocity variations. (Simons et al. 2011, p. 1421)
231
This is a rare case of an abstract in which the authors are mainly describing the data
they collected about an event.
1. Evidence: data – entity
Multiple qualities of geodetic measurements from the networks of the GPS
system in Central Chile show multiple qualities of the 2010 moment mag-
nitude (Mw) 8.8 Maule megathrust earthquake in Central Chile.
show
Multiple qualities multiple qualities
of geodetic measurements
from the networks
of the GPS system
of the 2010 moment magnitude
(Mw) 8.8 Maule
megathrust earthquake
in Central Chile in Central Chile.
Case C24
Seismic discontinuities in Earth typically arise from structural, chemical,
or temperature variations with increasing depth. The pressure-induced
iron spin state transition in the lower mantle may influence seismic wave
velocities by changing the elasticity of iron-bearing minerals, but no seis-
mological evidence of an anomaly exists. Inelastic x-ray scattering mea-
surements on (Mg0.83Fe0.17)O-ferropericlase at pressures across the spin
transition show effects limited to the only shear moduli of the elastic
tensor. This explains the absence of deviation in the aggregate seismic
velocities and, thus, the lack of a one-dimensional seismic signature of the
spin crossover. The spin state transition does, however, influence shear
anisotropy of ferropericlase and should contribute to the seismic shear
wave anisotropy of the lower mantle. (Antonangeli et al. 2011, p. 64)
1. Explanation: kind – kind
The limitation to the shear moduli of the elastic tensor of pressure-induced spin
state transitions in iron explains the absence of deviation in the aggregate of
seismic velocities in iron.
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explains
The limitation the absence
to the shear moduli
of the elastic tensor
of pressure-induced spin state
transitions
of deviation
in the aggregate
of seismic velocities
in iron in iron.
2. Explanation: kind – data
The limitation to the shear moduli of the elastic tensor of pressure-induced
spin state transitions in iron explains the lack of a one-dimensional seismic
signature on measurements of a sample of iron.
explains
The limitation the lack
to the shear moduli
of the elastic tensor
of pressure-induced spin state
transitions
of a one-dimensional seismic
signature
on measurements
of a sample
in iron of iron.
Case C25
Vernalization is an environmentally-induced epigenetic switch in which
winter cold triggers epigenetic silencing of floral repressors and thus pro-
vides competence to flower in spring. In Arabidopsis, winter cold triggers
enrichment of tri-methylated histone H3 Lys27 at chromatin of the floral
repressor, FLOWERING LOCUS C (FLC), and results in epigenetically
stable repression of FLC. This epigenetic change is mediated by an evo-
lutionarily conserved repressive complex, polycomb repressive complex 2
(PRC2). Here, we show that a long intronic noncoding RNA [termed
COLD ASSISTED INTRONIC NONCODING RNA (COLDAIR)] is re-
quired for the vernalization-mediated epigenetic repression of FLC. COLDAIR
physically associates with a component of PRC2 and targets PRC2 to
FLC. Our results show that COLDAIR is required for establishing stable
repressive chromatin at FLC through its interaction with PRC2. (Heo
and Sung 2011, p. 76)
233
1. Explanation: model – kind
Multiple qualities of COLDAIR in the model of interaction with PCR2 in
vernalization in Arabidopsis explain the stability of the repressive chromatin
at FLC in vernalization in Arabidopsis.
explain
Multiple qualities the stability
of COLDAIR
in the model
of interaction
with PCR2
of the repressive chromatin
at FLC
in vernalization
in Arabidopsis
in vernalization
in Arabidopsis.
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Appendix B
Appendix B: Code Listings
These programs were written in the Python 2.7 programming language using the
standard library and these third-party libraries:
• Natural Language Toolkit (nltk) version 2.0.1rc1 (http://www.nltk.org).
• Numeric Python (numpy) version 1.5.1 (http://numpy.scipy.org).
• matplotlib (pylab) version 1.1.0 (http://matplotlib.sourceforge.net).
• BeautifulSoup version 3.2.0
(http://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup/).
B.1 Articles
File: articles.py
from BeautifulSoup import BeautifulSoup
import codecs, os, re, string, pickle, unicodedata
import nltk
# Set the data directory
datadir = '/Users/james/Documents/School/Philosophy/PhDThesis/Thesis/data/'
# Normalize the whitespace in the content of an HTML paragraph.
def cleanParagraph(p):
texts = p.findAll(text=True)
output = ''.join(texts).strip()
output = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', output)
return output
# Convert some HTML to LaTeX.
def cleanLine(p):
texts = []
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for c in p.contents:
if c.__class__.__name__ == 'NavigableString':
texts.append(c)
elif c.name == u'em':
texts.append(r"\emph{%s}" % c.string)
elif c.name == u'sup':
texts.append(r"$ˆ{%s}$" % c.string)
elif c.name == u'sub':
texts.append(r"$_{%s}$" % c.string)
else:
pass
output = ''.join(texts).strip()
output = re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', output)
output = re.sub(u'\u03b1', r'$\\alpha$', output)
output = re.sub(u'\u03b4', r'$\\delta$', output)
output = re.sub(u'\u03B6', r'$\\zeta$', output)
return output
def cleanAuthor(p):
return "{%s}" % cleanLine(p)
def makeCiteKey(last_name, year, letter=''):
output = unicodedata.normalize('NFKD',
last_name).encode('ascii', 'ignore') + year + letter
return re.sub('}', '', output)
# Match certain tricky content.
def finder(doc, regex, nodeid):
match = re.search(regex,
doc.find('span', nodeid).string.strip()
)
if match:
return match.group(0)
else:
return ''
# Extract article data from a Science HTML page.
def parseScienceReport(html):
d = BeautifulSoup(html)
# A list of author names
authors = map(lambda n: n.string.strip(), d.findAll('a', 'name-search')) + \
map(cleanAuthor, d.findAll('span', 'collab'))
year = finder(d, r'\d{4}', 'slug-pub-date')
last_name = authors[0].split()[-1]
cite_key = makeCiteKey(last_name, year)
# The field of science -- this selector is fragile.
science = d.find(text='More in Collections').findNext('a').string.strip()
paragraphs = d.find('h1', {'id':'article-title-1'}).findNextSiblings('p')
cleanParagraphs = [cleanParagraph(p) for p in paragraphs]
abstract = cleanParagraph(d.find('div', 'abstract').p)
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body = u'\n\n'.join(cleanParagraphs)
content = u'\n\n\n'.join([abstract, body])
article = {
'journal': 'Science',
# The format is either 'Report' or 'Research Article'
'format': d.find('ul', 'subject-headings').li.string.strip(),
'title': cleanLine(d.find('h1', {'id':'article-title-1'})),
'doi': d.find('span', 'slug-doi').string.strip(),
'volume': finder(d, r'\d+', 'slug-vol'),
'number': finder(d, r'\d+', 'slug-issue'),
'pages': finder(d, r'\d+-\d+', 'slug-pages'),
'year': year,
'cite_key': cite_key,
'authors': authors,
'authorLine': ', '.join(authors),
'science': science,
'keywords': [science],
'abstract': abstract,
'body': body,
'content': content
}
return article
# Generate a plain text version of the article.
def formatArticle(article):
return u'''%(journal)s %(format)s %(doi)s
%(title)s
%(authorLine)s
Keywords: %(keywords)s
Abstract: %(abstract)s
%(body)s
''' % article
# Generate a BibTeX entry for the article.
def formatBibTeX(article):
article['bibtex_authors'] = ' and '.join(article['authors'])
return """@article{%(cite_key)s,
Author = {%(bibtex_authors)s},
Title = {%(title)s},
Journal = {Science},
Publisher = {American Association for the Advancement of Science},
Volume = {%(volume)s},
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Number = {%(number)s},
Pages = {%(pages)s},
Year = {%(year)s}}""" % article
# Load a stored article or parse it from HTML.
def loadArticle(basename, refresh=False):
# If the file has already been parsed and pickled, just load it
p = os.path.join(datadir, 'pickle', '%s.pickle' % basename)
if os.path.exists(p) and not refresh:
f = open(p, 'r')
article = pickle.load(f)
f.close()
return article
print 'Parsing article %s' % basename
# Read the HTML
f = open(os.path.join(datadir, 'html', '%s.html' % basename), 'r')
html = f.read()
f.close()
# Parse it
article = parseScienceReport(html)
article['basename'] = basename
# Spit it out as text
f = codecs.open(os.path.join(
datadir, 'text', '%s.txt' % basename), 'w', 'utf-8')
f.write(formatArticle(article))
f.close()
storeArticle(article, basename)
return article
# Store the data object for later use
def storeArticle(article, basename):
f = open(os.path.join(
datadir, 'pickle', '%s.pickle' % basename), 'w')
pickle.dump(article, f)
f.close()
# Load the full set of Science articles.
def loadArticles(refresh=False):
articles = []
cite_keys = {}
for fullname in os.listdir(os.path.join(datadir, 'html')):
path, filename = os.path.split(fullname)
basename, extension = os.path.splitext(filename)
if not basename.startswith('science'):
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continue
article = loadArticle(basename, refresh)
# Ensure the cite_key is unique.
key_count = 0
while article['cite_key'] in cite_keys:
key_count += 1
base = article['cite_key'].split('-')[0]
article['cite_key'] = base +'-'+ str(key_count)
if key_count > 0:
storeArticle(article, basename)
print ' New cite_key %s' % article['cite_key']
cite_keys[article['cite_key']] = article
articles.append(article)
return articles
# Break the article content into words and sentences.
def tokenize(article):
if not 'sentences' in article:
article['sentences'] = [nltk.word_tokenize(s) for s in
nltk.sent_tokenize(article['content'])]
if not 'words' in article:
article['words'] = []
for s in article['sentences']: article['words'].extend(s)
return article
# Generate a complete BibTeX file.
def generateBibTeX():
articles = loadArticles()
results = [formatBibTeX(a) for a in articles]
output = u'\n\n\n'.join(results)
f = codecs.open(os.path.join(
datadir, '..', 'build', 'articles.bib'), 'w', 'utf-8')
f.write(output)
f.close()
B.2 Keywords
File: keywords.py
from __future__ import division
import os, pickle
import pylab
from articles import loadArticles
sortedKeywords = [
u'Computers, Mathematics',
u'Physics',
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u'Physics, Applied',
u'Chemistry',
u'Materials Science',
u'Engineering',
u'Astronomy',
u'Planetary Science',
u'Geochemistry, Geophysics',
u'Atmospheric Science',
u'Oceanography',
u'Biochemistry',
u'Molecular Biology',
u'Microbiology',
u'Cell Biology',
u'Genetics',
u'Development',
u'Evolution',
u'Ecology',
u'Botany',
u'Paleontology',
u'Anatomy, Morphology, Biomechanics',
u'Physiology',
u'Virology',
u'Immunology',
u'Medicine, Diseases',
u'Epidemiology',
u'Neuroscience',
u'Psychology',
u'Sociology',
u'Economics',
u'Anthropology',
u'Education',
]
# Count the number of articles by keyword
def loadKeywords(filename='keywords.pickle', articles=loadArticles()):
# Either load the stored data...
if os.path.exists(filename):
f = open(filename, 'r')
keywords, labels, counts = pickle.load(f)
f.close()
# Or generate the keyword data.
else:
#keywords = sorted(set([a['science'] for a in articles]))
keywords = sortedKeywords
counts = {}
for keyword in keywords:
counts[keyword] = len([a for a in articles if a['science'] == keyword])
# Make a list of labels that is slightly modified.
labels = [x for x in keywords]
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index = labels.index(u'Anatomy, Morphology, Biomechanics')
labels[index] = u'Anatomy, Biomechanics'
if filename:
f = open(filename, 'w')
pickle.dump((keywords, labels, counts), f)
f.close()
return keywords, labels, counts
# Generate a plot of values for each keyword.
def plotKeywords(filename, title, values, average=None):
if os.path.exists(filename):
return False
keywords, labels, counts = loadKeywords()
length = len(labels)
indices = range(length)
# Generate a barplot of the number of articles by frequency.
fig = pylab.figure(figsize=(10,5))
fig.subplots_adjust(left=0.10, right=0.96, bottom=0.5, top=0.96)
ax = fig.add_subplot(1,1,1)
ax.bar(indices, values, align='center', facecolor='#cccccc')
if average != None:
cover = [-1,length+1]
ax.plot(cover, [average for x in cover], color='black', linestyle='-', lw=2)
ax.set_ylabel(title)
ax.set_xlim(-1, length)
ax.set_xticks(indices)
ax.set_xticklabels(labels, rotation='vertical')
fig.savefig(filename)
pylab.close()
return True
B.3 Terms
File: terms.py
from __future__ import division
import os
import pylab
explainTerms = ['explain', 'explains', 'explained', 'explaining',
'explainable', 'explanation', 'explanations', 'unexplained',
'unexplainable', 'explicate', 'explicates', 'explicated',
'explicable', 'inexplicable']
becauseTerms = ['because']
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evidenceTerms = ['evidence', 'evident', 'evidential']
showTerms = ['show', 'shows', 'showed', 'shown', 'showing']
searchTerms = [
('explain', explainTerms),
('because', becauseTerms),
('reason', ['reason', 'reasons', 'reasoning']),
('account', ['account', 'accounts', 'accounted', 'accounting']),
('understand', ['understand', 'understands', 'understood', 'understanding']),
('evidence', evidenceTerms),
('show', showTerms),
('discover', ['discover', 'discovers', 'discovered', 'discovering',
'discovery', 'discoveries']),
('reveal', ['reveal', 'reveals', 'revealed', 'revealing']),
('suggest', ['suggest', 'suggests', 'suggested', 'suggesting']),
('implication', ['imply', 'implies', 'implied', 'implying', 'implication',
'implications']),
('indicate', ['indicate', 'indicates', 'indicated', 'indicating']),
('confirm', ['confirm', 'confirms', 'confirmed', 'confirming']),
('establish', ['establish', 'establishes', 'established', 'establishing']),
('cause', ['cause', 'causes', 'caused', 'causing', 'causal',
'causation']),
('theory', ['theory', 'theories', 'theoretical']),
('law', ['law', 'laws', 'lawful']),
('mechanism', ['mechanism', 'mechanisms']),
('model', ['model', 'models', 'modelled', 'modelling']),
('phenomena', ['phenomena', 'phenomenon']),
('effect', ['effect', 'effects'])
]
terms = [x[0] for x in searchTerms]
# Generate a plot of values for each term.
def plotTerms(filename, title, values, percent=''):
if os.path.exists(filename):
return False
length = len(terms)
indices = range(length)
# Generate a barplot of the number of articles by frequency.
fig = pylab.figure(figsize=(8,4))
fig.subplots_adjust(left=0.10, right=0.90, bottom=0.3, top=0.96)
ax = fig.add_subplot(1,1,1)
ax.bar(indices, values, align='center', facecolor='#cccccc')
ax.set_ylabel(title)
if percent:
ax2 = ax.twinx()
ax2.set_ylabel(percent)
ax2.set_ylim(0, 100)
ax.set_ylim(0, 781)
ax.set_xlim(-1, length)
ax.set_xticks(indices)
ax.set_xticklabels(terms, rotation='vertical')
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fig.savefig(filename)
pylab.close()
return True
B.4 Frequencies
File: frequencies.py
from __future__ import division
import os, pickle
import nltk
from articles import loadArticles, tokenize
from terms import searchTerms
# Get frequencies for all search terms.
def searchTermsFrequencies(terms, articles):
frequencies = {}
for item in terms:
title, group = item
frequencies[title] = groupFrequencies(group, articles)
return frequencies
# Get frequencies for the words in this group.
def groupFrequencies(group, articles):
articlesByKeyword = nltk.defaultdict(int)
tokensByKeyword = nltk.defaultdict(int)
for article in articles:
# Break the content into words and sentences
# then get the frequency distribution.
tokenize(article)
article['wordsFD'] = nltk.FreqDist(
word.lower() for word in article['words'])
# Count the words of interest
keyword = article['science']
fd = article['wordsFD']
atLeastOne = False
for word in group:
if fd[word] > 0:
tokensByKeyword[keyword] += fd[word]
atLeastOne = True
if atLeastOne:
articlesByKeyword[keyword] += 1
numberOfArticles = len(articles)
totalArticles = sum(articlesByKeyword[k] for k in articlesByKeyword.keys())
totalTokens = sum(tokensByKeyword[k] for k in tokensByKeyword.keys())
return {
'articles': {
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'keywords': articlesByKeyword,
'total': totalArticles,
'percent': 100 * totalArticles / numberOfArticles
},
'tokens': {
'keywords': tokensByKeyword,
'total': totalTokens,
'average': totalTokens / numberOfArticles
}
}
def loadFrequencies(filename='frequencies.pickle', terms=searchTerms,
articles=loadArticles()):
# Either load the stored data...
if filename and os.path.exists(filename):
f = open(filename, 'r')
frequencies = pickle.load(f)
f.close()
# Or generate the data.
else:
frequencies = searchTermsFrequencies(searchTerms, articles)
frequencies['numberOfArticles'] = len(articles)
frequencies['numberOfWords'] = \
sum(len(article['words']) for article in articles)
# Store the data.
if filename:
f = open(filename, 'w')
pickle.dump(frequencies, f)
f.close()
return frequencies
B.5 Genres
File: genres.py
from __future__ import division
import os, pickle
import nltk, pylab
from terms import searchTerms
genreSearchTerms = searchTerms
genreTerms = [x[0] for x in genreSearchTerms]
corpusNames = ['Science', 'Gutenberg', 'Reuters']
corpusColors = {
'Science': '#cccccc',
'Gutenberg': '#777777',
'Reuters': '#333333'
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}# Get the word frequencies by genre.
def loadGenres(filename='genres.pickle'):
# Either load the stored data...
if filename and os.path.exists(filename):
f = open(filename, 'r')
genres = pickle.load(f)
f.close()
# Or generate the genres data.
else:
from nltk.corpus import gutenberg
from nltk.corpus import reuters
from frequencies import loadFrequencies
frequencies = loadFrequencies()
# Assemble the Science frequency data.
genres = {
'Science': {'words': frequencies['numberOfWords']}
}
for term in genreTerms:
count = frequencies[term]['tokens']['total']
freq = 1000000 * count / frequencies['numberOfWords']
genres['Science'][term] = {
'count': count,
'frequency': freq
}
# Get the data for the other corpora.
corpora = {
'Gutenberg': gutenberg,
'Reuters': reuters
}
for corpus in corpusNames[1:]:
words = corpora[corpus].words()
fd = nltk.FreqDist(word.lower() for word in words)
genres[corpus] = {
'words': len(words),
}
for item in genreSearchTerms:
title, group = item
count = sum(fd[word] for word in group)
freq = 1000000 * count / len(words)
genres[corpus][title] = {
'count': count,
'frequency': freq
}
# Store the data.
if filename:
f = open(filename, 'w')
pickle.dump(genres, f)
f.close()
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return genres
def plotGenres(filename, title='Tokens per Million Words'):
if os.path.exists(filename):
return False
genres = loadGenres()
labels = []
values = []
colors = []
for term in genreTerms:
for corpus in corpusNames:
labels.append('%s "%s"' % (corpus.capitalize(), term))
values.append(genres[corpus][term]['frequency'])
colors.append(corpusColors[corpus])
labels.append('space')
values.append(0)
colors.append('blue')
length = len(labels) - 1
indices = range(length)
# Generate a barplot of the token frequency.
# More complicated than usual because I want the bars to be different colours.
fig = pylab.figure(figsize=(8,4))
fig.subplots_adjust(left=0.10, right=0.96, bottom=0.3, top=0.96)
ax = fig.add_subplot(1,1,1)
bars = []
for i in indices:
bars.append(
ax.bar([i], values[i], align='center', facecolor=colors[i]))
ax.legend(bars[0:len(corpusNames)], corpusNames, loc=1)
ax.set_ylabel(title)
ax.set_xlim(-1, length)
ax.set_xticks([(x*4+1) for x in range(len(genreTerms))])
ax.set_xticklabels(genreTerms, rotation='vertical')
fig.savefig(filename)
pylab.close()
return True
B.6 N-Grams
File: ngrams.py
from __future__ import division
import os, pickle
import nltk
from articles import loadArticles, tokenize
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ngramRange = range(2,6)
ngramTerms = [
['explain', 'explained'],
['show']
]
bases = ['explain', 'be explained', 'show']
modals = ['may','can','could']
phrases = []
for modal in modals:
for base in bases:
phrases.append(' '.join([modal, base]))
phrases.append(' '.join([modal, 'not', base]))
# Test whether a word is in a list of words
def test(t):
for term in ngramTerms[0]:
if term in t: return True
return False
# Get the n-grams
def loadNGrams(filename='ngrams.pickle', articles=loadArticles()):
# Either load the stored data...
if os.path.exists(filename):
f = open(filename, 'r')
ngrams, ngramTermCounts, ngramPhraseCounts = pickle.load(f)
f.close()
# Or generate the n-gram data.
else:
# Count the total number of ngramTerms and phrases
ngramTermCounts = nltk.defaultdict(int)
ngramPhraseCounts = nltk.defaultdict(int)
for article in articles:
tokenize(article)
for sentence in article['sentences']:
# Join the words with normalized spaces so we can match phrases.
sent = ' '.join(word.lower() for word in sentence)
for phrase in phrases:
if phrase in sent: ngramPhraseCounts[phrase] += 1
for word in sentence:
for terms in ngramTerms:
if word.lower() in terms: ngramTermCounts[terms[0]] +=1
# Count the n-grams including the ngramTerms
ngrams = {}
for n in ngramRange:
ngrams[n] = []
for article in articles:
for sentence in article['sentences']:
words = [w.lower() for w in sentence]
if not test(words): continue
ngrams[n].extend(
t for t in nltk.util.ngrams(words,n) if test(t))
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# Store the data.
if filename:
f = open(filename, 'w')
pickle.dump((ngrams, ngramTermCounts, ngramPhraseCounts), f)
f.close()
return ngrams, ngramTermCounts, ngramPhraseCounts
B.7 Positions
File: positions.py
from __future__ import division
import os, pickle
import nltk, pylab
from articles import loadArticles, tokenize
from terms import searchTerms
# Get the index at which a word occurs in a list of words.
def getIndices(word, words):
indices = []
for i in range(0,len(words)):
if word.lower() == words[i].lower():
# return an index as a proportion of the article length
indices.append(i / len(words))
return indices
# Get the indices for a set of terms.
def searchTermsPositions(terms, articles):
positions = {}
for item in terms:
title, group = item
positions[title] = groupPositions(group, articles)
return positions
# Get the indices for a list of words.
def groupPositions(group, articles):
positions = []
for article in articles:
tokenize(article)
words = article['words']
# Count the words of interest
for word in group:
positions.extend(getIndices(word, words))
return positions
# Get the positions data.
def loadPositions(filename='positions.pickle', terms=searchTerms,
articles=loadArticles()):
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# Either load stored data...
if os.path.exists(filename):
f = open(filename, 'r')
positions = pickle.load(f)
f.close()
# Or generate the position data.
else:
positions = searchTermsPositions(terms, articles)
# Store the data.
if filename:
f = open(filename, 'w')
pickle.dump(positions, f)
f.close()
return positions
# Plot the positions as a histogram
def plotPositions(filename, data, ymax=0):
if os.path.exists(filename):
return False
fig = pylab.figure(figsize=(8,3))
fig.subplots_adjust(left=0.10, right=0.96, bottom=0.15, top=0.96)
ax = fig.add_subplot(1,1,1)
ax.set_ylabel('Tokens at Position')
ax.set_xlabel('Position in Article')
ax.hist(data, bins=20, range=[0,1], facecolor='#cccccc')
if ymax > 0: ax.set_ylim(0, ymax)
fig.savefig(filename)
pylab.close()
return True
B.8 Samples
File: samples.py
from __future__ import division
import os, codecs, re, random, subprocess
import nltk
from articles import datadir, loadArticles
# Set the data directory
sampledir = '/Users/james/Documents/School/Philosophy/PhDThesis/Thesis/'
pattern = re.compile(r'\b(explain|explains|explained)\b',
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE)
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articles = []
# Select a random article; collect all matching sentences;
# return a random matching sentence.
def sampleA():
global articles
while True:
sentences = []
article = random.choice(articles)
for sentence in article['full_sentences']:
if pattern.search(sentence):
sentences.append(sentence)
if len(sentences) > 0:
return (article, random.choice(sentences))
# Select a random article and return a random sentence.
def sampleB():
global articles
article = random.choice(articles)
return (article, random.choice(article['full_sentences']))
# Select a random article and return its abstract.
def sampleC():
global articles
article = random.choice(articles)
return (article, article['abstract'])
methods = {
'A': sampleA,
'B': sampleB,
'C': sampleC
}
# Collect a sample using the method provided and save it to a text file.
def generateSample(method, limit=25):
global sampledir, articles, methods
articles = loadArticles()
for article in articles:
if not 'full_sentences' in article:
article['full_sentences'] = nltk.sent_tokenize(article['content'])
samples = []
results = []
while len(samples) < limit:
article, sample = methods[method]()
# Sample without replacement
if sample in samples: continue
else: samples.append(sample)
metadata = [
'%s%i' % (method, len(samples)),
article['doi'],
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article['basename'],
'000'
]
results.append(' '.join(metadata) +'\n\n'+ sample)
file = codecs.open(os.path.join(sampledir, 'A-Sample%s.txt' % method),
'a', 'utf-8')
file.write('\n\nfailure: todo\n\n********************\n\n'.join(results))
file.close()
B.9 Cases
File: cases.py
from __future__ import division
import os, codecs, re, copy
import nltk
from articles import loadArticle
caseSplitter = re.compile(r'\s+\*{20}\s+', re.MULTILINE)
blockSplitter = re.compile(r'\s*\n\s*\n\s*', re.MULTILINE)
categories = ['data', 'entity', 'kind', 'model', 'theory']
types = [
('theory', ['theory']),
('model', ['model', 'mechanism']),
('entity', ['!', 'sample', 'specimen']),
('data', ['data', 'measurements', 'observations', 'results', 'images'])
]
highlight = ['theory',
'models', 'model', 'mechanisms', 'mechanism',
'samples', 'sample', 'specimens', 'specimen',
'data', 'measurements', 'observations', 'results', 'images']
# Parse a series of cases from a file.
def parseCases(filename):
f = codecs.open(filename, 'r', 'utf-8')
content = f.read()
f.close()
cases = caseSplitter.split(content)
results = []
for case in cases:
results.append(parseCase(case))
return results
# Parse a single case from its text representation.
def parseCase(content):
blocks = blockSplitter.split(content.strip())
header = blocks.pop(0).strip()
try:
label, doi, basename, page = header.split()
except:
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print "Bad Header:", header
raise
quotation = blocks.pop(0)
if blocks[0].startswith('type: '):
notes = ''
else:
notes = blocks.pop(0)
try:
explanations = parseExplanations(blocks)
explanations[0]['type']
except:
print "Exception when parsing case", label
raise
return {
'label': label,
'basename': basename,
'article': loadArticle(basename),
'quotation': quotation,
'page': page,
'notes': notes,
'explanations': explanations,
'success': explanations[0]['type'] != 'failure',
'content': content
}
# Parse a block of explanations for a case.
def parseExplanations(blocks):
explanations = []
for i in range(len(blocks)):
block = blocks[i]
try:
explanations.append(parseExplanation(block))
except:
print "Exception when parsing explanation %s" % (i+1)
raise
return explanations
# Parse a single explanation for a case.
# This can be a little tricky.
def parseExplanation(block):
output = {
'type': '',
'phrase': '',
'relation': '',
'notes': '',
'explanans': {
'type': '',
'top' : [],
'core': [],
'base': []
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},
'explanandum': {
'type': '',
'top' : [],
'core': [],
'base': []
}
}
lines = block.splitlines()
line = lines.pop(0)
if line.startswith('type: ') and line[6:] in \
['failure', 'explanation', 'evidence']:
output['type'] = line[6:]
else:
raise ValueError("The first line of an explanation block must "+ \
" provide the type. This one is invalid: ", line)
if len(lines) and lines[0].startswith('failure: '):
output['failure'] = lines.pop(0)[9:].strip()
if len(lines) and lines[0].startswith('phrase: '):
output['phrase'] = lines.pop(0)[8:].strip()
if len(lines) and lines[0].startswith('notes: '):
output['notes'] = lines.pop(0)[7:].strip()
# The error handling makes this code uglier.
x = 'explanans'
y = 'top'
for line in lines:
if y == 'top':
if line.startswith('>'):
raise ValueError("Extra base marker somewhere.")
output[x][y].append(line)
y = 'core'
continue
if y == 'core':
if line.startswith('='):
raise ValueError("Missing base marker in explanans.")
if line.startswith('>'):
y = 'base'
else:
if not output[x]['type']:
t = getType(line)
if t != '':
output[x]['type'] = t
output[x][y].append(line)
continue
if y == 'base':
if line.startswith('='):
if x == 'explanandum':
raise ValueError("Too many lines beginning with '='.")
output['relation'] = line
x = 'explanandum'
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y = 'top'
else:
if not output[x]['type']:
t = getType(line)
if t != '':
output[x]['type'] = t
output[x][y].append(line)
continue
raise ValueError("Malformed explanation block: " + line)
if len(lines) and x != 'explanandum' and y != 'base':
raise ValueError("Malformed explanation block: " + line)
if len(output['explanans']['base']) != len(output['explanandum']['base']):
raise ValueError("Mismatched bases.")
for x in ['explanans', 'explanandum']:
if not output[x]['type']:
output[x]['type'] = 'kind'
if not output['phrase']:
output['phrase'] = output['relation'][2:] # strip '=' from relation
return output
# Figure out the type of an explanans or explanandum from its annotation.
def getType(line):
for t in types:
label, words = t
for word in words:
if word in line:
return label
return ''
# Format an item in an explanation as LaTeX.
def formatItem(line):
line = line.replace(r"= ", '')
line = line.replace(r"> ", '')
line = line.replace(r">", '')
#line = line.replace(r"!", '')
line = line.replace(r"%", r'\%')
for word in highlight:
line = line.replace(word, r"\textbf{%s}" % word)
if line.strip().startswith('* '):
i = line.index('*')
line = line[:i] + r"\emph{%s}" % line[i+2:]
if line.find('!') > -1:
i = line.index('!')
line = line[0:i] + r"\textbf{%s}" % line[i+1:]
return line
def formatCell(line):
line = formatItem(line)
if line.startswith(' '):
line = "\\hspace{12pt}" + line[2:]
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return line
# Generate a gloss paragraph.
def formatGloss(explanation):
gloss = []
explanans = explanation['explanans']
for item in explanans['top'] + explanans['core'] + explanans['base']:
gloss.append(formatItem(item))
gloss.append(r'{\sc %s}' % formatItem(explanation['relation']))
explanandum = explanation['explanandum']
for item in explanandum['top'] + explanandum['core'] + explanandum['base']:
gloss.append(formatItem(item))
return ' '.join(gloss)
# Generate a LaTeX table (this gets ugly).
def formatTable(explanation):
explanans = explanation['explanans']
explanandum = explanation['explanandum']
w = '2.5in'
s = ' \\\\\n\n '
table = [r"\begin{tabular}{p{%s}p{%s}}" % (w,w)]
#table = [r"\begin{tabular}{ll}"]
table.append(r"\multicolumn{2}{c}{%s} \\" %
formatCell(explanation['relation']))
table.append(r"""\begin{minipage*}{t}{%s}
%s
\end{minipage*} & \begin{minipage*}{t}{%s}
%s
\end{minipage*} \\ \hline""" % (
w, formatCell(explanans['top'][0]),
w, formatCell(explanandum['top'][0])
))
table.append(r"""\begin{minipage*}{t}{%s}
%s
\end{minipage*}\vspace{6pt} & \begin{minipage*}{t}{%s}
%s
\end{minipage*}\vspace{6pt} \\ \hline""" % (
w, s.join(map(formatCell, explanans['core'])),
w, s.join(map(formatCell, explanandum['core']))
))
#table.append(r"\multicolumn{2}{c}{%s -- %s} \\ \hline" %
# (explanans['type'], explanandum['type'])
#)
table.append(r"""\begin{minipage*}{t}{%s}
%s
\end{minipage*} & \begin{minipage*}{t}{%s}
%s
\end{minipage*} \\""" % (
w, s.join(map(formatCell, explanans['base'])),
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w, s.join(map(formatCell, explanandum['base']))
))
table.append(r'\end{tabular}')
return '\n'.join(table)
# Format an entire case in LaTeX for the Appendix.
def formatCase(case):
page = case['page']
# Hack to make case C pages work.
if page == '000':
page = case['article']['pages'].split('-')[0]
output = [r'\hypertarget{%s}{}\subsection*{Case %s}' % (
case['label'], case['label']
)]
output.append(r"""\begin{quote*}
%s
\autocite[%s]{%s}
\end{quote*}
""" % (case['quotation'], page, case['article']['cite_key'])
)
if 'notes' in case:
output.append('\n\\noindent %s\n' % case['notes'])
if case['success']:
output.append('\\begin{enumerate}\n')
i = 0
for exp in case['explanations']:
i += 1
output.append(r"""\item \hypertarget{%s.%i}{} %s: %s -- %s
\vspace{12pt}
%s
\begin{center}
%s
\end{center}
\vspace{12pt}
""" % (
case['label'], i,
exp['type'].capitalize(),
exp['explanans']['type'],
exp['explanandum']['type'],
formatGloss(exp),
formatTable(exp)
))
output.append('\\end{enumerate}\n')
else:
output.append('\n\\vspace{12pt}\n\\noindent Failure: %s \n' %
case['explanations'][0]['failure'])
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return u'\n'.join(output)
# Format all the cases as LaTeX.
def formatCases(cases):
output = []
for case in cases:
output.append(formatCase(case))
return u'\n\n\n'.join(output)
# Get the explanations from a case.
def getExplanations(cases):
explanations = []
for case in cases:
if case['success']:
for e in case['explanations']:
explanations.append(copy.deepcopy(e))
return explanations
# Find and count the unique phrases used to mark explanations.
def uniquePhrases(explanations):
ps = nltk.defaultdict(int)
for e in explanations:
ps[e['phrase']] += 1
phrases = []
for p in ps.keys():
if ps[p] > 1:
p = "%s (%i)" % (p, ps[p])
phrases.append(p)
return sorted(phrases)
B.10 Analysis
File: analysis.py
from __future__ import division
import os
import nltk, pylab, numpy
from utils import tabulate
from keywords import loadKeywords
from samples import sampledir
from cases import categories, parseCases
# Generate plots for a given sample.
def plotSample(sample):
cases = parseCases(os.path.join(sampledir, 'A-Sample%s.txt' % sample))
return plotCases(sample, cases)
# Generate a table for a grid of explanatory form data.
def plotTable(filename, data):
rows = []
for c1 in categories:
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fields = [c1]
for c2 in categories:
fields.append(data[c1][c2])
rows.append(tuple(fields))
return tabulate(filename,
'r|rrrrr',
['data', 'entity', 'kind', 'model', 'theory'],
'%6s & %2i & %2i & %2i & %2i & %2i',
rows
)
# Generate a visualization of a grid of explanatory form data.
def plotVisualization(filename, data):
if os.path.exists(filename):
return False
arr = numpy.array([[data[y][x] for x in categories]
for y in categories], numpy.int32)
fig = pylab.figure(figsize=(4,4))
ax = fig.add_subplot(1,1,1)
fig.subplots_adjust(left=0.20, top=0.80)
ax.matshow(arr, cmap=pylab.cm.gray_r)
rng = range(0, len(categories))
ax.set_xticks(rng)
ax.set_yticks(rng)
ax.set_xticklabels(categories, rotation='vertical', ha='center')
ax.set_yticklabels(categories, va='center')
fig.savefig(filename)
pylab.close()
return True
def storeValue(sample, name, value):
filename = "sample%s-%s.tex" % (sample, name)
f = open(filename, 'w')
f.write(str(value))
f.close()
# Store the set of results in an ugly global variable.
results = []
# Generate all sorts of information and plots for a set of cases.
def plotCases(sample, cases):
global results
# Store some values
storeValue(sample, 'total', len(cases))
successes = len([case for case in cases if case['success']])
storeValue(sample, 'successes', successes)
failures = len([case for case in cases if not case['success']])
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storeValue(sample, 'failures', failures)
# Collect some data about the sample.
data = {
'explanation': nltk.defaultdict(lambda: nltk.defaultdict(int)),
'evidence': nltk.defaultdict(lambda: nltk.defaultdict(int)),
'total': nltk.defaultdict(lambda: nltk.defaultdict(int)),
'explanation-cases': 0,
'evidence-cases': 0,
'explanation-instances': 0,
'evidence-instances': 0,
'success-instances': 0
}
for case in cases:
if not case['success']: continue
excase = 0
evcase = 0
for exp in case['explanations']:
try:
data['success-instances'] += 1
type1 = exp['type']
type2 = exp['explanans']['type']
type3 = exp['explanandum']['type']
data[type1][type2][type3] += 1
data['total'][type2][type3] += 1
data[type1 + '-instances'] += 1
if type1 == 'explanation':
excase = 1
else:
evcase = 1
except KeyError:
print exp
raise
data['explanation-cases'] += excase
data['evidence-cases'] += evcase
# Store some more data.
storeValue(sample, 'explanation-instances', data['explanation-instances'])
storeValue(sample, 'explanation-cases', data['explanation-cases'])
storeValue(sample, 'evidence-instances', data['evidence-instances'])
storeValue(sample, 'evidence-cases', data['evidence-cases'])
# Collect the data in a very large table.
results.append(
r'%s & %4i & %3i & %3i & %3i & %3.1f & %3.1f & %3.1f & %3i & %3i & %3i \\' % (
sample,
len(cases),
data['explanation-cases'],
data['evidence-cases'],
successes,
100 * data['explanation-cases'] / len(cases),
100 * data['evidence-cases'] / len(cases),
100 * successes / len(cases),
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data['explanation-instances'],
data['evidence-instances'],
data['success-instances']
))
# Plot three tables for this data.
plotTable("sample%s-explanation.tex" % sample, data['explanation'])
plotTable("sample%s-evidence.tex" % sample, data['evidence'])
plotTable("sample%s.tex" % sample, data['total'])
# Create three heatmaps for this data.
plotVisualization("sample%s-explanation.pdf" % sample, data['explanation'])
plotVisualization("sample%s-evidence.pdf" % sample, data['evidence'])
plotVisualization("sample%s.pdf" % sample, data['total'])
return cases
# Put the global results data into a file.
def plotResults(filename="results.tex"):
global results
f = open(filename, 'w')
f.write('\n'.join(results))
f.close()
# Generate a table of keyword information.
def tabulateKeywords(allCases, filename="keywords-cases.tex"):
if os.path.exists(filename):
return False
keywords, labels, counts = loadKeywords()
articles = nltk.defaultdict(lambda: nltk.defaultdict(int))
casecounts = nltk.defaultdict(int)
for case in allCases:
keyword = case['article']['science']
casecounts[keyword] += 1
articles[keyword][case['article']['doi']] += 1
articlesByKeyword = {k:len(articles[k].keys()) for k in keywords}
successes = nltk.defaultdict(int)
explanations = nltk.defaultdict(int)
evidences = nltk.defaultdict(int)
for case in allCases:
if not case['success']: continue
successes[case['article']['science']] += 1
evcase = 0
excase = 0
for exp in case['explanations']:
if exp['type'] == 'explanation': excase = 1
if exp['type'] == 'evidence': evcase = 1
explanations[case['article']['science']] += excase
evidences[case['article']['science']] += evcase
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# Store the number of successful cases.
f = open('cases-successful.tex', 'w')
f.write(str(sum([successes[k] for k in keywords])))
f.close()
portion = nltk.defaultdict(float)
for k in keywords:
if casecounts[k] == 0: continue
portion[k] = successes[k]/casecounts[k]
numberOfArticles = sum(counts[k] for k in keywords)
tabulate(filename,
'r|rrrrrrrrrr',
['\# of Articles', '\% of Articles',
'\# of Articles Sampled', r'\% of Articles Sampled',
'Sampled Cases', 'Explanation Cases', 'IBE Cases',
'Successful Cases', r'\% of Successful Cases'],
'%20s & %4i & %2.2f & %3i & %2.1f & %3i & %3i & %3i & %3i & %s',
[(
k,
counts[k],
100 * counts[k]/numberOfArticles,
articlesByKeyword[k],
100 * articlesByKeyword[k]/counts[k],
casecounts[k],
#100 * casecounts[k]/counts[k],
explanations[k],
evidences[k],
successes[k],
_formatPortion(portion[k], casecounts[k])
) for k in keywords
]
)
return True
def _formatPortion(portion, cases):
p = '%2.1f' % (100 * portion)
if cases == 0:
p = '--'
return p
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